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ilarbarb College %ihxaxp 



Bequeathed bji 

Evangelinus AposColides Sophocles 

Tuiof and ProfetBOr of Greek 









G. T. W. PATRICK, Ph.D. 

w * • 







•'■.^; -//.^ 


CiJ^ 0'*yt 

[Reprinted trora the Amebioan Journal of PSTOHOLoaY, 1888.] 

A Thesis Accbpted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 

Johns Hopkins University, 1888. 

PBE88 OF Isaac fbiedenwald, 

01 ^ioi^ze!;, 


All thoughts, all creeds, all dreams are true, 

All visions wild and strange ; 
Man is the measure of all truth 

Unto himself. All truth is change, 
All men do walk in sleep, and all 

Have faith in that they dream : 
For all things are as they seem to all. 

And all things flow like a stream. 


There is no rest, no calm, no pause. 

Nor good nor ill, nor light nor shade. 
Nor essence nor eternal laws: 

For nothing is, but all is made. 
But if I dream that all these are. 

They are to me for that I dream ; 
For all things are as they seem to all. 

And all things flow like a stream. 

Argal — this very opinion is only true 
relatively to the flowing philosophers. 



The latest writers on Heraclitus, namely, Gustav 
Teichniuller and Edjnund Pfleiderer, have thought it 
neceesary to preface their works with an apology for 
adding other monographs to the Heraclitic literature, 
already enriched by treatises from such distinguished 
men as Schleiermacher, Lassalle, Zeller, and Schuster. 
That still other study of Heraclitus, however, needs 
no apology, will be admitted when it is seen that these 
scholarly critics, instead of determining the place of 
Heraclitus in the history of philosophy, have so far 
disagreed, that while Schuster makes him out to be a 
sensationalist and empiricist, Lassalle finds that he is 
a rationalist and idealist. While to Teichmuller, his 
starting point and the key to his whole system is found 
in his physics, to Zeller it is found in his metaphysics, 
and to Pfleiderer in his religion. Heraclitus' theology 
was derived, according to Teichmuller, from Egypt ; 
according to Lassalle, from India ; according to Pfleid- 
erer, from the Greek Mysteries. The Heraclitic flux, 
according to Pfleiderer, was consequent on his abstract 
theories ; according to Teichmiiller, his abstract theo- 
ries resulted from his observation of the flux. Pfleid- 
erer says that Heraclitus was an optimist ; Gottlob 

Mayer says that he was a peBsimiat. According to 
Schuster he was a hylozoist. according to Zeller a pan- 
theist, according to Pfleiderer a panzoist, according 
to Lassalle a panlogiat. Naturally, therefore, in the 
hands of these critics, with their various theories to 
support, the remains of Heraclltus' work have suffered 
a violence of interpretation only partially excused by 
his known obscurity. No small proportion of the 
fragments, as will be seen in my introduction, have 
been taken in a diametrically opposite sense. 

Recently a contribution towards the disentanglement 
of this maze has been made by Mr. Bywater, an acute 
English scholar. His work (Heracliti Ephesii Reli- 
quiae, Oxford, 18775 is simply a complete edition of the 
now existing fragments of Heraclitus' work, together 
with the sources from which they are drawn, w^ith so 
much of the context as to make them intelligible. 

Under these circumstances I have thought that a 
translation of the fragments into English, that every 
man may read and judge for himself, would be the 
best contribution that could be made. The increasing 
interest in early Greek philosophy, and particularly in 
Heraclitus, who is the one Greek thinker most in 
accord with the thought of our century, makes such a 
translation justifiable, and the excellent and timely 
edition of the Greek text by Mr. Bywater makes it 

The translations both of the fragments and of the 
context made from the original sources, though I 


have followed the text of Bywater except in a very 
few cases, designated in the critical notes. As a 
number of the fragments are ambiguous, and several 
of them contain a play upon words, I have appended 
the entire Greek text. 

The collection of sources is wholly that of Mr. 
Bywater. In these I have made a translation, not of 
all the references, but only of those from which the 
fragment is immediately taken, adding others only in 
cases of especial interest. 

My acknowledgments are due to Dr. Basil L. Gil- 
dersleeve, of the Johns Hopkins University, for kind 
suggestions concerning the translation, and to Dr. 
G. Stanley Hall for valuable assistance in relation to 
the plan of the work. 

Baltimobe, Septembbr 1, 1888. 


Section I. — Historical and Cbitical. 


Literature 1 

Over-systemization in Philosophy 2 

Over-interpretation in Historical Criticism 3 

Exposition of Lassalle 4 

Hegel's Conception of Heraclitus 6 

Criticism of Hegel's Conception 6 

Criticism of Lassalle 9 

Exposition of Schuster 11 

Criticism of Schuster 17 

Exposition of Teichmiiller 23 

Criticism of Teichmiiller 31 

Exposition of Pfleiderer 39 

Criticism of Pfleiderer 46 

Section II. — Reconstructive. 


Can the Positions of the Critics be harmonized? 66 

Heraclitus' Starting-point . 67 

Heraclitus as a Preacher and Prophet 67 

The Content of his Message 68 

The Universal Order 60 

Strife 62 

The Unity of Opposites 63 

The Flux 66 

Cosmogony 68 

Ethics ^9 

Optimism 71 



Cause of the Present Interest in Heraclitus 72 

Passion for Origins 72 

Greek Objectivity 73 

Heraclitic Ideas 74 

Relation to Socrates and Plato 75 

Socrates 76 

Birth of Self -consciousness 77 

Loss of Love of Beauty 78 

Rise of Transcendentalism 79 

Platonic Dualism 80 

Return to Heraclitus 82 

Defeat of Heraclitus 83 

Translation op thb Fragments 84-114 

Critical Notbs 115-123 

Greek Text 124-131 

Section I.— Historical and Critical. 

Modern Heraclitic literature belongs wholly to the 
present century. The most important works are the 
following : — Schleiermacher ; Herakleitos, der Dunkle 
von Ephesos, in Wolf and Buttmann's Museum der 
Alterthumswissenschaft, Vol. I, 1807, pp. 313-S33, and 
in Schleiermacher' 8 Sammt. Werke, Abth, III, Vol. 3, 
Berlin, 1838, pp. 1-146 ;— Jak. Bemays : Heraclitea, 
Bonn, 1848 ; Heraklitische Studien, in the Rhein. Mus., 
new series, VII, pp. 90-llC, 1850; Neue Bruchstiicke 
des Heraklit, ibid. IX, pp. 341-2G9, 1854; Die Hera- 
klitischen Briefe, Berlin, 1869 ;— Ferd. Laesalle : Die 
Philosophie Herakleitos dee Dunkeln von Ephesoe, 3 
vols., Berlin, 1858 ; — Paul Schuster : Heraklit von 
EphesuB, in Actis soc. phil. Lips. ed. Fr. Ritseheliue, 
1873, III, 1-397 ;— Teichmiiller, Neue Stud. z. Gesch. der 
Begriffe, Heft I, Gotha, 187C, and II, 1878 ;— Bywater : 
Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, Oxford, 1877 ; — Edmund 
Pfleiderer : Die Philosophie dea Heraklit von Ephesus 
im Lichte der Mysterienidee, Berlin, 1886 ; — Eduard 
Zeller : Die Philosophie der Qriechen, Bd. I, pp. 566-677. 

There may be mentioned also the following addi- 
tional writings whicli have been consulted in the 
preparation of these pages : — Gottlob Mayer : Heraklit 
von Ephesus und Arthur Schopenhauer, Heidelberg, 
1886 ; Campbell : Theaetetua of Plato, Appendix A, 
Oxford, 1883 ; A. W. Benn : The Greek PhUosophers, 
London, 1883. 


After the introductory collection and arrangement 
of the Heraclitic fragments by Schleiermacher, and 
the scholarly discriminative work and additions of 
Bernays, four attempts have been made successively 
by Lassalle, Schuster, Teichrauller, and Pfleiderer, to 
reconstruct or interpret the philosophical system of 
Heraclitus. The positions taken and the results 
arrived at by these eminent scholars and critics are 
largely, if not wholly, different and discordant. A 
brief statement of their several positions will be our 
best introduction to the study of Heraclitus at first 
hand, and at the same time will offer us incidentally 
some striking examples of prevalent methods of his- 
toric criticism. 

One of the greatest evils in circles of philosophical 
and religious thought has always been the evil of over- 
systemization. It is classification, or the scientific 
method, carried too far. It is the tendency to arrange 
under any outlined system or theory, more facts than 
it will properly include. It is the temptation, in a 
word, to classify according to resemblances which are 
too faint or fanciful. In the field of historic criticism 
this evil takes the form of over-interpretation. Just 
as in daily life we interpret every sense perception 
according to our own mental forms, so we tend to read 
our own thoughts into every saying of the ancients, 
and then proceed to use these, often without dis- 
honesty, to support our favorite modem systems. The 
use of sacred writings will naturally occur to every one 
as the most striking illustration of this over-interpre- 
tation. Especially in the exegesis of the Bible has this 
prostitution of ancient writings to every man's religious 
views been long since recognized and condemned, and 
if most recently this tendency has been largely cor- 


rected in religious circles, it is all the more deplorable, 
in phiioHophical criticiBm, to find it still flourishing. 
Unfortunately, this vice continues, and it appears 
nowhere more plainly than in the interpretation of 
Greek philosophy. There is a great temptation to 
modem writers to use the Greek philosophers as props 
to support their own systems — a temptation to inter- 
pret them arbitrarily, to look down upon them patron- 
izingly, as it were, showing that what they meant was 
this or that modern thought, having only not learned 
to express themselves as well as we have. Among his- 
torians of philosophy this appears as a one-sidedness, 
so that it is commonly necessary in reading a history 
of philosophy to make a correction for the author's 
" personal equation." The histories of Schwegler and 
of Lewes are examples — the one biased by Hegel- 
ianism, the other by Positivism. Undoubtedly, a cer- 
tain personal equation is unavoidable, and it is as 
impossible for an interpreter of Greek philosophy to 
make himself wholly Greek as it is unfair to represent 
the ancient thinker as wholly German or English. 
But when this becomes complete one-sidedness, or 
blindness to all but one series of an author's thoughts, 
or a willful or even unintentional perversion of his 
words, vigorous remonstrance is called for. 

This attempt tg fully u nderstan d the ancients, to 
make them speak in the phraseology of some modem 
school, must be distinguished from the recent move- 
ment, represented by Prof, Lagarde and others, in 
interpreting historic thought and historic events 
psychologically. This movement is certainly legiti- 
mate, based as it is on the truth of the similarity of 
constitution of all human minds, and the probability 
that underlying all representative historic creeds are 
great related if not identical thoughts. Even here, of 


course, the attempt to express these thoughts in the set 
phrases of any one people is inadequate. 

We proceed, then, to look at some of the work done 
upon the philosophy of Heraclitus. Here we shall not 
attempt any examination of Zeller's exposition, since 
his work, though it is perhaps the very best that has 
been done in this field, is critical rather than recon- 
structive, and like his whole history of Greek philos- 
ophy, is a marvel of candor as well as of immense 
research. Even Zeller, however, has not wholly 
escaped the charge of one-sidedness, since Benn, in the 
preface to his work on the Greek philosophers, has 
accused him of never having outgrown the semi-Hege- 
lian prejudice of his youths 

Lassalle, in two ponderous volumes noted above 
{page 1), made the first and most elaborate attempt 
to reconstruct the system of the Ephesian philosopher. 
His work exhibits immense labor and study, and 
extended research in the discovery of new fragments 
and of ancient testimony, together with some acuteness 
in their use. Lassalle has a very distinct view of the 
philosophy of Heraclitus. But it is not an original 
view. It is, in fact, nothing but an expansion of the 
short account of Heraclitus in Hegel's History of Phil- 
osophy, although Lassalle makes no mention of him, 
except to quote upon his title-page Hegel's well-known 
motto, " Es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht 
in meine Logik aufgenommen." Hegel's conception 
of Heraclitus is, in a word, as follows : Heraclitus' 
Absolute was the unity of being and non-being. His 
whole system was an expansion of the speculative 
thought of the principle of pure becoming. He appre- 
hended, and was the first to apprehend, the Absolute 


as a process, as the unity of oppositea, as dialectic 
itself. His great contribution was the speculative 
transition from the being of the Eleatics to the idea of 
becoming. Now how does Hegel support this position ? 
There is in his Logic but one passage referring to Hera- 
clituB. There he says, " Glancing at the principle of the 
Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes on to say. ' Beingno more 
is than non-being ' {oudii' fia^Xou rb on zou fiij outoi: i<TTi), 
a statement expressing the negative nature of abstract 
being and its identity with non-being" (Wallace, 
The Logic of Hegel, p. 144 ; cp. Science of Logic, 
Hegel's Werke, Vol. 3, p. SO). Hegel omits, in the 
Logic, to give the reference to the above quotation, 
but in his History of Philosophy (Werke, Vol. 13, p. 
332) he quotes the same passage with the reference. 
It is to Aristotle, Metaph. i. 4. We turn to the same 
and find that it is a passage which Aristotle quotes 
from the Atomists, Democritus and Leucippus, and 
Hlat it has not the slightest reference to Heraclitus, 
who, indeed, is not mentioned in the same chapter. 
This is rather discouraging, but the account in the 
History of Philosophy, to which we now turn, is 
scarcely less so. There Hegel begins his exposition 
of Heraclitus as follow^s : 

"1, Das allgemeine Princip. Dieser kiihne Geist 
(Heraclitus) hat zuerst das tiefe Wort gesagt, ' Das 
Seyn ist nicht mehr ala das Nichtseyn,' es ist ebenso 
wenig, Oder, ' Seyn imd Nichts sey daaselbe,' das 
Wesen sey die Veranderung " (Gesch. d, Phil. Vol, 13, 
p. 332). 

Now it happens that Heraclitus said nothing of the 
kind. As references Hegel gives Aristotle, Meta- 
phys. i. 4; iv. 7; iv, 3. The first passage, as we have 
already seen, is from the Atomists. The secopd turns 
out upon examination to be simply the expression. 


" All things are and are not " {xdura ehat xai /nj dvai), 
and the third is a statement of Aristotle that some 
people supposed Heraclitus to have said that the same 
thing could both be and not be the same. Moreover, 
neither of these passages is Heraclitic in form, and 
they are not even mentioned in Bywater's edition. 
The only expression of Heraclitus that resembles in 
form the above passage from Aristotle is that of frag. 
81, " Into the same river we step and we do not step. 
We are and wo are not," The over-interpretation by 
which this simple passage, expressing incessant phys- 
ical change, is transformed into the logical principle 
of Hegel, "Das Seyn ist nicht mehr als das Nicht- 
seyn," " Seyn und Nicbts sey dasselbe," is audacious 
at least. Furthermore, w^e may say here in passing, 
that neither the expressions to m, loj on, nor even t6 
Yip^6fiBi/ov, occur in any genuine saying of Heraclitus ; 
although if they did occur, it would be easy to show 
that they could not mean at all what Hegel meant by 
being, non-being, and becoming. Even the Eleatic 
Being was not at all the same with that of Hegel, but 
was finite, spherical, and something very much like 
that which we should call material. But Heraclitus, 
who indeed preceded Parmenides, said nothing of 
being nor of non-being, nor did he speak of becoming 
in the abstract, although the trustful reader of Hegel, 
Lassalle, or Ferrier, might well suppose he spoke of 
nothing else. That which these writers mistook for 
becoming was, as we shall see later, only physical 
change. With the loss of this corner-stone, the Hera- 
clitic support of the Hegelian Logic fails, and Hegel's 
boast that there was no sentence of Heraclitus that 
his Logic had not taken up becomes rather ludicrous, 
especially if one will read through the remains of 


Heraclitua' work on Nature and search for his rich 
and varied thoughts in the Logic of Hegel. 

Returning now to Lassalle, the above principles are 
carried out more in detail as follows : The chief point 
in the philosophy of Heraclitus is that here first the 
formal notion of the speculative idea in general was 
grasped. With him first emerged the conception of 
pure thought defecated of the sensuous. His ground 
principle was the dialectical opposition of being and 
non-being. The kernel and whole depth of his phil- 
osophy may be expressed in the one sentence, " Only 
non-being is" (Lassalle, Vol. 1, p. 35). The unity of 
being and nou-being is a unity of process {processi- 
rende Einheit). It is the unity of opposites, the idea of 
becoming, the divine law, the yvil>iiij of the determining 
God (Id. Vol. 1, p. 34). Fire, strife, peace, time, neces- 
sity, harmony, the way up and down, the flux, justice, 
fate, Logos, are all different terms for this one idea 
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 57). Hence arises Heraclitus' obscurity. 
It is not a mere grammatical obscurity, as Schleier- 
macher, following Aristotle {Rhet. iii, 6, p. 1407, b. 14) 
thought ; nor is it a willful obscurity, but it arises 
from the very nature of his great thought, which could 
not be enunciated in exact terms, but could only be 
suggested by such words as fire, time, etc., and so he 
labored on with one new symbol after another, vainly 
trying to express himself. 

The Heraclitic fire is a " metaphysical abstraction " 
— a pure process, " whose existence is pure self -annull- 
ing (sich aufheben), whose being is pure self-consump- 
[ tion {sich selbst verzehren) " (Lassalle, Vol. 1, p. 18). 

Most clearly, however, is the great thought of Hera- 
clitus shown in " the way up and down," which does 
not involve change of place, but only a logical process. 


It is " nothing else " than the change from being into 
non-being and the reverse. The way down is transi- 
tion into being ; the way up is the return into the pure 
and free negativity of non-being, motion in the undis- 
turbed ideal harmony (Id. Vol. 3, p. 241 ff.). 

God, in his adequate form, is " nothing else " than 
pure negativity, the pure unity of process of opposites. 
Nature is only the corporeal manifestation of the law 
of the identity of opposites. It owes its existence to 
privation (ddixia'), that is, to the injustice which pure 
becoming suffers when it becomes being (Id. Vol. 1, 
p. 138). 

The duadij/iiatTii; of Heraclitus is not any vapor or sen- 
sible exhalation, but is " nothing else " than the way 
up, or the ix:Tup(oaii:, that is, the cessation of the sen- 
sible and the particular and the assumption of the real 
universal becoming. 'Ai'ad'J/uto/iiuai, Lassalle says, 
should be translated " processirend " (Id. Vol. 1, p. 144). 

The Heraelitic flux is the same as the way up and 
down. It is the dialectic of spacial being ; it is the 
unity of being and non-being as spacial ; it is the here 
which is not here. The jrepii^ou of Heraclitus is not 
anything physical or spacial, but "the universal real 
process of becoming," which works through the Logos 
or law of thought (Id. Vol. 1, p. 306). 

The Heraelitic Logos is the pure intelligible logical 
law of the identity in process (die processirende Iden- 
titiit) of being and non-being. It is "nothing else" 
than the law of opposites and the change into the same 
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 327 ; Vol. 3, p. 365). 

The substance of the soul is identical with the sub- 
stance of nature. It is pure becoming which has in- 
corporated itself, embraced the way down. The dry 
or fiery soul is better than the moist because moisture 



* nothing else " than a symbol of the downward 
way. The soul that is moist has descended out of its 
pure self- annulling movement or negativity in process, 
into the sphere of the particular and determinate 
(Id. Vol. 1, pp. 180, 192). 

Heraclitus, in his desperate labor to express this idea, 
enters the sphere of religion. Dionysus and Hades 
are the same, he says {see frag. 127). That is, says 
Lassalle, Dionysus, the god of generation which repre- 
sents the descent of pure non-being into being, is iden- 
tical with Hades, the god of death ; and this fragment, 
which is a polemic against Dionysus, is really a 
polemic against being, which is inferior to non-being 
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 208). 

Knowledge consists in the recognition in each parti- 
cular thing of the two opposites which constitute its 
nature (Id. Vol. 2, p. 372). Of ethics, the formal prin- 
ciple is self-realization or self-representation. It is the 
realization of what we are in ourselves or according 
to our inner nature. The ideal is separation from the 
sensible and particular and the realization of the uni- 
versal (Id. Vol. 2, p. 428 ff.\ 

Such in brief outline is what Ferdinand Lassalle 
finds in Horaclitus' book On Nature. As an exposition 
of Hemclitus it is not worth the space we have given 
it, ot'any space, in fact ; but as one of the most beau- 
tiful illustrations of over-systemization, it is extremely 
■vayuable. Any formal refutation of his conception of 
iferaclitus is unnecessary, for almost the whole of it is 
without any foundation whatever. The expositions 
which are to follow, or even a slight reading of the 
f fragments themselves, will sufficiently show how thor- 
■ oughly fantastic and arbitrary are his interpretations. 
' Lassalle seems to have been misled partly by Hegel's 



mismterpretation of the passages from Aristotle not- 
iced above, and partly by the principle of opposition 
which runs through a nmnbor of the sayings of Hera- 
clitus — an opposition which, as we shall see later, was 
wholly physical, and far more simple than the abstruse 
logical meaning given it by Lassalle. This German 
scholar had no power or no wish to put himself in the 
attitude of the Greek mind, which was as widely dif- 
ferent from his as possible. It w^aa a mistake for this 
disciple of pure thought, bred in the stifling atmosphere 
of a nineteenth century Hegelian lecture-room, and 
powerless to transport himself out of it even in thought, 
to attempt to interpret the sentences of an ingenuous 
lover of Nature, who, five centuries before the Chris- 
tian era, lived and moved in the free air of Ephesus. 
In this we do not mean to say that the philosophy of 
Heraclitus was purely physical rather than metaphys- 
ical, for we shall see that such was not the case, but 
primitive pre-Socratic metaphysics and the panlogism 
of Lassalle are as wide asunder as the poles. On this 
point, Benn, in the work already referred to, well says, 
" The Greek pbilosopherB-from Thales to Democritus 
did not even suspect the existence of those ethical and 
dialectical problems which long constituted the sole 
object of philosophical discussion " (Vol. 1,'p. 4). 

Those who wish to trace Lassalle's errors f{irther 
may compare, on his mistaken conception of the Mera- 
clitic fire, Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 591, 3'; Grote : Plato, Vol. 
1, p. 33, note. On "the way up and down," com- 
pare Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 619, 1. On the fiux, compa*? ' 
Schuster, p. 201 ; Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 577, 1. \ 

The characterization of Lassalle's book as a whole 



is, that it is a striking example of great philosophic 
waste, turning as he does the rich and suggestive phil- 
osophy of the Ephesian into a wretched mouthful of 
Hegelian phrases. His citation of so many diverse 
sentences of Heraclitus, drawn from theology, ethics, 
nature, and man, and his discovery in all of them of his 
single ever-recurring notion of "die reine umschlag- 
ende Identitat von Sein und Nichtsein," impresses us 
with the power which the tyranny of a single idea may 
have to so blur one's vision as to cause him to see that 
idea reflected in everything that is presented. It is 
not true, as Lassalle's motto goes, that there is no sen- 
tence of Heraclitus that Hegel has not incorporated in 
his Logic, but it is not far from the truth that there is 
no sentence of Heraclitus which Hegel and Lassalle 
have not either willfully or ignorantly perverted. 


"We will mention now the work of Paul Schuster 
(see above, p, 1). Schuster approaches the problem of 
the interpretation of Heraclitus with the advantage of 
a rich philological and historical knowledge. He suf- 
fers a disadvantage, however, in the magnitude of the 
task he undertakes, which is nothing less than the 
reconstruction of the order and plan of the book of 
Heraclitus itself. The interpretation of the fragments, 
he justly observes, depends upon the connection in 
which they occurred. It will be necessary, therefore, 
if we will grasp their true sense, to recover the plan of 
the original writing. Such a reconstruction Schuster 
holds to be possible, since by the law of selection, the 
fragments which have been preserved to us must have 
been the central thoughts of the original work. Con- 
trary to Schleiermacher, he accepts as trustworthy the 






statement of Diogenes (Diog. Laert. ix. 5) that the 
book of Heraclitus was divided into three parts or 
Logoi, the first concerning "the all," the second poli- 
tical, the third theological. On this basis Schuster 
arranges the fragments, freely translated or rather 
paraphrased, and interspaced with the restored pro- 
gress of thought. The well known obscurity of our 
philosopher, Schuster, contrary to all other critics ex- 
cept Teichmiiller, Bupposes to have been partly, at 
least, intentional, as a precaution against persecution 
for atheism.' 

The distinctive feature of Schuster's conception of 
Heraclitus is that he was not a distruster of the senses, 
but on th e contrary the first philosopher who dared 
_ tD base all knowledge upon sense experienc e. He was 
therefore the first of experimental philosophers. To 
this idea the introduction of Heraclitus' book was 
devoted. The majority of people, says the Ephesiau, 
have little interest in that which immediately sur- 
rounds them, nor do they think to seek for know^Iedge 
by investigation of that with which they daily come 
in contact (Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 2, p. 432 ; M. 
Aurelius iv. 4(5; cp. frags. 5, 93). Nevertheless, that 
which surrounds us is the source of knowledge. 
Nature is not irrational and dumb, but is an ever 
living Voice plainly revealing the law of the world. 
This Voice of Nature is the Heraclitic Logos, The 
thought which Heraclitus utters in the passage stand- 
ing at the beginning of his book (frag, 3, Hippolytus, 
Bel haer. ix. 9 ; cp. Aristotle, Rhet, iii. 5, p. 1407, b. 14) 
is no other than that which since the Renaissance has 

' Compare Plutarch. Pvtli. orac. 21, p. 404 ; =■ frag. 11 ; Clement of 
Alex. Strom. V. 13, p. 0(19 ; = trag. lid. The numbers refer not to 
Schuster's minnbering of the fragments, but to that of the preBBnt 
work, which is the numeration of Bywater. 



inspired natural science and its accompanying specu- 
lation, namely, that truth is to be won by observation 
of the visible world. But the people, he complains, 
despise the revelation which Nature offers us with 
audible voice. Why, asks Heraclitus (Hippols'tus, Ref . 
haer. ix. 9 ; cp. frag. 47), should an invisible harmony 
be better than a visible ? It is not better, but, on the 
contrary, whatever is the object of seeing, hearing, or 
investigation, that I particularly honor (idem ix. 10 ; 
cp. frag. 13). Men, therefore, must trust their eyes 
(Polybius, xii. 27; cp. frag. 15) and not make reckless 
guesses concerning the weightiest things {Diog. Laert. 
ix. 73 ; cp. frag. 48). That HeracKtus' theory of knowl- 
edge, therefore, based it upon sense perception and 
reflection thereupon, is shown, continues Schuster, 
not only by the above passages, but also by the fact 
that the exaggerated form of the theory held by 
Protagoras (cp. Plato's Theaetetus) must necessarily 
have had its source in Heraclitus, his master. None 
the less is this shown also by Parmenides' attack on 
the empirical theory of knowledge (Sextus Empir, vii, 
3), which could have been aimed only at the philoso- 
pher of Ephesus (Schuster, pp. 7 and 13-43). 

Turning now from the theory of knowledge to its 
results, the first law which the observation of Nature 
teaches us is the law of e ternal and recurrent mo- 
tion [ndura y^tafiu xa't ouHhi' fikvu, I'laio, Crat. pTloS A). 
'rhe .starting point and central position of our philoso- 
pher we must find in this recurrent motion, rather 
than in the primitive lire which itself held a subordi- 
nate place in the system. But the Heraclitic motion 
was not conceived as any absolute molecular change 
in the modem sense, nor yet as that abs olu te inst a- 
bility w hich appeared in the nihilism of the later 



Heracliteans. It was rather conceived in a simpler 
wa^ y, as a general law that evervtbipg. comes to an end 
and there is nothing permaj ieDt. Under this was 
included : 1) spacial motion, as of the flowing river; 
3) qualitative change, as in the human body ; 3) a 
kind of periodicity which brings everything under its 
dominion. The last was the most emphasized. Birth 
and death are universal; nothing escapes this fate. 
There is no fixed or unmoved being above or outside 
the shifting world, no divine heavenly existence that 
does not change, but all is involved in the same 
perpetual ebb and flow, rise and fall, life and death 
(Schuster, p. 81 ff.). 

But this life and death of the universe is literal ^jtft 
figurativ e. The world itself is a great living organism 
subject to the same alternation of elemental fire, air, 
and water. This thoroughgoing hylozoism which 
Schuster attributes to Heraclitus, he bases principally 
on the writing de diaeta of Pseudo-Hippocrates, who, 
he believes, made a free use of the work of Heraclitus, 
if he did not directly plagiarize from him. Comparing 
this writing (particularly the passage, c. 10, p. G38) 
with Plato's Timaeus (p. 40 A, also drawn from Hera- 
clitus), he ventures to reconstruct the original as 
follows: "Everything passes away and nothing per- 
sists. So it is with the river, and so with mortal 
beings ; in whom continually fire dies in the birth of 
air, and air in the birth of water. So also with the 
divine heavenly existence, which is subject to the 
same process, for we are in reality only an imitation 
of that and of the whole world ; as it happens w^ith 
that so it must happen with us, and inversely we may 
judge of that by ourselves " (Schuster, p. 118), 

The life principle of the universe, as of the human 


organism, is flre. This fire is everywhere present, so 
that "everything ia full of gods and souls" (Diog. 
Laert, ix, 7). The life of the body is sustained hy the 
breath which inhales the dry vapors kindred to flre. 
At night, when the sun is extinguished and the world 
becomes unconscious, we inhale the dark wet vapors 
and sink into death-like sleep (Schuster, p. 135). 

The sun, which is new every day, changes at night 
into the surrounding air and then into the water of the 
sea. The sea produces the daily sun, as it is the source 
of all earthly phenomena. On a large scale this three- 
fold change takes place with the universe, which mil 
ultimately be consumed in fire, again to become sea 
and cosmos. This is " the way up and down " — not a 
circular movement of the elements within the cosmos 
(Zeller), but the periodicity of the world itself. The 
way up and the way down relate only to the cosmogony. 
The latter is the creation of the world by condensation 
of flre into water, then earth ; the former is the reverse 
process of vaporization (Id. p. 169). 

This law or order is not dependent upon any divine 
purposeful will, hut all is ruled by an inherent neces- 
sary "fate," The elemental fire carries within itself 
the tendency toward change, and thus pursuing the 
way down, it enters the " strife " and war of opposites 
which condition the birth of the world (Scaxoaitr^mi;), 
and experience that hunger {-^pr^aiioaitv^ which arises 
in a state where life is dependent upon nourishment, 
and where satiety (xopo^) is only again found when, in 
pursuit of the way up, opposites are annulled, and 
" unity " and " peace " again emerge in the pure 
original fire {ixrzdpwffc^). This impulse of Nature 
towards change is conceived now as "destiny," 
"force," "necessity," "justice," or, when exhibited , 



in definite forms of time and matter, as "intelligence" 

(Id. p. ISa, 194 ff.). 

The Heraclitic harmony of opposites, as of the bow 
and the lyre, is a pu rely physical harmony. It is 
simply the operation of the strife ot" opposite forces, hy 
"which motion within an organism, at the point where 
if further continued it would endanger the whole, is 
balanced and caused to return within the limits of a 
determined amplitude (Id. p. 330 ff.). 

The identity of opposites means only that very dif- 
ferent properties may unite in the same physical thing, 
either by simultaneous comparison with different 
things or successive comparison with a changeable 
thmg (Id. pp. 23G, 243). 

The second or political section of Heraclitus' work 
treated of arts, ethics, society, and politics. It aimed 
to show how human arts are imitations of Nature, and 
how organized life, as in the universe and the indi- 
vidual, so in the state, is the secret of unity in 
variety. The central thought was the analogy existing 
between man and the universe, between the microcosm 
and the macrocosm, from which it results that the 
true ethical principle lies in imitation of Nature, and 
that law is founded on early customs which sprang 
from Nature (Id. p. 310 ff.). 

The third or theological section was mainly devoted to 
showing that the names of things are designations of 
their essence. That Heraclitus himself, not merely his 
followers, held the ifuast dfidorr^^ di/o/idrtuv, and used 
etymologies as proofs of the nature of things, Schuster 
believes is both consistent with his philosophy and 
conclusively proved by Plato's Cratylus. Primitive 
men named things from the language which Nature 
spoke to them ; names, therefore, give us the truth of 



things. Etymologies of the names of the gods was the 
proof first brought forward, as in Plato's Cratylus ; 
hence the name of this section of the work. To show 
this connection of names and things was to prove the 
intimate connection of man with Nature, and so to lead 
to the conclusion that all knowledge is based on 
experience, which, indeed, was the end he had in 
view {Id. p. 31? ff.). 

It is not our purpose to criticize in detail Schuster's 
conception of Heraclitus. Much of it will commend 
itself to the careful student of the remains, particu- 
larly that which relates to the Heraclitic flux and its 
relation to the primitive fire. Suggestive, also, if not ^^ — ^ 
unimpeachable, is his conception of the relation of the \ 

microcosm to the macrocosm, and of the harmony and I 

identity of opposites. In his exposition of these / 

doctrines, Schuster has rendered valuable serviGa.__— ^ ^| 
We can by no means, however, allow thus tentatively 
to pass, Schuster's conception of Heraclitus as a purely 
empirical philosopher. Before noticing this, a word 
needs to be said in regard to Schuster's method as a 
whole. As to the latter, the very extent of the task 
proposed made over-systemization inevitable. In 
criticism of Schuster's attempt, Zeller has well said 
that with the extant material of Herachtus' book, the 
recovery of its plan is impossible (Vol, 1, p. 570, note). 
Such a plan of reconstruction as that which Schuster 
undertakes, demands the power not only to penetrate 
the sense of every fragment, but also so to read the mind 
of the author as to be able to restore that of the large 
absent portions. The small number and enigmatical 
character of the fragments which are extant, together 
with the contradictory character of ancient testimony 
to Heraclitus, makes such a task extremely hazardous. 



It can be carried through only by the help of "unlim- 
ited conjecture." Such conjecture Schuster has used 
extensively. The necessity of carrying through his 
plan has led him to find in some passages more mean- 
ing than they will justly bear, while his apparently 
preconceived notion as to the wholly empirical charac- 
ter of the system has led him to distort the meaning 
of many sentences. We shall see examples of this 
presently. Incidentally, his method may be illustrated 
by his connection and use of the two passages: 
av^pilino'jz /iSuit dnodawbrax, S.ffca obx ib^ourac oiirik Soxiauat 
(Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 630 ; cp. frag. 122), 
and a? timyai oajifauzat xad' ^St^i- (Plutarch, de Fac. in 
orbe Inn. 38, p. 943 ; cp. frag. 38). Schuster conjectures 
that these passages came together in the original work, 
and he renders and interprets them as follows : " There 
awaits men in death what they neither hope nor 
believe," namely, rest and the joy of a sleep-like con- 
dition (!), so that even instinctively "souls scent out 
death," desiring to obtain it (Schuster, p. 190). Not to 
Bpeak of the forced translation of the latter fragment, 
only the most vivid imagination would think of using 
these passages in this way, especially as Clement 
himself, in his use of the first passage, refers it to the 
punishments which happen to men after death (see 
below, frags. 132 and 124, sources), and Plutarch, in 
respect to the second, uses it as proof that souls in 
Hades are nourished by vapors (see below, frag. 38, 
sources). But Schuster's conception of Heraclitus did 
not admit of belief in a distinct life after death, and it 
was necessary to make these passages fit in with the 
plan. The attempt to weave the fragments into a con- 
nected whole, and their division into the three Logoi, 
may be regarded on the whole as a decided failure. 



Schuster finds only thirteen fragments for the con- 
cluding theological section, although our knowledge 
of Heraclitus and his times would rather indicate, as 
indeed Teichmiiller thinks probable, that the theo- 
logical section was the principal portion of the book. 

Turning now to the theory of knowledge, according 
to Schuster, as we have seen, Heraclitus is an empiri- 
cist and sensationalist and knows no world but the 
visible. With this conclusion we cannot agree. Schus- 
ter's argument that this doctrine must have arisen with 
Heraclitus since it was held by Protagoras, his disciple, ■ 
has little weight. The order of development was rather 
that pointed out by Plato himself in the Theaetetus 
(p. 151 ff,), namely, that the sensational theory of 
knowledge was the outcome of the Protagorean doc- 
trine that man is the measure of all things, and that 
this in turn grew out of the Heraclitic flux. No doubt 
the sensational theory was implied by the Sophists, 
but it was incipient with them and not yet formulated. 
Much less can it be attributed to Heraclitus, whose 
contribution to the theory began and ended with the 
eternal flux. A sensational theory of knowledge, it is 
quite true, was likely to be an outcome of the Ephe- 
sian's philosophy, but he did not himself proceed thus 
far. The question, theoretically considered, was be- 
yond his time. There are passages which indicate 
that he held, inconsistently it may be, quite the oppo- 
site doctrine. " Eyes and ears," he says, " are bad 
"witnesses to men having rude souls" (Sextus Emp. 
adv. Math. vii. 12G ;=frag. 4 ; cp. frags. 3, 5, G, 19, etc., 
and below (p. 50). The passage which offers Schuster 
the strongest support for his sensationalism is that 
noted above (p. 13) from Hippolytus, "Whatever con- 
cerns seeing, hearing and learning {fiddr^ai^, Schuster 



translates " Erforschung "), I particularly honor " 
(frag. 13), Adopting the simplest and most natural 
meaning of this passage, it has no bearing on any 
theory of knowledge, but means merely, as Pfleiderer 
points out (Heraklit,p. 64, note), that Heraclitus prefers 
the pleasures of the higher senses, as of seeing, hearing, 
and the knowledge acquired thereby, to the sensual 
pleasures of the lower senses which the masses pursue, 
If, however, Schuster will take it in a theoretical 
sense, then it comes into conflict with the other passage, 
"The hidden harmony is better than the visible." The 
contradiction is foreseen by Schuster, who dehberately 
changes the latter into a question (see above, p. 13), 
without a shadow of right, as may be seen by reference 
to the context in Hippolytus (see below, frag. 47}, who 
expressly states that the two passages seem to conflict. 
Further support for his interpretation Schuster seeks 
in the following passage from Hippolytus : 

To\> Sk ?.6yoij tou3' iouroz ahi d^uvBvoi j-lj^uvzaf4i^8pt07zoe 
xai T^jjoadsv ij axoTjaae xa'i djco'jtra'uzE^ zd TrfKozou, fcuoiiivmu 
yap TtduToiii xaza rbv Xoyon Ttii'^e djislpoiai ioixam TrsiptufiEi/oi 
xai iTziiov xai i/jyaii' Toiouriwii bxoiaiv iyui 3ir/fsij/iat,.3caipdaiu 
StaoTOf xara ip'jacu xai ippd^iuu oxai; Ij^a (Ref . haer, ix. 
9 ; = frag. 3), 

This is the passage of which Schuster says that if 
Heraclitus had written nothing more it would have 
given him a place of honor in philosophy, for here for 
the first time appeared the thought that has inspired 
speculation and modern science since the Renaissance, 
that truth is to be sought in the observation of Nature. 
But we are unable to find here any such meaning. 
The sense of the passage depends upon the sense of 
Logos. Of course, if Schuster is free to translate this 
word in any way he chooses, he can get from the pas- 



sage almost any meaning. He chooses to render it 
the Voice of Nature or tlie Speech of the visible world. 
In this he is not supported by any other critics. By 
ancient commentators of Heraclitus the Logos was 
understood as Reason, and in this general sense it is 
taken by modem commentators including Heinze, 
Zeller, Teichmiiller, and Pfleiderer, although more 
specifically they see that, in harmony with the whole 
Heraclitic philosophy, it is to be taken as Reason 
immanent in the world as Order or Law. Schuster 
objects that Logos could not mean Reason, since before 
the time of Heraclitus it had never been so used, and 
no author would venture to introduce at the very 
beginning of his work words with new meanings. But 
precisely the same objection applies to its meaning the 
Speech of Nature, for the whole point in Schuster's 
exposition is that this was an original idea with 
Heraclitus. If the Logos is conceived as Order, this 
objection is met, since this meaning is given in the 
derivation of the word. Moreover, if Schuster could 
show that the word meant " speech " or " discourse," 
then the discourse referred to must have been not that 
of Nature but of the author himself. Finally, if we 
adopt Reason as the meaning of Logos here, the 
whole passage, so far from supporting, directly refutes 
Schuster's sensational theory of knowledge. Another 
argument for the empiricism of Heraclitus, Schuster 
seeks in his denunciation of the people for their failure 
to interest themselves in acquiring knowledge by 
empirical investigation of the things that surround 
them, which he bases on a couple of passages from 
Clement and M. Aurelius fsee above, p. 12). Heraclitus, 
in fact, said nothing of the kind; but Schuster, by 
conjectural reconstruction of the text and an arbitrary 



translation, extracts a theoretical meaning from simple 
sentences which no one who had not a preconceived 
theory to support would ever imagine to mean more 
than a reproach upon the masses for their superficiality 
and neglect of interest in a deeper knowledge of the 
world {see Schuster, p. 17, and cp. frags. 5, 93). What 
Heraclitua' theory of knowledge really was we shall 
see more fully in the examination of Pfleiderer's posi- 
tion later. Here it is sufficient to add that, whatever 
empirical tendency his philosophy may have had, any 
such positive doctrine as that which Schuster ascribes 
to him was far beyond the time of Heraclitua. 

Schiister's interpretation of the Heraclitic jipr^irftoaui^ 
and M/wf is also open to criticism, Zeller, indeed, has 
given a similar explanation of these words (Vol. 1, p. 
641}, but Pfleiderer has understood them differently 
(p. 176). From Heraclitus himself there remains only 
the two above words (frag. 24), Hippolytus (Ref. haer. 
ix. 10, cp. frag. a4, sources) says that the arrangement 
of the world {diaxorr/ir^aii;'), Heraclitus called " crav- 
ing" {j(f)j/a/ioaui/7}), and the conflagration of the world 
{IxKupaiaez) he called " satiety " {xoiioz). Schuster, 
therefore, understanding by Staxoafojai:;, not the process 
of world-building, that is, the passing of the homoge- 
neous original fire into the manifold of divided exist- 
ence, but the completed manifold world itself or the 
xofffto:;, interprets the " craving " or hunger as belong- 
ing to the present differentiated world, which hxmgers, 
as it were, to get back into the state of original fire or 
satietVj^^The testimony is too meagre to say that this 
1 not a possible interpretation, but it seems to be 
wrong. For Schuster admits, as of course he must, 
that the original fire carries within itself an impulse 
\ to change and develop into a manifold world. But 



this impulBe to change is hardly consistent with a 
state of perfect " satiety," If now we take dtaxbajoiatz 
in its primary signification denoting the action or pro- 
cess of arranging, then craving becomes the designa- 
tion of the world-building process itself. Craving then 
is nothing but the original impulse to evolve itself, 
contained in the primitive fire, while the reverse pro- 
cess, the conflagration, is satiety, or better, the result 
of satiety. 


The work of TeichmilUer {see above, p. 1) does not 
profess to be a complete exposition of the philosophy 
of Heraclitus, but to indicate rather the direction in 
which the intfltpretation is to be found. Teichmtiller 
behoves that the philosophy of the ancients is to be 
interpreted by their theories of Nature, Physics came 
before metaphysics. Particularly does this apply to 
Heraclitus of Ephesus. His philosophy of Nature, 
therefore, is the key with which Teichmtiller will 
unlock the secrets of his system (Teichmiiller, I, p. 3). 
- ^But yet Heracl it"" '^'"' T^"t ^. naturalis t. Of the 
8un, moon, eclipses, seasons, or earth, he has little to 
say. In the astronomy of Anaximander or the mathe- 
matics of Pythagoras he took little interest. On such 
polymathyhecastaslurCDiog. Laert, ix.l; cp.frag. 10), 
He went back to Thales and started from his childlike 
conception of Nature, To Heraclitus the earth was 
flat, extending with its land and sea indefinitely in 
each direction. The sun, therefore, describes only a 
semicircle, kindled every morning from the sea and 
extinguished in it every evening. Moreover, the sun 
is no larger than it looks (Diog. Laert, ix. 7'). The 
sun, therefore, cannot pass his boundaries {of the half- 
circle), else the Erinyes (who inhabit the lower world) 



will find him out (Plutarch, de Esil. ii.p. 60-t ; = frag. 2 
Up and down are not relative but absolute directions 
(TeichmuUer, I, p. 14). 

Thus upon physical grounds we may interpret at 
once some of the aphorisms. For instance, since the 
Bun is a daily exhalation from the earth, eun and earth 
must have in part a common substance ; hence Diony- 
sus and Hades are the same (Clement of Alex. Protrept. 
ii. p. 30 ; cp. frag. 127), since the former stands for the 
sun and the latter for the lower world. Likewise day 
and night are the same (Hippolytus, Eef, haer. ix. 10; 
cp. frag. 35), since they are essentially of the same 
elements, the difference being only one of degree, the 
former having a preponderance of the light and dry, 
the latter of the dark and moist {Teichmiiller, I, pp. 
26, 56). 

The four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, are not, 
as with Empedocles, unchangeable elements, but in 
ceaseless qualitative change are continually passing 
into one another. Experience itself teaches this in 
the daily observation of such phenomena as the drying 
up of swamps, the melting of solids, and the evapo- 
ration of liquids (Id. I, p. 58). 

Fire is not a symbol, but is real flre that bums and 
crackles. It is the ground principle, the entelechy of 
the world, in which reside life, soul, reason. It is God 
himself. It is absolute purity. It rules in the pure 
upper air, the realm of the sun. Its antithesis is 
moisture, absolute impurity, which rules in the lower 
regions of the earth. The sun with his clear light 
moves in the upper fiery air. The moon with her 
dimmed light moves in the lower moister air. The 
central thought, therefore, is purification, or "the 
way up," from the moist and earthy to the dry and 
fiery (Id. I, p. G2 ff.). 



The psychology of Heraclitus is not analogous, but 
identical with hia physics. The soul is the pure, light, 
fiery, incorporeal principle which bums lite the eun, 
Its degree of life and intelligence depends upon its 
purity from moisture. The stupid drunken man has a 
moist soul (StobaeuB Floril. v. 120 ; cp. frag. 73). " The 
dry soul is the wisest and best ' ' (frag. 74). In sleep the 
fire principle bums low ; in death it is extinguished, 
when the soul, like the sun at night, sinks into the 
dark regions of Hades. Hence it follows that there 
was with Heraclitus no doctrine of the immortality of 
the soul (Teichmiiller, I, p. 74 ff.). 

Ethics, therefore, is purification, and in this thought 
we see the origin of that general idea which as 
"Catharsis" became prominent in Plato and later 
philosophy, Teichmiiller finds it of the greatest 
interest to have traced the history of this idea, with 
its related one of "separation" or "apartness," back 
to Heraclitus. "Of all whose words I have heard," 
says the latter, " no one has attained to this — to know 
that "Wisdom is apart (xi^to/ieaftevau) from all " (Sto- 
baeus Floril. iii. 81 ; =frag. 18). This ' 
of Wisdom, which was only another term for i 
God or pure fire, reveals the origin of the distinction 
of the immaterial from the material. With Hera- 
clitus, to be sure, the idea of immateriality in its later 
sense was not present, but fire as the jnost incorporeal 
being of which he knew, identical with reason and 
intelligence, was set over against the crude material 
world. We have therefore here neither spiritualism 
nor crude materialism, but the beginning of the dis- 
tinction between the two. With Anaxagoras another 
step was taken when fire was dropped and the Nous 
was conceived in pure separateness apart even from 



fire. Following Anaxagoras, Plato regarded the 
Ideas as distinct and separate {uhxpmic;, xs^co/xa^ii'Oi'). 
Ill Aristotle it appears as the separation {^topiaz6u) 
which belongs to absolute spirit or pure form. Finally 
in the New Testament it is seen as the purity {£cf.apiv£ia) 
which is opposed to the flesh CPaul, Epist. to Corinth. 
II, i. 13; ii. 17). Human intelligence, according to 
Heraclitus, attains only in the case of a few to this 
greatest purity, this highest virtue, this most perfect 
knowledge. They are the chosen ones, the elect 
(ixhxToi) (Teichmiiller, I, p. 112 ff.). 

The senses, since they partake of the earthy char- 
acter of the body, give us only deceitful testimony as 
compared with the pure light of Reason, which alone, 
since it is of the essence of all things, that is, fire, has 
the power to know all. Here therefore was the first 
distinction of the intelligible from the sensible world 
(Id. I, p. 97). 

Again, in the qualitative change of Heraclitus we 
discover the incipient idea of the actual and potential 
first formulated by Aristotle. Since the elements pass 
into one another, they must be in some sense the same. 
"Water is fire and fire is water. But since water is not 
actually fire, it must be so potentially. To express 
this idea, Heraclitus used such phrases as "self -con- 
cealment," "sunset," "death," "sleep," "seed" (Id. 
I, p. 93 S.). 

Moreover, inasmuch as we have a progress from the 
potential to the actual, from the moist and earthy to 
the dry and fiery, that is, from the worse to the better, 
we find in Heraclitus the recognition of an end or 
purpose in Nature, or a sort of teleology, subject, how- 
ever, to the rule of rigid necessity (Id. I, p. 137). 

The flux of all things Teichmiiller understands not 



as a metapliysical proposition, but as a physical truth 
gained by generalization from direct observation of 
Nature. Furthermore, it was nothing new, all the 
philosophers from Thales on having taught the motion 
of things between beginning and end (Id, I, p. 131). 

That which was new in this part of Heraclitus' work 
was his opposition to the transcendentalism of Xeno- 
phanes. Over against the absolute, unmoved and 
undivided unity of the Eleatic philosopher, Hera- 
clitus placed the unity of opposition. In Xenophanes' 
system, above all stood the inunovable, transcendent 
God. In Heraclitus' system there was nothing tran- 
scendent or immovable, but aU was pursuing the 
endless way upward and downward. His God was 
ceaselessly taking new forms. Gods become men, and 
men gods (Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. 34, p. 51, Mehler ; 
cp. frag. 67). The immanent replaces the transcendent. 
Here emerges the historically significant idea of unity. 
Against the unity of Xenophanes, a unity opposed to 
the manifold, Heraclitus grasped the idea of a unity j 
w^hich includes the manifold within itself, "Unite 
whole and part, agreement and diRng^*"'"""?it. nnrnr 
fj{i.nt and disaccordant — from all comes o ne, and from 
one all " (Arist, de mundo 5, p. 39(>, b. ia;:=trag. 59). 
Everywhere is war, but from the war of opposites re- 
sults the most beautiful harmony (cp. frag. 46). Here 
three principles are involved : 1). Through strife all 
things arise ; the birth of water is the death of fire, the- 
death of water is the birth of earth, etc. (cp. frag. 68). 
2). Through strife of opposites all things are preserved ; 
take away one, the other falls ; sickness is conditioned 
by health, hunger by satiety (cp. frag. 104). 3). There 
is an alternating mastery of one or the other oppo- 
site ; hence it follows that since all opposite 


from one another, they are the same (Teichmiiller, I, 
p. 130 ff.). 

What did Heraclitus mean by the visible and invis- 
ible harmony ? Teichmiiller censureB Schuster for 
failing to recognize that most significant side of Hera- 
clitus' philosophy which is represented by the invisible 
harmony — in other words, for reducing him to a mere 
sensationalist. The visible harmony, according to 
Teichmiiller, is the entire sensible world, in which the 
war of opposites results in a harmony of the whole. 
— But the invisible harmony is the divine, all-ruling and 
all-producing Wisdom or World-reason, concealed 
from the senses and the sense-loving masses and 
revealed only to pure intellect. Thus Heraclitus, to 
whom there was an intelligible world revealing itself 
to intellect alone, and in the recognition of which was 
the highest virtue, was the forerunner of Plato (Id. I, 
pp. 154, 161 ff.). 

By the Logos of Heraclitus was indicated Law, 
Truth, Wisdom, Reason. It was more than blind law, 
thinks Teichmiiller, it was self-conscious intelligence ; 
for self-consciousness, according to Heraclitus, who 
praised the Delphic motto, "Know thyself," is the 
highest activity of man, and how could he attribute 
less to God, from whom man learns like a child ? (cp. 
frag. 97). But this self-conscious reason is not to be 
understood as a constant, ever abiding condition. 
God, who in this purely pantheistic system is one w^ith 
the world, is himself subject to the eternal law of 
ceaseless change, pursuing forever the downward and 
upward way. But is not then God, Logos, Reason, 
subject, after all, to some higher destiny {tl/iapiiivyf) ?' 
No, says TeichmuUer, for it is this very destiny which 
it is the highest wisdom in man to recognize, and 



which is, therefore, identical with the Wisdom which 
rul6a all. The difficulty here he ao far admits, how- 
ever, as to acknowledge that this doctrine is " dark and 
undetermined'" (Id, I, p. 183 fE.). 

Finally, says our author, there was no idea of per- 
sonality of spirit in the philosophy of Heraclitus, as 
there was not in any Greek philosopher from Xeno- 
phanes to Plotinus {Id. I, 187). 

In closing this part of his exposition, TeichmuUer 
calls attention to the relation of Heraclitus to Anax- 
agoras. M. Heinze (Lehre voro Logos, p. 3-3), following 
Aristotle, attributes to Anaxagoras the introduction 
into philosophy of the idea of world-ruling intelligence. 
But, says Teichmiiller, this idea was present to 
every Greek from Homer on. Its recognition by Hera- 
clitus has been shown by the fact that everywhere 
he attributes to his God, wisdom (aoifla), intelligent 
will {fpiafoj), reason (<fpouow and fpsui^ps^'), and recog- 
nized truth O-oyo;'). What then did Anaxagoras add ? 
The history of the idea of transcendent reason turns 
upon two characteristics. Identity (raurdnyc) and Pure 
Separation ischxpti'sz). With Heraclitus both failed ; 
the former, because the World Intelligence took part 
in the universal change ; the latter, because it was 
mingled with matter. For, in choosing fire for his 
intelligent principle, although as Aristotle says he 
chose that which was least corporeal (daw/taztiiTazoii), 
he did not escape a sort of materialism. The new that 
Anaxagoras added, therefore, was the complete sepa- 
ration of reason from materiality. In a word, while 
the Logos of the Epheaian was at once world-soul and 
matter in endless motion, the Nous of Anaxagoras was 
motionless, passionless, soulless and immaterial. Iden- 
tity, the other attribute, was added in the epoch- 


making work of Socrates when the content of reason 
was determined by the definition, following whom 
Plato established the complete transcendence of the 
ideal world (Teichmiiller, I, 189 ff.)- 

Heraclitus assumed a world-year or world-period, 
the beginning of which was the flood, and whose end 
was to be a universal conflagration, the whole to be 
periodically repeated forever. In this he was preceded 
by Anaximander and followed by the Stoics. This 
general idea was adopted by the Christian Church, but 
the latter limited the number of worlds to three, the 
first ending with the flood ; ours, the second, to end with 
the conflagration of the world ; the third to be eternal 
(Epist. Pet. II, iii. 4 ff.; Clement of Bome, Epist. to 
Corinth, i. 57, 58) ; CTeichmuller, I, 198 ff.). 

In the second part of his work, Teichmiiller enters 
upon an exhaustive argument to show the dependence 
of the Heraclitic philosophy upon Egyptian theology. 
Heraclitus moved within the sphere of religious thought. 
He praised the Sibyl and defended revelation and in- 
spiration (Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397 ; cp, frag. 
13). His obscure and oracular style, Uke that of the 
king at Delphi (cp. frag. 11), was in conformity with his 
religious character. Observation of Nature he fully 
neglected, depending for his sources more than any 
other philosopher upon the beliefs of the older theo- 
logy. Without deciding how far Heraclitus is directly, 
as a student of the Book of Death, or indirectly by 
connection with the Greek Mysteries, dependent upon 
the religion of Egypt, he proceeds to indicate the 
interesting points of similarity between them (Teich- 
muUer, II, p. 122). 

Among the Egyptians the earth was flat and infl- 
nitely extended. The visible world arose out of water. 


The upper world belonged to fire and the Bun, Ab the 
sun of Heraclitus was daily generated from water, so 
HoruB, aB Ra of the sun, daily proceeded from Lotus 
the water. As the elements with Heraclitus proceed 
upward and downward, so the gods of the elements 
upon the steps in Hermopohs climb up and down (Id. 
II, p. 143). 

With these illustrations, it is sufficient to say, w^ith- 
out following him further in detail, that Teichmiiller 
carries the comparison through the whole system of 
HeracUtus, and parallels his actual and potential, his 
unity of opposites, his eternal flux, strife, harmony, 
purification, Logos, and periodicity of the world, with 
similar notions found in the religion of Egypt, 

In order to appreciate the worth of TeicbmiiUer's 
work, it is necessary to remember that, as we have said, 
it does not profess to be a unified exposition of Hera- 
clitus' philosophy, but a contribution to the history 
of philosophic ideas in their relation to him. In afford- 
ing this service to the history of ideas, he has thrown a 
good deal of light upon the true interpretation of the 
philosophy of Heraclitus. But the very purpose of his 
task has caused him to put certain of the ideas into 
such prominence, that unless we are on our guard, w^e 
shall not get therefrom a well proportioned conception 
of the system as a whole. "We shall do well, conse- 
quently, to make a short examination of thew^ork out- 
lined in the foregoing pages, to put the results, if we 
can, into their fit relation to the whole. 

Concerning TeicbmiiUer's starting point, namely, 
that the physics of Heraclitus is the key to his whole 
thought, we must observe, in passing, the inconsist- 
ency between the first part of TeicbmiiUer's book, 


where this principle is made the basis of interpretation, 
and the second part, where it sinks into comparative 
insignificance when he discovers that Heraclitus is 
primarily a theologian and gets his ideas from Egyptian 
religion. To say that we shall better appreciate a 
phUoaopber's position if we understand his astronomy 
and his theories of the earth and nature, is of course 
true to every one. Moreover, that Heraclitus con- 
sidered the earth as flat, the sun as moving in a semi- 
circle and as no larger than it looks, the upper air as 
drier than the lower, and the lower world as dark and 
wet, there is no reason to deny. In fact, this cosmology, 
as Teichmiiller details it, is so simple and blends so 
well with the Heraclitic sayings in general, that the 
picture of it once formed can hardly be banished from 
the mind. But that it adds much to the explication 
of the philosophy as a whole is doubtful. It is true 
that physics came before metaphysics, if by that is 
meant that men speculated about Nature before they 
speculated about being. But this distinction has little 
bearing on the intei'pretation of Heraclitus. A prin- 
ciple more to the point, and one that Teichmiiller has 
not always observed, is that religion, poetry and 
metaphor came before either physics or metaphysics. 
From the very fact, also, that physics came before 
metaphysics, when the latter did come, men were 
compelled to express its truths in such physical terms 
as they were in possession of. He therefore who will 
see in the sentences of Heraclitus nothing beyond their 
physical and literal meaning, will miss the best part of 
his philosophy. For instance, TeicIimuUer interprets 
'the saying that day and night are the same, as meaning 
that they are made up of the same physical constitu- 
ents (see above, p. 24). If possible, this is worse than 


Schuster's explanation that they are the same because 
they are each similar divisions of time (!), an explana- 
tion which Teichmuller very well ridicules {Id. I, p. 40). 
No such childish interpretations of this passage are 
necessary when it is seen that this is simply another 
antithesis to express Heraclitus' great thought of the 
unity of opposites, on the ground that hy the universal 
law of change, opposites are forever passing into each 
other, as indeed is said in bo many words in a passage 
from Plutarch which these critics seem to have 
slighted (Consol. ad ApoU, 10, p. 106; see frag. 78). 
Equally unnecessary and arbitrary is TeicbmuUer's 
singular attempt to prove on physical grounds the 
identity of the two gods, Dionysus and Hades (see 
above, p. 24). 

In pursuance of his method, Teichmiiller supposes 
that the HeracUtic fire was real fire such as our senses 
perceive, fire that bums and crackles and feels warm. 
No other critic agrees with him in this. Zeller espec- 
ially opposes this conception ("Vol. I, p. 588), It is not 
to be supposed that Teichmiiller understands Hera- 
clitus to mean that the present world and all its 
phenomena are real fire. Fire he conceives to be, 
rather, the first principle or d/i^', the real essence of 
the universe, chosen as water was by Thales or air by 
Anaximenes, only with more deliberation, since fire 
has the peculiarity of taking to itself nourishment. In 
a word, since anybody can see that our present earth, 
water, and air, are not fire that burns and crackles, 
all that Teichmiiller can mean is that this kind of fire 
was the original thing out of which the present world 
was made. But there is not the least support for this 
meaning in any saying of Heraclitus. In all the sen- 
tences, fire is conceived as something of the present, 



something directly involved in the ceaseless change of 
the world. "Fire, (i. e., xtj-wjuoq, the thunderholt)," 
he says, "rules all" (Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10; 
= frag. 28). "This world, the same for all, neither 
any of the gods nor any man has made, bat it always 
was, ayid is, and shall be, an ever living fire " (Clement 
of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711; =frag. 20). "Fire is 
exchanged for all things and all things for fire" 
(Plutarch, de EI. 8, p. 388 ; =frag. 33). These passages 
are sufficient to show that TeichmuUer's conception of 
the fire is untenable. We may, however, mention the 
fact noted by Zeller (Vol. I, p. 588), that both Aristotle 
(de An. i. 3, 405, a, 25) and Simplicius (Phys. 8, a) 
explain that Heraclitus chose to call the world firQ 
" in order to express the absolute life of Nature, and to 
make the restless change of phenomena comprehen- 

^,— Ail5?Eerpomrthftt4i^ands criticism is the idea of 
^ actuality and potentiality^ which Teichmuller finds 

^'^ udden in Heraclitus' njufosophy and metaphorically 
expressedby~siinset,"^ath, sleep, etc. Since there is 
a qualitative interchange of the elements, they must 
be in some sense the same. Water is tire and fire is 
water. But since water is not actually fire, it must be 
so potentially. Therefore, water is potential fire. 
Such is TeichmuUer's reasoning, as we have seen. Of 
course, it can be reversed with equal right. Since fire 
is not actually water, it must be so potentially. There- 
fore, fire is potential water. Which is to say that we 
have here a simple reversible series in which there ia 
not only an eternal progress (or regress) from fire to 
water, but equally, and under the same conditions, an 
eternal regress (or progress) from water to fire. 
Either, therefore, may, with as good right as the other. 



I represent actuality or potentiality. In other words, 
I actuality and potentiality are superfluous ideas in this 
' eystem. In fact, this antithesis has no place in meta- 
I physics outside the philosophy of Aristotle, and he 
who has failed to see that right in this connection lies 
the main difference between the philoBophy of Aris- 
totle and that of Heraclitus, has missed the most vital 
part of the latter. With Aristotle there is an eternal 
progress but no regress. The potential is ever passing 
into the actual, but not the reverse. To be sure, a 
thing may be both actual and potential, but not as 
Tegards the same thing. The hewn marble is potential 
as regards the statue and actual as regards the rough 
marble, but of course the hewn marble and the statue 
cannot be reciprocally potential or actual. Matter is 
eternally becoming form, but not the reverse. Thus 
follows Aristotle's necessary assumption of a prime 
mover, an inexhaustible source of motion, itself un- 
moved — ^pure actuality, without potentiality. Hence 
the mainspring of the peripatetic philosophy is the 
I unmoved moving first cause. But the philosophy of 
the Ephesian is the reverse of all this. With him 
there is no fixed being whatever (see Teichmiiller him- 
self, I, p. 121 : " Es bleibt dahei nichts Festesi 
etc.), no unmoved first cause outside the shiftingV 
world which is its own God and prime mover. Thus \ 
- Teichmiiller, in identifying the Heraclitic fire with the 
Aristotelian pure actuality, overlooked the slight differ- 
ence that while the one is absolute motion, the other is 
absolute rest 1 We are glad, however, not to find this^ 
Aristotelian notion, which, though prevaleii 
physics, has never added a ray of light to the subject, 
present in the philosophy of the Ephesian, and we see 
here another case of over-interpretation by which 



Heraplitus' innocent use of such terms ae sunset, death, 
and self -concealment, caused Aristotelian metaphysics 
to be forced upon him. 

In tracing the history of ideas, much emphasis has 
been laid by Teichmiiller, as we have seen, upon the 
idea of purification {xd8ai>at;) as it appears in Hera- 
clitus, and in connection therewith he has found the 
.^igginning of the idea of the " apartness " or " gepara- 
tion~^^~orT5g~Tn miaLCTlal ■ vvuil i l, an idoa -STTenormouely 
enlarged by Anaxagoras and Plato. As regards the 
Catharsis proper, TeichmuHer has rendered a service 
by pointing out Heraclitus' connection with the idea ; 
but in reading Teichmiiller's book, one would be easily 
led to believe that the Catharsis idea is much more 
prominent in Heraclitus than it really is, and as 
regards the doctrine of " separation," it seems at once 
so incongruous with the system as a whole that we 
must inquire what foundation, if any, there is for it. 
The student of Heraclitus knows, although the reader 
of TeichmuHer might not suspect, that the words 
xddapat;, xallaf'oc, stUixpti'dz, sckx/ilueea, ■^luptirroi', y(i>piadiu, 
ixhxzoi, themselves do not occur in the authentic remains 
of his writings. One exception is to be noted. The word 
xsy^ioptartst'ou occurs in the passage from Stobaeus 
already noticed C^ee above, p. 25). It is as follows : 
'Oxorrtw Xoyou^ ^xouaa oudsi': dipix'AErai i<; Toi/zo, Sore 
puiiiaxui/ Sti aofov karc Tdvrtov xs^iopia/iiwi' (Stobaeua 
Floril. iii. 81). This passage TeichmuHer uses as his 
text in establishing the connection of Heraclitus with 
the doctrine of " separation,'" unfortunately, however, 
first because he has not found the correct interpreta- 
tion of it, and second, because, if he had, it would 
stand in direct contradiction to the doctrine of imma- 
nence which he spends all the next chapter in estab- 



Kshiilg for Heraclitus. lo^ov in this passage does not 
stand for the world-ruling Wisdom or Reason, or 
Divine Law, of which Heraclitus has so much to say 
in other passages. To assert the " apartness " of that 
Law would be to disintegrate the entire system, the 
chief point of which is the immanence of the Divine 
Law as the element of order in the shifting world. It 
does not follow that because to aoifba is used in the 
above larger sense in the passage from Clement of 
Alexandria {Strom, v. li, p. 718 ; =frag. 65), that ao(fw 
cannot be used in quite the ordinary sense in the 
present passage, That it is so is attested by the 
agreement of Schuster {p. 42), Heinze (Lehre vom 
Logos, p. 32), Zeller (Vol. I, p. 573, 1), and Pfleiderer 
(p. 60). Lassalle, indeed, agrees with Teichmiiller. 
Schuster, following Heinze, understands the sentence 
to mean merely that wisdom is separated from all 
(men), that is, true wisdom is possessed by no one. 
Zeller, followed by Pfleiderer, renders it : '* No one 
attains to this — to understand that wisdom is separated 
from all things, that is, has to go its own way inde- 
pendent of general opinion." Schuster's interpretation 
is the most natural, so that the fragment belongs 
among the many denunciations of the ignorance of the 
common people — as indeed Bywater places it — and has 
nothing to do with any theory of the " separateness " 
of an absolute or immaterial principle, Neither is 
there any other passage which supports this doctrine. 
In further support, however, of the Catharsis theory in 
general, Teichmiiller alleges the passage from Plutarch 
(Vit. Rom. 28), which speaks of the future purification 
of the soul from all bodily and earthy elements, and 
which Teichmiiller thinks to have a strong Heraclitio 
coloring. In this passage Heraclitus is quoted as 


saying that "the dry soul is the best," but beyond 
this fragment it is a mere con jecture that it was taken 
from him. The passage at any rate is unimportant. 
What then remains to establish any connection what- 
ever of Heraclitus yfith the "history of the idea of the 
eiXixpiue:;"? Only the most general antithesis of fire 
and moisture, with the added notion that the former is 
the better and the latter worse. Since the divine 
essence of the universe itself is fire, the way upward 
from earth and water to fire is the diviner process, and 
pure fire is the noblest and highest existence. But this 
is shown better in the ethical sphere. The soul itself 
is the fiery principle (Arist, de An. i. 3, p. 405, a, 36). 
" The dry soul is the wisest and best " (frag. 74). The 
soul of the drunken, stupid man is moist (cp. frag. 73). 
The highest good was to Heraclitus the clearest 
perception, and the clearest and most perfect percep- 
tion was the perception of the Universal Law of 
Nature, the expression of which was pure fire ; and 
such perception was coincident with that condition of 
the soul when it was most like the essence of the uni- 
verse. This is the sum-total of the idea of the Catharsis 
found in Heraclitus. It is worthy of notice, to be sure, 
but it is not so different from what might be found in 
any philosophy, especially an ethical philosophy, as to 
make it of any great moment, either in the history of 
ideas or in the exposition of this system. 

We have studied now those parts of Teichraiiller's 
work which, either by reason of their incompleteness 
or manifest error, most needed examination, namely 
bis method, his wrong conception of the Heraclitic 
fire, his useless and unfounded theory of the actual 
and potential and of the separateness of the imma- 
terial, and his over-emphasized doctrine of the Cathar- 



BIB. Concerning the other points, it is only neceesary 
in addition to call attention to the extreme value of 
hie contribution in his explanations of the relation of 
Heraclitus to Xenophanes, to Anaxagoraa and to Plato, 
of the Heraclitic Logos, of the flux, of the unity of 
opposites, and of the invisible harmony and the intelli- 
gible world defended against the sensationalism of 
Schuster. In the second part of his work also, though 
its value is less, he has contributed not a little light 
by his emphasis of the theological character of this 
philosophy, though one doubts whether his laborious 
collection of resemblances between the philosophy of 
the Ephesian and the religion of Egypt has shed much 
light on Heraclitus' position. It is seen at once that by 
taking such general conceptions as war and harmony, 
purification, periodicity of the world, etc., it w^ouid be 
easy to make a long list of parallelisms between any 
religion and any system of philosophy not separated 
farther in time and place than Heraclitus of Ephesus 
and the Egyptians. The resemblances, however, are 
certainly not all accidental, but they are such as do 
not affect the originality of the Ephesian, and unfor- 
tunately do not add much to a better knowledge of 
his philosophy. 

Dr. Edmund Pfleiderer comes forward in a recent 
volume of 380 pages (see above, p. 1), with an attempt 
to interpret the philosophy of Heraclitus from a new 
and independent standpoint. He expresses dissatisfac- 
tion with all previous results. Other critics have made 
the mistake of starting not from the positive but from 
the negative side, namely, from the universal flux (as 
Zeller), or from the law of opposites (as Lassalle). 
But the hatred of the opinions of the masses which 


Heraclitus exhibits, calls for some greater philosophical 
departure than the above negative principles, which 
indeed were already well known truths. Moreover, 
if we take these for his starting point, we can get no 
consistent system, for the doctrine of the universal 
flux does not lead naturally to the law of opposites, but 
rather the reverse. Again, neither the flux nor the 
law of opposites harmonizes with the doctrine of fire. 
Finally, the pessimistic, nihilistic tendency of the theory 
of absolute change does not agree well with the deep 
rationality and world-order which Heraclitus recog- 
nizes in all things, nor with his. psychology, eschat- 
ology, and ethics (Pfleiderer, p. 7 flf.). 

We must look elsewhere for his ground principle. 
To flnd it, we must discover the genesis of this philoso- 
phy, which did not spring into being spontaneously, 
like Pallas Athena from the head of her father. It 
could not have come from the Eleatics, for the chro- 
nology forbids, nor from Pythagoras, whom Heraclitus 
reviles, nor flnally from the physicists of Miletus, with 
whose astronomy Teichmiiller has well shown our 
philosopher to be unacquainted. Its source is rather to 
be sought in the field of religion, and particularly in 
the Greek Mysteries. In the light of the Orphico- 
Dionysiac Mysteries, in a word, according to Pfleid- 
erer, this philosophy is to be interpreted. Here is the 
long-sought key. The mystic holds it, as indeed Dio- 
genes Laertius says : 

Mrj rayix; ""HpaxXetroo iir* d/jtcpaXbi^ eche ^i^Xov 
Toixpeacou • fidAa roc doa^aTO^ dTpa7rcT6(:, 

dpipi^Tj xal axoTO^ iarh dM/j.7reT0i> • ^v 8e as iiuaT7j(; 
eecraydyTj, (pavepoi) AapLnpoTep rjeXlou, — ix. 16. 

With the religion of the Mysteries, in its older and 
purer form, Heraclitus was in full sympathy. By his 



• family he was brought into close connection with it. 
Ephesus, too, his city, was a religious centre. Dio- 
genes {ix. 6) relates that he deposited his book in the 
temple of Artemis. Heraclitus, indeed, was not a 
friend of the popular religion, but that was because of 
its abuses, and it was in particular the popular Olym- 
pian religion that be attacked. The connection of the 
Ephesian with the Mysteries may be considered as a 
deep-seated influence which their underlying princi- 
ples exerted upon him. These religious principles he 
turned into metaphysics. His system as a whole was 
religious and metaphysical (Pfleiderer, p. SS f.). 

With this introduction, Pfleiderer proceeds as fol- 
lows. Heraclitus' starting point lay positively in his 
theory of knowledge, which was a doctrine of specu- 
lative intuition and self -absorption. In this sense our 
author understands the fragment from Plutarch (ad^ 
Colot. ao, p. 1118 ; := frag. 80), ' KHi^r^ffd/a/V i/isiuDzou, " I 
' searched within myself," that is, I wrapped myself in 
I thought, and so in this self-absorption I sought the 
kernel of all truth. Hence his contempt for the masses 
' who act and speak without insight. But does not this 
conflict with those Heraclitic sentences which place 
the standard of truth and action in the common or 
imiversal (Sui-oi,) ? (cp. frags. 93, 91). Do these not lead 
as Schuster holds, to the rule, Verum est, quod semper, 
■ quod ubique, quod ah omnibus creditum est? No, 
I says Pfleiderer, the common here does not mean the 
I general opinion of the majority. All such interpret- 
ations are sufficiently refuted by that other passage, 
" To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag. 
I 113). What Heraclitus really meant by the common 
I (fynji-) was " the true inward universality," Absorp- 
I tion into one's inner self was absorption into that 



ground of reason which is identical with the divine 
principle of the world. By this universal reason under 
which he contemplated all things, Heraclitus meant 
nothing different from what by Spinoza was expressed 
by "sub specie aetemitatis," and in subsequent phi- 
losophy by "intellectual intuition" and "the stand- 
point of universal knowledge." Heraclitus fell back 
upon that universal instinct which in the form of 
human language is exhibited as the deposit of succes- 
sive ages, and which again he did not distinguish 
from the voice of the Sibyl, representative of divine 
revelation. As respects the source of knowledge, 
Heraclitus as little as Spinoza, Fichte and Hegel, 
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that 
singular and qualitative divine source in which the 
individual participates (Pfleiderer, p. Ifi ff,). 

The senses, though they do not give us the whole 
truth, yet furnish the sufficient data that are to be 
interpreted by the light of reason. The errors of the 
masses do not arise from trusting the senses, for the 
latter give not a false, but a partial account. Their 
error lies in missing the spiritual band which unites 
the manifold of sense into the higher unity, an error 
distinctive of the popular polytheism as against the 
religion of the Mysteries (Id. p. 70). 

The theory of knowledge, Heraclitus' starting point, 
being thus disposed of, Pfleiderer proceeds to discuss 
the material principles of his philosophy in their 
abstract metaphysical form, The keynote here is the 
indestructibility of life. The oscillating identity of 
life and death, a truth adopted from the Mysteries, is 
taken up by Heraclitus and elevated into a universal 
and metaphysical principle. It is based on the simple 
observation of Nature, which sees the life and light 



and warmth of summer passing into the death and 
darkneBS and cold of winter, only to be revived and 
restored in the never-failing spring. So on a smaller 
scale, day passes Into night, but night ever again into 
day. So everywhere in Nature nothing passes aw^ay 
but to revive again. From this follows the hope of 
the universality of this law, the indestructibility of 
human life, and the resolution of the opposition be- 
tween the light, warm life here above and the dark, 
cold death below. This is the hopeful element which 
characterizes the philosophy of the Ephesian. Over 
against it was the hopeless creed of the masses, whose 
complaint over the inexoiable destiny of death found 
expression from the earliest times in the despairing 
lines of the poets. The common view does not see too 
much continuance and constancy in reality, but too 
little. " What we see waking," says Heraclitus, ■' is 
death, what we see sleeping is a dream " {Clement of 
Alex. iii. 3, p. 520 ; =frag. 64). Which means, that like 
the unreality and inconstancy of dreams is this ephem- 
eral and perishing existence which we, the vulgar 
people, see when awake. Reversing this gloomy view, 
the Mysteries taught that Hades and Dionysus were 
the same (cp. frag. 127). That is, the god of death 
feared in the world below, is identical with the god of 
life and joy of the world here above, which is to say 
that the regenerative pow^er of life persists even in 
death and shall overcome it (Pfleiderer, p. 74 fF.). 

From this theory of the indestructibility of the fire 
force of life, Heraclitus passes to the ancillary truth of 
the unity of opposition in general. Hence he asserted 
the identity of day and night, winter and summer, 
young and old, sleeping and waking, hunger and 
satiety (cp, frags. 30, 78). His whole theory of the 



harmony of opposites was, as it were, apologetic. If 
life rules in death, why does death exist 'i It was in 
answer to this question that Heraclitus developed his 
science of opposition and strife, by showing the pres- 
ence here of a general law (Pfleiderer, p. 84 ff.). 

In the same spirit Pfleiderer interprets the much 
(onteeted figure of the hannony of the world as the 
harmony of the bow and the lyre (see frags. 45, 5(j). 
Without rejecting the interpretation suggested by 
Bernays (Rhein. Mus. vii, p. 94) and followed by most 
other critics, which refers the figure to the form of 
the bow and of the lyre, their opposite stretching annn 
producing harmony by tension, Pfleiderer finds in the 
comparison still another meajiing. The bow and the 
lyre are both attributes of Apollo, the slayer and the 
giver of life and joy. Thus the hannony between the 
bow and the lyre, as attributes of one god— symbols 
respectively of death and of life and joy — expresses the 
great thought of the harmony and reciprocal inter- 
change of death and life (Pfleiderer, p. 89 ff.). 

The Heraclitic flux of all things, says Pfleiderer, was 
not antecedent to his abstract teachings, but the logi- 
cal consequence thereof. The identity of life and 
death led him to the identity of all opposites. But 
opposites are endlessly flowing or passing into each 
other. Hence from the principle that everything is 
opposition, follows the principle that everything flows. 
The universal flux is only a. picture to make his relig- 
ious metaphysical sentences intelligible (Id. p. 100 ff.). 

The Heraclitic fire is real fire as opposed to the 
logical symbol of Lassalle, but not the strictly sensible 
fire that bums and crackles, as Teichmtiller supposes. 
It is rather a less definite conception, which is takeu 
now as fire, now as warmth, warm air or vapor. It is 


the concrete form or iDtuitional correlate of the meta- 
physical notion of life (Id. p. lao ff.). 

" The way up and down " refers not only to the trans- 
mutations of fire, water, and earth, but holds good in 
general for the oscillation of opposites, and particularly 
for the polarity of life and death (Id, p. 140). 

As one result of his investigation, Pfleiderer affirms 
a strong optimistic element in the philosophy of the 
Ephesian. He contests the opinion of Schuster and 
Zeller that the endless destruction of single existences 
is kindred to the pessimistic doctrine of Anaximander, 
of the extinction of all individuals as an atonement 
for the " injustice '" of individual existence. The pro- 
cess indeed goes on, but it has a bright side, and it is 
this that Heraclitus sees. Life, to be sure, is ever pass- 
ing into death, but out of death life ever emerges. It 
is this thought, the powerlessness of death over the 
indestructible fire force of life, which Heraclitus em- 
phasizes (Id. p. 180 ff.). 

Still more decided is his rational optimism, his un- 
swerving belief in a world well ordered and disposed. 
A deep rationality characterizes the universe (cp. frags. / 
a, 1, 91, 32, 98, 99, 96, 19). To express this idea, Hera- 
clitus used the word Logos, which after his time played 
so prominent a part in the older philosophy. This 
word, passing even beyond its signification of " well 
ordered relation," conveyed finally with Heraclitus, 
as kSyot; f ofof, rather the idea of Reason immanent in 
the world (Pfieiderer, p. 231 ff.). 

In the invisible harmony we find the same general 
thought. As distinguished from the visible harmony, 
which meant that external order of Nature insuring to 
the trustful peasant the never failing return of summer 
and winter, heat and frost, day and night,— the invisi- 


ble harmony was that all-embracing harmony which 
ie revealed to thought as the rational union of all 
oppositions. Against this theodicy there is no valid 
objection to be derived from the accounts which repre- 
sent the Ephesiau philosopher as sad and complain- 
ing, nor from the passages descriptive of the evils 
of life and the weakness of men (cp. frags. 86, 55, 113, 
etc.). In all cases these refer not to the philosopher's 
own opinions, but to the errors of the ignorant masses 
(Pfleiderer, p. 235 ff.). 

The future existence of the soul, though not consis- 
tent with his physics and metaphysics, was neverthe- 
less held from the religious and ethical standpoint. In 
fact it was involved, as has been shown, in Heraclitus' 
point of departure, so that we have less reason to com- 
plain of inconsistency in his case than we have, in 
reference to the same matter, in the case of the Stoics 
later (Id. p. 210J. 

We have given, perhaps, more space to the exposi- 
tion of Pfleiderer's work than it relatively deserves, 
because it is the last word that has been spoken on 
Heraclitus, because, also, it has deservedly brought 
into prominence the optimism and the religious char- 
acter of his philosophy, and because finally it presents 
another instructive example of over-systemization. It 
claims our attention, too, because the view it proposes 
is a complete reversal of the prevalent conception of 
Heraclitus, and if seriously taken, changes the whole 
tenor of his philosophy. 

In what follows we shall examine chiefly the two 
main points in Pfleiderer's work, namely, the theory 
of knowledge and the connection with the Greek 
Mysteries ; the latter, because it is Pfleiderer's particu- 



lar contribution, and the former, because it will open 
to us an important aspect of the Ephesian's philosophy. 
In the first place, however, it can by no means be 
admitted that the doctrine of the flux and the harmony 
of opposites represent the negative side of his system, 
and are secondary to his theory of knowledge and 
his religious dogmas. The unanimous testimony of 
the ancients cannot be thus easily set aside. That of 
Plato and Aristotle alone is decisive. Pfleiderer objects 
that Plato's purpose, which was to establish the 
changelessness of nouniena against the change of 
phenomena, led him to emphasize the flux of Hera- 
clitns. But if Heraclitus' positive teachings were, as 
Pfleiderer says, first of all the theory of knowledge, 
this and not the flux must have been emphasized in the 
Theaetetus where the theory of knowledge was Plato's 
theme. It is sufficient, however, here to note that 
what Heraclitus has stood for in philosophy from his 
own time to the present, is the doctrine of absolute . 
change, and this doctrine may, therefore, properly be I 
called the positive side of his philosophy. If what 
Pfleiderer means is that the theory of knowledge and 
not the flux was his starting point, he would have a 
shadow more of right. It is, however, misleading to 
say that his theory of knowledge was his starting 
point, for, as we have indicated in our examination of 
Schuster's work, Heraclitus was not concerned with a 
theory of knowledge as such. To state in a word what 
his point of departure really was, regarded from a 
common-sense view, it was his conviction that he was 
in possession of new truth which the blindness and 
ignorance of men prevented them from seeing (the 
point of departure indeed of almost every one who 
writes a book), and the three leading ideas in this 


new truth were : I . the absence of that stability in 
Nature which the untrained senses perceive ; 'i. the 
unsuspected presence of a universal law of order ; 3. 
the law of strife which brin^ unity out of diversity. 
Id one sense this may be called a theory of knowledge, 
and only in this sense was it his starting point. 

But concerning the theory of knowledge itself, we 
cannot accept Pfleiderer's position. By placing it in 
speculative intuition and self -absorption, he has rushed 
to the very opposite extreme of Schuster's sensation- 
alism, and in so doing has equally misrepresented 
Heraclitus. Either extreme is forcing a modem theory 
of knowledge upon the Ephesian of which he was 
wholly innocent. What support has Pfleiderer for 
his ■' self-absorption " theory ? / None whatever. He 
alleges the fragment ' ESil^rfadiojii i/isiuuTou (cp. frag. 80), 
which he arbitrarily renders, " I searched within 
myself" ("Ich forschte in mir selbst"). This frag- 
ment is from Plutarch (adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118), Diog- 
enes Laertius {ix. 5 ; cp. frag. 80, sources), and others. 
Plutarch understands it to refer simply to self-knowl- 
edge like the FumOi aa'JTou at Delphi (similarly Julian, 
Or. vi. p. 185 A). Diogenes understands it as referring 
to self- instruction (similarly Tatian, Or. ad Graec. 3). 
Diogenes says, " He (Heraclitus) was a pupil of no one, 
but he said that he inquired for himself and learned all 
things by himself" {fjxuuae r obosi/6:;, akJC a^rbv Iftj 
iit!^^aaaltat xai ;ial>siu Tidvra Tza/i kto'JTo^). The latter 
seems to be its true meaning, as is seen by comparing 
the passage from Polybius (xii. 27; cp. frag. 15), " The 
eyes are better witnesses than the ears." As here lie 
means to say that men should see for themselves and 
not trust to the reports of others, so in the fragment in 
question he means only that he himself has inquired of 


himeelf and not of others (cp. also frags, li, 13), But 
Pfleiderer, in order to support a theory, has taken 
these two innocent words and pressed them into a doc- 
trine of contemplative intuition, by giving them the 
meaning, " I wrapped myself in thought " {" Ich ver- 
senkte mich sinnend und forschend," etc., p. 47). So 
far is it from the case that Heraclitus sought the 
source of knowledge by turning inward, that he ex- 
pressed himself directly to the contrary. Thus we read 
in Plutarch (de Superst. 3, p. 166; = frag. 1)5): o'ffpd- 
xieiTO; if^rrt, zuii; iypT^yojioaii' iva xai xoii-ou xoanou thai, rton 
dk xoifuo/Ui'Wj sxaiTTOi' £(f iHmu anoaTpetpsadat, the sense of 
which is well given by Campbell (Theaetetus of Plato, 
p. 246), " To live in the light of the universal Order is 
to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is 
to go to sleep," Again, the whole passage from Sextus 
Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 1.33, 133; cp. frags. 92, 3) 
is conclusive. "For," says Sextus, "having thus 
statedly shown that we do and think everything by 
participation in the divine reason, he [Heraclitus] 
adds, ' It is necessary therefore to' follow the com- 
mon, for although the Law of Reason is common, the 
majority of people live as though they had an under- 
standing of their own.' But this is nothing else than 
an explanation of the mode of the universal disposition 
I of things. As far therefore as we participate in the 
[ memory of this, we are true, hut as far as we separate 
[ ourselves individually we are false. A more express 
[ denial of any self-abeorption or a priori theory of 
j knowledge would be impossible. Heraclitus is con- 
stantly urging men to come out of themselves and 
place themselves in an attitude of receptivity to that 
I which surrounds them, and not go about as if self- 
k included (cp. frags. 94, 3, 3). But what does Hera- 


clitus mean by participation in the divine or universal 
Reason ? Is not this just Pfleiderer's position when 
he eays that the Ephesian as little as Fichte or Hegel 
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that abso- 
lute reason in which the individual participates ? The 
difference is radical and vital, but Pfieiderer, like 
Lassalle, failed to see it because he did not free himself 
from strictly modem theories of knowledge. The dif- 
ference is simply this. The universal reason of which 
Pfieiderer is speaking is that in which man necessarily 
and by his intellectual nature participates. That of 
Heraclitus is the divine Reason, in which man ought 
to participate but may not. Pfleiderer's universal 
reason is universal in man. That of Heraclitus, out- 
side of and independent of man. The latter, so far 
from being necessarily involved in thought, is inde- 
pendent of thought. It is that pure, fiery and godlike 
essence, the apprehension of which gives rationality in 
the measure in which it is possessed. No reader, 
therefore, who can think of only two theories of 
knowledge, a strictly o priori theory and a strictly 
empirical theory, can understand Heraclitus. But, it 
may be asked, if knowledge does not come from with- 
out through the senses, nor from within from the 
nature of thought, whence does it come ? Heraclitus, 
however, would not be disturbed by such a modern 
dilemma. There is reason, in fact, to believe, though 
it sounds strange to us, that he supposed this divine 
rational essence to be inhaled in the air we breathe 
(cp. Sextus Emp. adv. Math. vii. 137, 133). It exists 
in that which surrounds us {7ii,ptiyov), and the measure 
of our rationality depends on the degree in which we 
can possess ourselves of this divine flame. There was 
no conciseness of thought here, however, and Heracli- 



tus seemed to think that it was partly apprehended 
through the senses, that is, the moat perfect condition 
of receptivity to trnth was the condition in which a man 
was most awake. The stupidest man is he who is 
asleep, blind, self -involved, and we may add, seif- 
absorbed (cp. frags. i)5, 90, 77, 3, %, 9i). Hence, if 
we have rightly interpreted Heraclitus here, a man 
might wrap himself in thought forever and be no 
nearer to truth. The source of knowledge did not He 
in that direction to any pre-Socratic Greek philosopher. 
Absorption into one's inner self, which Pfleiderer thinks 
was Heraclitus' source of absolute knowledge, was the 
one thing he most despised. 

Let us now consider the connection of Heraclitus 
with the Greek Mysteries, w^hicli Pfleiderer makes the 
basis of his interpretation of the whole philosophy. 
Pfleiderer has done a good work in emphasizing the 
religious character of the philosophy of the Ephesian. 
Lassalle and Teichmuller had already pointed it out. 
Failure to recognize this is the gravest fault in the 
critical work of Zeller. But as in Lassalle we found 
over-systemization of the logical idea, in Schuster of the 
empirical, in Teichmuller of the physical, so in Pflei- 
derer there is great over-systemization of the religi- 
ous element. More strictly, it is a vast over-emphasis 
of one thought, namely, the indestructibility of life, or 
the alternating identity of life and death, which Pflei- 
derer claims to be a religious truth taken from the 
Mysteries, and out of which, as we have seen, he 
spins the whole philosophy of Heraclitus, including 
the doctrine of the eternal flux, the unity of opposites, 
and the fire. The slight grounds on which all this is 
based must have already impressed the reader with 
surprise that Pfleiderer should make so much out 



of it. The fact that Heraclitus lived in Ephesus and 
that EphesuR was a very religious city, is a fair speci- 
men of the arguments by which he would establish a 
connection with the Mysteries. There have been pre- 
served only three fragments in which Heraclitus makes 
any direct reference to the Greek Mysteries, all taken 
from Clement of Alexandria (Protrept. 2, pp. 19, 30 ; 
cp. frags. 124, 135, 137), and in these three passages 
other critics have found no sympathy with, but stern 
condemnation of the mystic cult. In the first passage 
where the vinrtzoXoe, /idj-ot, ^dxyoe, Xr^vat and ttuaiae are 
threatened with future fire, Pfleiderer admits con- 
demnation of mystic abuses. But the third fragment, 
relating to the Dionysiac orgies, ts the one upon which 
he most relies to establish the sympathy of our philo- 
sopher with the Mysteries. The passage is as follows : 
Ei i^j Yti/i Jtowau. jioiuijjy s^ois'jutu xa't "jfiveov ff.ajia 
aiSoiotai, avatdiaraza ufiyaffv dv liuroc (ik' './Wi^c icu 
Jiowaoc, iiTBi}) iiahovrat xa't hjvaO^oijtTe. " For were it not 
Dionysus to whom they institute a procession and 
sing songs in honor of the pudenda, it would be the 
most shameful action. But Dionysus, in whose honor 
they rave in bacchic frenzy, and Hades, are the same." 
Although this has usually been interpreted (by Schlei- 
ermacber, Lassalle, and Schuster) to mean that the 
excesses practiced in these ceremonies will be atoned for 
hereafter, since Dionysus under whose name they are 
carried on is identical with Pluto, the god of the lower 
world, Pfleiderer, interpreting it in a wholly different 
spirit, believes it to mean that these rites, although in 
themselves considered they would be most shameful, 
nevertheless have at least a partial justification from 
the fact that they are celebrated in honor of Dionysus, 
because since Dionysus and Pluto are the same, the 



rites are really a symbolism expressing the power of 
life over death and the indestructibility of life even 
in death. These vile phallus songs are in fact songs 
of triumph of life over death (Pfleiderer, p. 28). 
Although somewhat far-fetched, this is a possible in- 
terpretation of this obscure passage. This explanation 
is perhaps not more strained than the others that have 
been given {see below, frag. 137, crit. note). Granting 
it, and granting that Heraclitus here expresses a cer- 
tain sympathy with, or at least does not express 
condemnation of the Mysteries, what follows !' Surely, 
Pfleiderer would not seriously ask us to conclude from 
a single passage friendly to the religion of the Myste- 
ries, that Heraclitus' whole philosophy or any part of 
it was drawn from them. 

But this fragment has another and more important 
use for Pfleiderer. In the religious truth here expressed 
of the identity of Dionysus 'and Hades, that is, the 
identity of life and death, he finds the germ of all 
the Heraclitic philosophy. But the serious question 
immediately arises whether the philosophy of oppo- 
sites grew out of this identity, or whether this identity 
was merely another illustration of the law of oppo- 
sites. As Pfleiderer has produced no sufficient reason 
for believing differently, the natural conclusion is 
that, as elsewhere we find the unity of day and night, 
up and down, awake and asleep, so here we have the 
unity of the god of death and the god of Ufe, as another 
illustration of the general law. To reverse this ami 
say that in this particular antithesis we have the 
parent of all antitheses is very fanciful. Still further, 
we should infer from Pfleiderer's argument that the 
identity of Dionysus and Hades was a well known and 
accepted truth among the Mysteries, and that in the 



above fragment we find it in the very act of passing 
into the philosophy of the Ephesian. How much truth 
is there in this ? So little that there is no record of the 
identity of these two gode before the time of Hera- 
clitUB, Later, to be sure, something of the kind ap- 
pears. Dionysus represented at least five different 
gods, and in different times and places seems to have 
been identified with most of the principal deities. In 
Crete and at Delphi we hear of Zagreus, the winter 
Dionysus of the lower world. No doubt other instances 
might be shown where Dionysus was brought into 
Home relation or other with a chthonian deity. But 
Heraclitus, if he had wished to develop a philosophy 
from the alternation of summer and winter and the 
mystic symbolism of life and death therein contained, 
would hardly have chosen so dubious an expression of 
it as the unity of Dionysus and Hades. We have no 
reason to regard this as anything else than one of the 
many paradoxical statements which he loved, of his 
law of opposites. Indeed, the genesis of this law is not 
so obscure that we need to force it out of a hidden 
mystic symboUsm, Zeller in his introduction to Greek 
philosophy has well said that" " philosophy did not 
need the myth of Kore and Demeter to make known 
the alternation of natural conditions, the passage from, 
death to life and life to death ; daily observation taught 
it*' (Vol. l,p. 60). 

The intrinsic weakness of Pfleiderer's position is 
best seen when he attempts to pass to the doctrine of 
the flux. It taxes the imagination to see how the 
identity of life and death should lead to the universal 
principle ^dura ^topu xac oitdtn /isusc Pfieiderer would 
have us believe that the eternal flux was a subordinate 
thought — a mere picture to help the mind to conceive 



the primary metaphysical truth of the unity of oppo- 
sites. We have already attempted to show that any 
explanation of the Heraclitic philosophy must be wrong i 
which reduces the doctrine of the flux to a subordinate | 
position. Here it is sufficient to add that if Heraclitus 
had been seeking a picture to illustrate the optimistic 
endurance of life even in death, and the rational unity 
and harmony of opposite powers, he could not possibly 
have chosen a more unfortunate figure than the ever- 
flowing river into which one cannot step twice. Pflei- 
derer, in saying that Heraclitus chose the picture of the 
evanescence of things to illustrate his law of opposites 
and the endurance of life, seems to have forgotten 
that on a previous page (above, p, 602) he said that the 
hopeless creed of the masses, against which the Ephe- 
sian was trying to establish the triumph of life, saw 
not too much permanence and constancy in the world, 
but too little. 

We are forced, therefore, to conclude not only that 
Pfleiderer has failed to establish any especial depend- 
ence of Heraclitus upon thejreligion of the Greek Mys- 
teries, but also that his supposed discovery that we 
have here a metaphysical philosophy developed from 
the material principle of the oscillating identity of life 
and death, is an assumption without basis in fact. 

In redeeming the Ephesian from the charge of pessi- 
mism, Pfleiderer has done a good work. But here 
again he has gone too far, in flnding not only a well 
grounded rational optimism in the doctrine of a world- 
ruling Order, but also a practical optimism in the idea 
of the indestructibility of life, an idea which, although 
it appears on every page of Pfleiderer's book, is not to 
be found in any saying of Heraclitus or in any record 
of his philosophy. 


Section II. — Reconstructive. 

Having examined the four preceding fundamentally 
different views of the philosophy of Heraclitus, and 
having discovered that the opinions of modern critics 
on the tenor of this philosophy furnish a new and un- 
expected illustration of Heraclitus' own law of abso- 
lute instability, it remains to be considered whether it 
is possible to resolve, as he did, this general diversity 
into a higher unity, and in this case to verify hie law 
that in all opposition there is harmony. If such a 
unity is sought as that attempted by Lassalle, Schuster, 
and Pfleiderer, it may be said at once that the task is 
impossible. All such ambitious attempts in construc- 
tive criticism in the case of Heraclitus are certain to 
result, as we have seen, in over-interpretation, and 
while they may leave a completed picture in the mind 
of the reader, they do not leave a true one. Not only 
is such a unified view of the philosophy of the Ephe- 
sian unattainable, but it is unnecessary. It is quite 
. certain that had we before us his original book in its 
entirety, we should find therein no fully consistent 
system of philosophy. Yet it is just this fact that 
modern critics forget. While they point out errors 
and contradictions by the score in the books of their 
fellow critics, they allow^ for no inconsistencies on the 
part of the original philosopher. Presuppositions of 
harmony between all the sentences of an ancient 
writer have led to much violence of interpretation. 
Our interest in Heraclitus is not in his system as such, 
I but in his great thoughts which have historic signifi- 
' cance. These we should know, if possible, in their 



original meaning and in their connection with preced- 
ing and succeeding philosophy. Before concluding 
this introduction, then, it will be of advantage to re- 
capitulate the results of the foregoing criticism, and 
to place together such conclusions concerning the chief 
Heraclitic thoughts as we have drawn either from the 
agreement or the disagreement of the various critiSs, 
We shall best understand Heraclitus if we fix well 
in nund.his inunediate starting-point. As we found 
above in the examination of Pfleiderer's position (p\ 
47), the Ephesian philosopher was first and primarily \ 
a preacher. To him the people almost without excep- \ 
tion, were blind, stupid, and beastly. Heraclitus \ 
hated them. They got no farther than crude sense \ 
perception (cp. frags. 4, C, 3), failing not only to recog- 1 
nize the invisible harmony of the changing world, but I 
even the change itself (,cp. frag. 2). They believed / 
things were fixed because they appeared so at first / 
Bight. They preferred the lower passions to the higher / 
senses (cp. frag. 111). He is from first to last a misau/ 
\ thrope. He despises the people, yet as if constrain^ia 
/ by a divine command, he must deliver his message (cp. 
i frags. 1, 2). To understEind Heraclitus we must free our 
minds from conceptions of every other Greek philoso- V 
pher, except, perhaps, his fellow lonians. Never after- 
wards did philosophy exhibit such seriousness. We ] 
can no more imagine Herachtus at Athens than we ' 
can think of Socrates away from it. Although, as we ^ 
shall see, the philosophy of Plato stood in vital con- / 
nection with that of Heraclitus, no contrast could be | 
greater than the half playful speculative style of the / 
former, and the stern, oracular and dogmatic utter- 
ances of the latter. We shall find no parallel except 
in Jewish literature. Indeed, Herachtus was a pro- 


phet. As the prophets of Israel hurled their messages 
in actual defiance at the people, hardly more does the 
Ephesian seem to care how his words are received, if 
only he gets them spoken. Not more bitter and mis- 
anthropic is Hosea in his denunciation of the people's 
sins (cp. ch. iv. 1, 2 flf.), than is our philosopher in his 
contempt for the stupidity and dullness of the masses. 
At the very opening of his book he says, from his lofty 
position of conscious superiority : " This Law which I 
unfold, men insensible and half asleep will not hear, 
and hearing, will not comprehend" (frag. 2 ; cp. frags. 
3, 5, 94, 95). 

Now what was the prime error of the people which 
so aroused the Ephesian, and what was the message 
which he had to deliver to them ? Zeller is wrong in 
saying (Vol. 1, p. 576) that, according to Heraclitus, the 
radical error of the people was in attributing to things 
a permanence of being which they did not possess. In 
no passage does he censure the people for this. What 
he blames them for is their insensibility, for looking 
low when they ought to look high — in a word, for 
blindness to the Divine Law or the Universal Reason 
(frags. 2, 3, 4, 51, 45, 14). He blames them for 
not recognizing the beauty of strife (frag. 43), and 
the law of opposites (frag. 45). He blames them 
for their g rossness and beastliness (frags. 86, 111). 
Finally, he blames them for their immorality (frag. 
124), their silliness in praying to idols (frag. 126), 
and their imbecility in thinking they could purify 
themselves by sacrifices of blood (frag. 130). We 
see therefore how wholly impossible it is to under- 
stand Heraclitus unless we consider the ethical and 
religious character of his mind. Thus Zeller, in as far 
as he has attempted to give us a picture of Heraclitus' 


JsyBtem, has failed by starting with the doctrine of the / 
( flux and overlooking the religious motive. This is not 
to say, as Pfleiderer has done, that the flux was 
merely a negative teaching. Next to the recognition ( 
of the Eternal Law, it was the most positive of his \ 
teachings, and was the ground of his influence upon 
subsequent thought. As such it is of chief interest to 
us ; but as far as we wish to get a picture of HeracLitus 
himself, we must think first of his religious and ethical \ 
point of departure. Thus the content of Heraclitus' | 
message to his countrymen was ethical. It was a \ I 
call to men everywhere to wake up, to purify their / 
pa/ij9d/}o'j; i/'o^di;, and see things in their reality. ( / 

What now was this reality which he with his finer / 
insight saw, but which ruder souls were blind to ? ■ 
This brings us to the theoretical side or the philo- 
sophical content of Heraclitus' message. Here comes 
in the contribution of Teichmiiller, who, as we sawJ 
clearly pointed out that the great new thought of the I 
Ephesian was the unity in the manifold, as opposed to/ 
the imity over against the manifold, taught by' 
Xenophanes. It was the unity of opposition, the I 
harmony of strife. It was Order immanent in cease- 
less change. To use a phrase of Campbell's, " The 
Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity 
and perfect law" (Plat. Theaet. Appendix, p. 344). This 
was the central thought of Heraclitus, " the grandeur 
of which," says Campbell, " was far beyond the com- 
prehension of that time." But, it may he said, if we 
have rightly apprehended Heraclitus' position as a 
prophet and preacher, this was rather strong meat to 
feed the masses. But the ttoUoI with Heraclitus was a 
very broad term. It included everybody. The arro- 
gance of this man was sublime. Neither Homer nor 


Hesiod nor Pythagoras nor Xenophanes escaped his 
lash (cp. frags. l(i, 17, 119, 114). He had especially 
in mind the so-called "men of repute," and said they 
were makers and witnesses of lies (cp. frag. 118). The 

i whole male population of Ephesus, he said, ought to 
be hung or expelled on accoimt of their infatuation 
and blindness (cp. frag. 114). Addressing such an 
audience, indeed, his message had to be pitched high. 
We have in the Ephesian sage a man who openly 
claimed to have an insight superior to all the world, 
and the history of thought has vindicated his claim. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Heraclitus 
[ ^ did, in a measure, try to make the world-ruling Law 

! intelligible. He pictured it now as Justice, whose 
handmaids, the Erinyes, Tvill not let the sun overstep 
his bounds (frag. 39) ; now as Fate, or the all-determin- 
i ing Destiny (Stohaeus, Eel. i 5, p, 178; cp. frag. 63); 
; now as simple Law {frags. S3, 91), now as Wisdom 
(frag. 65), intelligent Will (frag. 19), God (frag. 36), 
Zeufi (frag. 65). Respecting the latter term he ez- 
preasly adds that it is misleading. So we see that 
Heraclitus did what some modem philosophers have 
been blamed for doing — he put his new thoughts into" 
old religious formulas. But it was more justifiable in ^ 
the case of the Ephesian. He did so, not to present ( 
, semblance of orthodoxy, but to try to make his idea 
intelligible. In fact, Heraclitus, no less than Xeno- 
phanes, was a fearless, outspoken enemy of the popular 
anthropomorphisms. " This world, the same for all," 
he says, " neither any of the gods nor any man has 
l made, hut it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever 
. living fire, kindled and quenched according to law " 
(frag. 20; cp. frag. 126). 
At this point it is natural to ask ourselves what, 



more exactly coneidered, Heraclitus meant by hie Uni- 
versal Order, his Divine Law, xoti/b; lojoi;, etc. This 
inquiry fair criticism will probably not allow us to 
answer more concisely than baa already been done. 
We have found ample reason for rejecting the notion 
that it was of a logical nature, or any objectification of 
that which is inherent in human thought. Yet it was 
not without human attributes. As fiery essence, it 
was identified with the universe and became ahnoat 
m ateria l. As Order, it approached the idea of pure 
mathematical Relation or Form (cp. frag. 33, and Zel- 
ler, Vol. 1, p. (i28, 3, and 620). As Wisdom, it was pic- 
tured as the intelligent power or efficient force that 
produces the Order. When we reflect what difficulty 
even at the present day we find in answering the 
simple question, What is Order ? we are less surprised 
to find that the Ephesian philosopher did not always 
distinguish it from less difficult conceptions. We are, \ 
however, surprised and startled at the significance of ) 
the thought which this early Greek so nearly formu- 
lated, that the one permanent, abiding element in a 

,l' universe of ceaseless change is mathematical relation. 
At any rate, while recognizing the want of perfect 
consistency and coordination in Heraclitus' system 
here, we shall be helped by keeping this in mind, that 
the system was pure pantheism. Too much stress can- 
not be laid upon Teichmuller's exposition of the history ' 
of the idea of Transcendent Beason, which first arose, 
not in Heraclitus, but in Anaxagoras. To the latter 
belongs the credit or the blame, whichever it may be, 
of taking the first step towards the doctrine of imma- 
teriality or pure spirit, which has influenced not only | 
philosophy, but society to its foundations even to 

I the present day. Heraclitus was guiltless of it. To 





him the world intelligence itself was a part of the world 
material — itself took part in the miiversal change. 

►se connection with the Heraclitic Universal 
Order stands the doctrine of strife as the method of 
the evolution of the worid, and the doctrine of the har- 
mony and ultimately the unity of opposites — thoughts 
which were not only central in Heraclitus' system, 
but which, being too advanced for his time, have 
waited to be taken up in no small degree by modem 
science. It is unnecessary to repeat here the explana- 
tions of Schuster (above, pp. 15, 16), and particularly 
of Teichmiiller (above, p. 27), which we found to indi- 
cate the correct interpretation of these thoughts. These 
principles are to Heraclitus the mediation between 
absolute change and perfect law. That which appears 
to the senses as rest and stability is merely the tempo- 
rary equilibriimoL of opposite striving forces. It is har- 
mony by tension (cp. frags. 45, 43, 46). This law, 
elementary in modem physics, is yet, as we shall pres- 
ently see, not the whole content of the Heraclitic 
thought, although it is its chief import. But in the 
equilibrium of opposite forces we have at least relative 
rest, not motion. And of molecular motion Heraclitus 
knew nothing. How then did he conceive of apparent 
stability as absolute motion ? This question supposes 
more exactness of thought than we look for in the 
Ephesian. The eternal flux was more generally con- 
ceived as absolute perishability. Nothing is perma- 
nently fixed. All is involved in the ceaseless round of 
life and death, growth and decay. Strictly, however, 
there is no contradiction here, since the rest of balanced 
forces is only relative rest. It is possibly not going 
too far to accept an illustration given by Ernst Laas 
(Idealismus u. Positivismus 1, p. 200) of Heraclitus' 



conception of absolute change under the dominion of 
law. He compares it to the actual path of our planets, 
which move neither in circles nor in exact ellipses, but 
under the influence of the attractive forces of moons 
f ) and of other planets, or of comets, continually change 

I both their course and their velocity, and yet all accord- 

[_ ing to law. 

In addition to the explanations now given, how- 
ever, there is something more to be said concerning 
the unity or sameness of opposites. This teaching is 
very prominent in the Heraclitic fragments (cp. frags. 
35, 36, 39, 43, 45, 46, 53, 57, 58, 59, 67, 78). This 
prominence was no doubt less in the original work, as 
the paradoxical character of these sayings has encour- 
aged their preservation. But all the critics have failed 
to notice that we have in these fragments two distinct 
c lass es of oppositlooa which, though confused in Hera- 
clitus' mind, led historically into different paths of 
development. The first is that unity of oppot 
which results from the fact that they are endlessly 

^ passing into one another. It must not be forgotten 
that this is a purely physical opposition, as has been 
pointed out by Zeller, Schuster and others, in refutff 
tion of the opinion of Lassalle, who fancied that he 
had found here a Hegelian logical identity of contra- 
dictories. As examples of this class of oppositions 
may be mentioned the identity of day and night (frag. 
36), gods and men ifrag. 07), alive and dead, asleep and 
awake (frag. 78). The identity of these oppositions 
means that they are not in themselves abiding condi- 
tions, but are continually and reciprocally passing 
into one another. As Heraclitus plainly says, they are ' 
the same because they are reciprocal transmutations 
of each other (frag. 78). But now we have another 




class of opposites to which this reasoning will not 
apply. "Gtood and evil," he says, "are the same" 
(frag^7). This in simply that identity of opposites 
^*^ich ^fe¥ eloped into the Protagorean doctrine of 

/ ref&Hvity.Tiie same thing may be good or evil 
according to Ahe side from which you look at it. The 

.^assagefwmi Hippolytus (Ref . haer. ix. 10 ; cp. frag. 
53, sources) states the doctrine of relativity as plainly 
as it can be stated. " Pure and impure, he [Heraclitus] 
says, are one and the same, and drinkable and undrink- 
,able are one and the same. ' Sea water,' he says, ' is 
'i very pure and very foul, for while to fishes it is drink- 
I able and healthful, to men it is hurtful and unfit to 
■ drink.' " (Compare the opposition of just and unjust, 
frag. 61 ; young and old, frag. 78 ; beauty and ugli- 

I ness, frag. 99 ; cp. frags. lOi, 98, 60, 61, 51, 53.) This 
simple truth is so prominent in the Heraclitic sayings 
that we see how Schuster could have mistaken it for 
the whole content of the theory of opposites and ig- 
nored the more important doctrine of the other class. 
fWe see further that Plato's incorrect supposition that 
the Protagorean subjectivism was wholly an outgrowth 
of the Heraclitic flux, resulted from his insufficient 
acquaintance with the Ephesian's own writings. It 
was a characteristic of Heraclitus that, in a degree 
surpassing any other philosopher of antiquity, and 
comparable only to the discoveries of Greek mathema- 
ticians and of modem physical philosophers, he had an 
insight into truths beyond his contemporaries, but he 
knew not how to coordinate or use them. Having hit 
upon certain paradoxical relations of opposites, he 
hastened to gi-oup under his new law all sorts of oppo- 
sitions. Some that cannot be included under either of 
the above classes appear in a passage from Aristotle 


(deMundo, 5, p. 396 b 13; cp. frag. 59, Bources ; cp. 
Eth. Eud. vii. 1, p. 1335 a 26 ; frag. 43), where in the 
case of the opposites sharps and flats, male and female, 
tlie opposition becomes simple correlation and the 
unity, harmony. * 

The order of treatment brings us now to the Hera- 
clitic flux, but we have been compelled so far to anti- 
cipate this in discussing the Universal Order and the 
Law of Opposites that but one or two points need be 
considered here. As we have seen in the study of 
Schuster and Teichmiiller, the Heraclitic doctrine of 
the flux was a thoroughly ratUcal one. Heaven and 
earth and all that they contain were caught in its fatal 
whirlpool. It exempted no inunortal gods of the poets 
above us, no unchangeable realm of Platonic ideas 
around us, no fixed Aristotelian earth beneath us. 
It banished all permanence from the universe, and 
banished therewith all those last supports which men 
are accustomed to cling to. It introduced alarm into 
philosophy, and set men, even to the present day, 
asking. What can be saved from this general wreck ? 
^ What is there absolutely permanent in the universe? ) 
This question, as we have seen, did not trouble Hera- 
clitus himself, for, consistently or inconsistently, he / 
had a foundation rock in his Universal Law, Reason! 
or Order, which was his theoretical starting-point, 1 
Furthermore, concerning the flux, it is doubtful 
whether he ever pictured to himself such absolute 
instability as his words imply. 

But we are tempted to ask. Is his system here 
really, as it first appears, inconsistent P Mr. Borden 
P. Bowne in his Metaphysics (p. 89) says that the 
Heraclitic theory of change thus extremely conceived 
" is intelligible and possible only because it is false," 

? I 



Let US look at Mr. Bowue's argument. He has first 
shown in the same chapter that the Eleatic conception 
of rigid being without change is impossible, since in a 
world of absolute fixity, even the illusion of change 
would be impossible. Furthermore, he has shown that 
the vulgar conception of changeless being with 
changing states is untenable, since the "state of a 
thing expresses what the thing is at the time." 
Changing states would be uncaused and undetermined 
except as the being changes. There can be therefore 
no fixed useless core of being. In general there is no 
changeless being. All is change, all is becoming. Is 
there then, he asks, any permanence or identity what- 
ever, or is the extreme Heraclitic position true ? It is 
false. Why? Because, as in a world of Eleatic 
fixity, even the illusion of change would be impos- 
sible, so in a world of absolute change, even the appear- 
ance of rest would be impossible. There must be some 
abiding factor, that change may be known as change. 
There must be something permanent somewhere to 
make the notion of flow possible. This permanent 
something Mr. Bowne finds in the knowing subject — 
the conscious self. Having proceeded plainly up to 
this point, here he becomes mystical. The permanence 
of the conscious self, he continues, does not consist in 
any permanent substance of the soul. The soul forever 
changes equally with other being. The permanence 
consists in memory or self-consciousness. " How this 
is possible," he says, " there is no telling." The per- 
manence and identity of the soul consists, however, 
only in its ability " to gather up its past and carry it 
with it." 

In this argument, Mr. Bowne's first fallacy is in 
saying that in a world of absolute change there must 



be some permanent factor in order that the change 
itself may be known. This is meaningless. Perma- 
nent as regards what ? Permanence as regards other 
moving factors is simply relative difference of change. 

l^Mr. Bowne seems to have committed the primitive 
error of supposing that because all things seem to 

[ move, he alone is fixed— ^like the earth in the Ptole- 
maic astronomy. According to his argument, if he 
were in a moving car and should meet another moving 
car, the perception of movement would be impossible. 
His reasoning assumes that by absolute change is 
meant uniform change all in one way, which would 
not be change at all, but absolute fixity. Difference 
is the essential element in change, and difference is 
all that is necessary to the idea of change. The 
assumption of peimanent personality in order to make 
change itself possible is unnecessary. Mr. Eowne says 
that what constitutes permanence in the conscious 
self is its ability to gather up its past and carry it with 
it. But a stratifying rock or growing tree gathers 
up its past and carries it with it. But the apparent 
permanence in the case of the rock or tree is a tempo- 
rarily abiding form or temporarily abiding spacial 
relations. The apparent permanence of personality 
may similarly consist wholly in a temporarily abiding 
form or relation, must in fact consist in this, since 
Mr. Bowne rejects any abiding soul substance. But 
temporarily abiding relations, the extreme Heracli- 
teans do not deny, certainly not Heraclitus, to whom 
apparent rest was due to the temporary equilibrium 
of opposite balancing forces. We conclude, therefore, 
that Mr. Bowne's charge of falsity against the theory 
of the Heraclitic flux is not well substantiated. Here 
as ever we see the difference between modern and 


ancient philosophy. The former looks "within, the 
latter without. Mr. Bowne seeks the abiding within 
himself. HeraclituB looked away from himself to the 
Universal Order without, which determined all things 
and himself. 

But though the Heraclitic absolute fiux is vindicated 
from objections of the above character, the question 
still remains unanswered whether the doctrine is con- 
sistent with his conception of absolute Order, Did 
not Heraclitus make the common mistake of hypost'a- 
sizing law ? Did he not conceive of law as something 
by which the action of things is predeterminedj rather 

' than as a mere abstraction from the action of things ? 
No doubt he did even worse than this, for he ascribed 
to his xotvo; ioyoi;, attributes which led Bernays and 

I Teichmiiller to believe that it was a self-conscious 

. being, (a conclusion questioned by Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 
609, 3). But yet again he saved his consistency here 
by identifying his Absolute with fire and thereby 
bringing it after all into the all-consuming vortex of 
endless change. But in the face of this all-embracing 
flux, the one idea which stands out most prominent in 
Heraclitus is the deep rationality of the world — the 
eternal Order. Nor in the last analysis are these two 
at variance, for any world must be rational to the 
beings in it, for the rationality of the world to us is 

j only our adaptation to the world, which is involved in 

I the very fact of our existence. 

Concerning the cosmogony, it is worth while to re- 
call the suggestive thought contained in the •j^pT^fffiaai/i/^ 
and xopo^ of Heraclitus. In our examination of Schus- 
ter's work we found reason to believe that the word 
y_pr^a/ioa-ju^, which we may render " craving " or " long- 
ing," was used by the Ephesian to denote the charac- 



ter of the impulse or motive force by which the primi- 
tive world matter or fire evolved itself into the world 
of individual things. The records are too meagre to 
warrant much enlargement upon this idea ; neverthe- 
less it is important historically and in itself interesting. 
It is the beginning of that line of thought which finds 
thg_analogy to the original motive or creative power of ^ 
the unive rse, not in man's intellectual but in his emo- 
tio ^al nat ure, not in pure thought but in pure desire. (/ 
It is opposed to the conception of Aristotle that the 
absolute first mover is pure intellect, the thought of 
thought {ybr^atz for^auu:;) , and to the modem German 
enlargement of the same which began with the intel- 
lectual monads of Leibniz. On the other hand, it is 
in^ agreement with the idea brought out by Plato in 
hi s Symp osium, the idea of Love as the source of devel- 
opment and immortality, and it reminds us later of 
Plotinus, who refuses to predicate thought or reason of 
the One but identifies it with the Good. The Hera- 
clitic-PIatonic notion is no less anthropomorphic than 
the Aristotelian-Leibnizian ; but if the human mind 
must furnish forth some faculty to be singly hyposta- 
sized into God, we much prefer the richer emotional 
side to that of pure dry intellect or reason. 

We come now to the Heraclitic ethics, the freshest y 
and most vital part of his philosophy, but most misun- 
derstood by all the critics. The practical ethical rule 
with_ Heraclitus is to follow the law of the state, i 
which again is dependent upon the Divine Law (frags. [ 
91, 100). From his standpoint this agrees with his in- 
junction to live according to Nature (frag. 107). More . 
broadly stated, men should follow the Universal as 
opposed to individual whims. " The Law of Keason 
is common, but the majority of people live as though 



they had an understanding of their own " (frag. 92). 
This leads us directly to the theoretical ethical prin- 
ciple which lay at the root of all Heraclitus' philosophy, 
and which we have outlined above (p. 58) in defining 
his starting point as that of a preacher and prophet. 
The highest good was not contentment (jsxjapiarr^acz), a 
(Statement taken from a single indefinite passage in 
Clement of Alexandria (Strom, ii. 21, p. 417 ; Clement 
is followed by Theodoretus, iv. p. 984, ed. Halle), and 
which, though adopted by Zeller, is as silly and impos- 
sible as the better authenticated statement that Hera- 
clitus wept over everything. Such an ethical principle 
is at variance with every sentence of the Ephesian. 
He continually exhorts men, as we have seen, to arise, 
get out of their lethargy and wake up. His most 
pungent sarcasm is directed against the people who 
are in a state of indifference, sleepiness, contentment 
(frags. 2, 3, 5, 94, 95, etc.). The highest good with Hera- 
/ clitus, therefore, is the greatest intellectually activity ^ 

: the greatest receptivity to the divine reason around 
us, the greatest freedom from individual peculiarities 

1 and the greatest possession of that which is universal. 

1 *^ Human nature," he says, " does not possess under- 
standing, but the divine does " (frag. 96). We must 
look away from ourselves to Nature around us. We 
must follow the universal Reason therein expressed. 
Proximately for men this is best found in the common, 

; the normal, the customary, finally therefore in public 

(^ law. 

It will thus be noticed that we have in Heraclitus 
an emphatic expression of the type of ethics peculiar 

;. to the Greeks. Of the individual he thought little. 
" To me one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag. 
113). He blamed the Ephesians for their declaration 



of democracy (frag. lU). He would not have been 
able to appreciate those modern systems of ethics / 
which make a moral law out of individual conscience I 
and justify actions by good intentions. Heraclitus, as 
I r-^ell as psychologists of recent times, seemed to appre- 
t^ciate the dangers of self -involution. His whole sys- 
tem is a protest against individual intensification. He 
will not have men roll themselves into a cocoon of a 
single system, or revolve in the circle of a single set of 
ideas. He will have them throw themselves open tot 
the common light, keep every sense open and recep- 
tive to new impressions, and thereby attain ti-uth, 
which is found in the universal alone. 

The optimism which Pfleiderer justifies for Hera- 
oUtus does not stand in contradiction to the misan- 
thropy that we have found to characterize him. His 
optimisnLwas thoroughly Leibnizian. It was reasoned 
optimism, resulting in Jhe strong conviction that the 
world is good, rational and orderly. Most men, to be 
sure, are fools, but it is their own fault, as they will 
not put themselves in right relation to the world. 
Gottlob Mayer, in a pamphlet entitled "Heraklit von 
Ephesus imd Arthur Schopenhauer," has been at pains 
to prove that Heraclitus ia a Schopenhauer pessimist. 
We cannot regard his attempt as successful. Our 
study of the Ephesian philosopher in the preceding 
pages has shown nothing more clearly than that the 
logical result of his metaphysics is not, as this author 
claims, pessimism, but quite the opposite. None of the 
passages which he cites Ccp. frags. 86, 55, 84, 66, 30, 
111) can be made to yield any pessimism beyond mis- 
anthropy, unless possibly the one from Lucian (Vit. 
Auct. c. U—HNHTMI. ri jap o ahow lauv; HP.U 
KAEITOS, Tidii; Tiai^wu, Tisaaz'jwj, diatftpoiiivon;^ cp, frag. 



79), where Time is compared to a child at play, now 
arranging, now scattering the pebbles. And yet noth- 
ing is concluBive from this. It refers evidently to 
the periodic creation and destruction of the world. 
Whether this world building is a pastime of Jove, or 
the product of fate or of love, makes no difference in 
this case, provided only the resulting world is one well 
disposed and rational. 


What has given rise to the reviving interest in Hera- 
clitus attested by the monographs which have lately 
appeared ? The modern world hardly hopes to get any 
new light from his oracular sayings gathered in muti- 
lated fragments from Philo and Plutarch, from Cle- 
ment and Origen, Such unhoped for light, however, 
as our introductory study has shown, may for some 
minds be found breaking in after all. But the interest 
in the philosopher of Ephesus is historical. The new 
discovery of the present half century is that the way 
to study philosophy is to study its history, and eepeci- 
\ ally its genesis. The passion for origins has carried 
the interest back to Greek philosophy, and finally back 
to the beginnings of Greek philosophy. But there is 
still another reason for going back. In the confusion 
arising from the fall of the idealistic philosophy in 
Germany, it was first thought that it would be neces- 
sary to return to Kant and secure a new footing ; not 
that any new light was seen emanating from Kant, 
but error having arisen, it was necessary to trace it to 
its source. 

This movement has neither been successful nor does 

it promise to be. In fact, there is a certain weariness 

. in philosophy of the whole modern subjective method. 



The result has been that thinkers have turned away 
from it to the one objective side of modem philosophy, 
namely, the sciences. Those, however, who still retain 
their love of philosophy in its larger sense, are going 
back farther than Kant. They see that the whole 
Hume-Kantian-Fichtean movement was a digression, 
a sort of branch road, which to be sure had to be 
explored before philosophy could go on in safety, but 
which was found to lead nowhere in particular, and 
that, having thanked these investigators for their ser- 
vices rendered, we may decline to concern ourselves 
further with this digression, but go on with our search 
for objective results. In this search our starting point 
must be from that philosophy which is most free I 
from this whole subjective tendency. Such is the 
philosophy of Greece. Considering therefore that the 
introspective method has not proved so fruitful as 
was hoped, and that it is at least more modest if not 
more rational to regard man as a part of Nature, rather | 
than Nature as a part of man, students of philosophy 
are turning their attention to the Greek philosophers 
where the freer and more ingenuous conception rules. 

These two causes, therefore, the former, the passion 
for studying the origin and development of thought and 
the connection of different systems of thought, the 
latter, the need of disinfecting our minds from all the 
germs of a pathological introspective habit, and putting 
ourselves as an experiment in the position of those 
who took it for granted that Nature was larger than 
man, have led us back to Greek philosophy and 
especially to its sources. 

In either o:f these aspects Heraclitus is important. 
He is a perfect, by all means the most perfect, illustra-i 
tion of those qualities which are usually supposed tol 



characterize the Greek mind, namely, receptivity, un- 
prejudiced freedom of thought, love of order, and truet- 
, fill confidence in the unity of man and Nature. Of all 
the Greek schools these qualities were best represented 
by the Ionian thinkers who, coming before what has 
been called " the fall of man in Socrates,'' were free 
from the later dialectical disturbances. And of the 
lonians, Heraclitus, the last, best incorporates them. 
But it is in the other aspect that the philosopher of 
Ephesus is most important, namely, in the origin and 
history of ideas. Let us notice summarily what has 
come from him. 

To Heraclitus we trace the philosophy of change, 
prominent in subsequent Greek philosophy as yq-uSiiEi/ov, 
the indirect cause of the counter movement of Socrates 
and Plato with its powerful determining influences, 
central in modern times as motion in the philosophy 
of Hobhes and the ground principle in the important 
system of Trendelenburg, and finally in a logical trans- 
^'formation, prominent in both German and English 

■ (, thought as Werden or Becoming. To Heraclitus we 

f trace the notion of Relativity, the central point in the 
doctrine of the Sophists, which jhy withdrawing every 
absolute standard of truth, threatened to destroy all 
knowledge and all faith, and which sent Socrates 
searching for something permanent and fixed in the 
concepts of the human mind, and so led to the finished 
results of Plato and Aristotle. To Heraclitus we trace 
some of the fundamental doctrines of the Stoics, 
namely, their abrogation of the antithesis of mind and 
matter and their return to pre-Socratic monism, their 

J conception of Nature as larger than man and his com- 
plete subjection to it, and finally their doctrine of the 
" future conflagration of the world, later an influential 

'. factor in Christianity. , 



These were the thoughts which were most important 
in their determining influence upon subsequent philo- 
sophy. The following, while in themselves no less im- 
portant, were less directly involved in the history of 
opinion. Of these the first is the notion of Law and 
Order ahsolute and immanent in the world, an idea so 
large that no Greek follower could grasp it, and yet 
vital to Heraclitus' system, for without it his philo- 
sophy becomes the philosophy of desperation, the source 
among the ingenuous Greeks of the nihilism of Gor-' 
giaa or the universal doubt of the skeptics, and among 
the brooding moderns the source of the pessimism of 
Schopenhauer. To Heraclitus again we trace, as 
TeichmuUer has shown, the closely related doctrine of 
' the immanence of God in the world, so that we have in 

- him one source of the pantheistic systems. To Hera- 
clitus, finally, we trace the physical law of opposites, 
the thought that all order and harmony and apparent 
permanence are the result of opposite tension, the bal- 
ance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. Less in- 
volved in the history of philosophy, though most im- 
portant to Heraclitus, and in themselves most interest- 

' ing to us of modern times, are his great ethical thoughts 

- which we have already outlined. 

The determinative ideas of the Ephesian may be 
Bunamed up in a word by saying that they represent 
all that way of thinking against which Socrates and 
Plato raised the whole weight -of their authority. 
Without repeating here the facts, well enough known 
to everybody, of the Socratic reaction in Greek philo- 
sophy, we must sketch one or two phases of it in order 
to establish the influence and explain the final defeat 
of the Heraclitic philosophy. In Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle, philosophy underwent a change more radical 



than any other in its history, a change that was ulti- 
mately to revolutionize all thought, and, through its 
influence on Christian theology, to enter as a large 
determining element into all western civilization. 

IHeracIitus is the representative of what philosophy 
was before that change. 

Socrates said he could not understand the book of 
Heraclitus. That was not strange. The Ephesian 
could have told him the reason why. The man who 
could learn nothing from the fields and trees {see 
Plato's Phaedrus, p. 230), who spent all his time in 
the Agora conversing with other men about virtue, 
and who never seemed to realize that there was a 
world above the heads and under the feet of men, 
was not likely to understand the book of Heraclitus. 
Could the Ephesian philosopher have taken the Atheni- 

- an logician out and given him a few lessons from Nature 
at first hand, could he have induced him to desist for a 
while from his boring into human intellects in search 
of a definition, and got his gaze lifted up to the clouds 
and stars, and put him in actual contact with the 
■Ktpdypv, he would have been an apter scholar with the 
book. But it is quite imposBible even in fancy to 
think of these two men together. The conmiuner 
with Nature, the stern misanthropic sage and prophet 

, of Ephesus had no points in common with the society- 
loving Athenian sophist. They were radically differ- 
ent, and on this difference hangs the secret of the 
development of philosophy for two thousand years. 
Socrates was not a Greek at all. He denied the most 

i' characteristic traite of his nation. He was a modem 
in many true senses. He was a curiosity at Athens, 
and consequently very much in vogue. 
Socrates representsthe birth of self-consciousness. In 



practicing his maieutic art to this end, he little thought 
that he was giving the death-blow to the most beauti- 
ful trait of his countrymen, namely, the instinctive, 
the unconscious, the naive. No doubt this new birth 
had to take place some time, but under Socrates' 
direction it was premature. The old methods were 
not yet dead. Here historians of philosophy err. They 
say the pre-Socratic philosophers of Nature had in vain 
) tried to solve the problems of the world, and it was high 
J time for a critical philosophy that should begin with 
man. In vain, indeed ! Had the naturalists labored in 
vain when the foundation of the atomic philosophy had 
been laid iu Abdera, that of mathematics in Italy, and 
a far-seeing metaphysics and ethics in Ephesus ? Soc- 
rates and Plato took fright too easily at the Sophists. " 
Their philosophy would have died with them. Not so 
that of Democritus, Pythagoras, and Heraclitus. Soc- 
rates was a professor of clear thinking. Clear thinking 
is in itself well, but two solid centuries of clear think- 
ing from Descartes to Hegel have in modem times 
ended in failure. We long to know what natural 
thinking would have accomplished if it had been left 
an open field a while longer in Greece. Then again 
clear thinking was overdone. It was, to be sure, not 
Socrates' fault that bis method was afterwards abused, 
but as a matter of fact it took in later history a patho- 
logical turn that has resulted in wide-spread evils. 
Over self-consciousness, too much inwardness and i 
, painful self-inspection, absence of trust in our instincts 
) and of the healthful study of Nature, which in ethics 
/' are illustrated in modern questions of casuistry, and 
|in philosophy in Cartesian doubt and the skepticism of 
f Hume, characterize our worst faults. The philosophy 
jand ethics of Heraclitus, as we have seen, stood in 
[vital opposition to all these traits. 


But there was Einother respect in which the fall of 
) man took place in Socrates. The love of beauty and 
Nform, and particularly beauty of the human body, 
(characterized all the Greeks until Socrates, but char- 
/acterizes modem people in a relatively small degree, 
' Socrates cared nothing for outward beauty, but to the 
surprise of his fellow-citizens laid all the emphasis 
upon moral beauty, {"We will say he was too large 
hearted to have had a personal motive for so doing.) 
It may be that the Greeks estimated physical beauty 
relatively too high, but the rebound has been too 
great. Caught up by the genius of Plato and inten- 
sified by the tenor of his philosophy, and met six 
centuries later in Alexandria by a powerful current 
of the same tendency from Judea, it effected the com- 
plete destruction of the Greek idea, and with it of 
course of Greek art. In the medieval church, inherited 
moral deformity was a sin of such extreme import, 
that for it a man was to be forever damned ; but inher- 
ited physical deformity w^as not only not a siu, but 
often a blessing, teaching him as it did the relative 
worthlessness of the earthly life and body. So far was 
the Greek idea reversed that the body, instead of being 
the type of beauty, became the type of impurity, and 
from being the support of the soul, became its cou- 
taminator. The "flesh," indeed, was the symbol of 
evil. The results in modem life are only too well 
-known. Among them may be mentioned the loss of 
'i appreciation of the worth of the present physical life 
I in itself, failure to recognize the close connection of 
/ Boul and body, and that the health of the former 
depends on the health of the latter, resulting in all the 
' -strange devices to secure the welfare of the soul in the 
face of persistent disregard of the laws of physical 



health, or in such attempts as that of sustaining the 
moral status of a community where all hygienic laws 
are violated. This idea has been groimd into the 
popular mind ("by so long J education that modern 
educators find it a serious problem how to correct it. 
It is not merely physical education that is wanted, but 
a reconstruction of our notions about the relation of 
body and mind. The Socratic work must be in part 
undone, and we mjist get back more nearly to the pre- 
Socratic conception of balance, for to them physical 
ugliness was no less an evil than moral ugliness. 

But there is still another aspect of the Socratic 
apostasy, as important as those we have mentioned, and 
so far-reaching in its effects that it determines modern 
thought even to the lowest ranks of society. In this 
movement begun by Socrates, but perfected by Plato 
and Aristotle, the central thought of the Heraclitic phi- 
losophy was denied, and denied with such power that 
now after twenty -two hundred years it hardly dares 
assert itself. We refer, of course, to the Platonic tran- 
scendentalism. It was designed to give the death-blow 
to Heraclitus, and it succeeded ultimately beyond the 
wildest hopes of its founders. Strictly it wasbegun by 
Anaxagoras. We have already seen with Teichmuller 
how the doctrine of transcendent reason gained its first 
characteristic, Pure Separation, in the Nous of Anax- 
agoras. its second. Identity, in the definitive work of 
Socrates. But it was Plato who elevated it into a 
great system and gave it to the world for a perpetual 
inheritance. Finally, Aristotle, as if the fates con- 
spired to make this doctrine, immortal, took it up and 
adapted it to unpoetical inductive minds. Heraclitus 
in a wonderful conception of the world had abolished 
every antithesis and enunciated a system of pure 


liism. The Socratic school reversed his plan and set 
.p a dualism of universal and particular, noumenon and 
i|f/ phenomenon, mind and body, spirit and matter, which 
has dominated all philosophy, religion and literature. 

it is with the origin of this dualism that we are 
concerned, not with the familiar history of its out- 
come, but yet we may recall what to the student of 
philosophy or even of history it is needless to more 
than mention, how this dualism fastened itself upon 
Bu bse qu e ntth ought ; how as realism and nominalism 
it divided the schoolmen ; how as mind and matter it 
left_De8carte8 in hopeless difficulty ; how Spinoza 
founded a philosophy expressly to resolve it, but suc- 
ceeded only by the artifice of terms ; how Leibnitz 
solved the problem, though with too much violence, by 
use of the same bolduess vrith which its founders 
established it ; how Kant finally left the antithesis 
unexplained ; how again as the material and imma- 
terial it fixed itself in the psychology of Aristotle, who 
affirmed as the higher part of the human mind, the 
active Nous or principle of pure immateriality, cogniz- 
ant of the highest things, identical with the divine 
Prime Mover, and inunortal, thus constituting for 
man the highest glorification that he ever received 
from his own hand,; how Thomas Aquinas, spokesman 
for a powerfulchurch, adopted this psychology and fast- 
ened it upon the modem popular world ; how finally, 
in the sphere of religion proper, the transcendent- 
alism of Plato has grown into the belief in pure Spirit 
and spiritual existences, peopling heaven and earth, 
and holding conununion w^ith matter and body, though 
having absolutely nothing in common (if the paradox 
may be excused) with them. Such has been in part 
the wonderful expansion of the Platonic Idealism. 


And "what was all this for in the first place ? It was i 
raised primarily, as a barrier against the dissolving ■ 
power o£ theeternal flux of the Heracliteans. A philo- 
sophy had arisen in Greece that denied all perma- / 
^euce. Misunderstood by the Sophists and abused by ' 
Cratylus, it called out the protest of Socrates, at heart 
the sincerest man of his contemporaries. Man, im- 
pelled by that very faculty which connects him most 
closely with Nature, namely, the sense of dependence, 
demands something permanent and unchangeable, 
upon which he can base his laws, religion and philo- 
sophy. If he cannot find it in Nature or in Revelation, 
he will make it out of a part of himself. This is what I 
Socrates and Plato did. Socrates, seeking the perma- 
nent for ethical motives, detesting Nature and failing 
to find there anything fixed and abiding, turned to 
man and man's manner of thinking. By analysis of 
thought he separated out general concepts which ap- 
peared to be the same for all. Plato, perhaps less in 
earnest than subsequent ages gave him credit for, 
hypoatasized them, raised them into real objective 
existences, henceforth to become idols, convenient 
entities to fill all gaps in human reasoning, objects of 
the dreams of poets and the worship of the religious, 
archetypes from which a lazy philosophy could deduce 
the universe. How, we naturally ask, could this auda- 
cious piece of anthropomorphism, in which man delib- 
erately took his own norms of thought, projected them 
outward, and elevated them into gods, impose itself 
upon the world as it did ? There are two answers. 
First, it flattered men immensely, and like all anthro- 
pomorphisms, thereby won half the battle. Second, it 
did not succeed at once, but slumbered for four centu- 
ries, and finally, in the decadence of all systems of 


philosophy and the breaking up of the old civilization, 
awakened to supply the groundwork of a religious 
revival. Platonism fell dead on the Greek world. 
Plato, and Aristotle as well, shot over the heads of 
their fellows. The philosophy of the Academy was a 
hrilliant piece of speculation such as only the age of 
Pericles could call out. After that, philosophy fell 
back into the old ways. The Older Academy dragged 
out a short existence and died. Zeno, a Cypriote, hut 
in his desire for unity more Greek than Plato, studied 
first with Polemo, head of the Academy, but disap- 
pointed with Platonism, turned back to Heraclitus. 
His school, as well as the Epicureans and Skeptics, 
returned to the Heraclitic monism. These schools 
loyally upheld for three centuries the Greek idea of 
the unity of man and Nature. But philosophy itself 
was doomed and fated to pass over into religion on the 
one hand and mysticism on the other. Platonism w^as 
admirably adapted to this end. In luxurious Alex- 
andria, the weary inductive method of Aristotle, which 
the Ptolemies had instituted in the Museum, soon 
yielded to the fascinating lazy philosophy of Plato. 
Philo the Jew, Plutarch the moralist, Valentinus the 
Gnostic, Origen the Christian, all yielded to it in 
greater or less degree. In Plotinus it reached its full 
fruitage. Porphyry, his pupil, relates that he was 
ashamed of having a body and was careless of its 
needs, so anxious was he ecstatically to absorb his 
rsoul in the Supra- rational Transcendent One. Here 
we have a last consequence of the Socratic doctrine of 
• mind. Here we have the extreme opposition to the 
I naturalism of Heraclitus which considered man as a 
I subordinate part of Nature. Greek philosophy ended 
with the triumph of Socrates and the defeat of Hera- 


clituB. The wealth of Plato and Aristotle was the 
bequest that was handed over to the coming centuries. 
/ The Greek naturalists were forgotten. It was reserved 
for the present century to revive and vindicate them. 
In what has been said in setting in relief the philo- 
sophy of Heraclitus, it is obvious that we have been 
concerned with but two or three- aspects of that of 
Socrates and Plato, namely, its transcendental, ideal- 
istic and subjective character. It is not necessary to 
add that were we referring to other sides of it, as for 
instance, the undeniable importance of Socrates' con- 
tribution to ethics, and that of Plato to ethics and reli- 
gion as well as to real scientific thought, the result 
would be very different. And of the Idealism itself, its 
very fascination and prevalence argue that it meets 
some want of human beings. It is poetry, to be sure, 
but as poetry it has been and will still be useful in saving 
men from' the dangers of coarse materialistic thought. 


Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature. 

I. — It is wise for those who hear, not me, but the 
universal Reason, to confess that all things are on^.^ 

II. — To this universal Reason which I unfold, 
although it always exists, men make themselves in- 
sensible, both before they have heard it and when 
they have heard it for the first time. For notwith- 
standing that all things happen according to this 
Reason, men act as though they had never had any 
experience in regard to it when they attempt such 
words and works as I am now relating, describing 
each thing according to its nature and explaining how 
it is ordered. And some men are as ignorant of what 

SouECES. — I. — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 9. Context : — Heraclitus 
says that all things are one, divided undivided, created uncreated, 
mortal immortal, reason eternity, father son, God justice. " It is 
wise for those who hear, not me, but the universal Reason, to con- 
fess that all things are one." And since all do not comprehend 
this or acknowledge it, he reproves them somewhat as follows: 
*'They do not understand how that which separates unites with 
itself ; it is a harmony of oppositions like that of the bow and of 
the lyre'* (=:frag. 45). 

Compare Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 88. Context, see frag. 24. 

II. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9. Context: — And that Beason 
always exists, being all and permeating all, he (Heraclitus) says in 
this manner : " To this universal,*' etc. 

Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 5, p. 1407, b. 14. Context : — For it is very hard 
to punctuate Heraclitus' writings on account of its not being clear 
whether the words refer to those which precede or to those which 
follow. For instance, in the beginning of his work, where he says, 
"To Reason existing always men make themselves insensible." 
For here it is ambiguous to what "always" refers. 

Sextus Empir. adv. Math. vii. 132. — Clement of Alex. Stromata, 
V. 14, p. 716. — Amelius from Euseb. Praep. Evang. xi. 19, p. 540. — 
Compare Philo, Quis. rer. div. haer. 43, p. 505. — Compare loannes 
Sicel.'in Walz. Rhett. Gr. vi. p. 95. 

1 The small figures in the translation refer to the critical notes, pp. 115 ff. 


they do w'hen awake as they are forgetful of what they 
do when asleep.' 

— III. — Those who hear a.nd do not understand are 
like the deaf. Of them the proverb says: "Present, 
they are absent," 

— IV. — Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men having 
rude souls. 

" V. — The majority of people have no understanding 
of tlie things with which they daily meet, nor, when 
instructed, do they have any right knowledge of them, 
although to themselves they seem to have. 

— VI. — They understand neither how to hear nor how 
to speak. ~^ 

III.— Clement of Ales. Strom, v. 14, p. 718, Context,:— And if you 
wiah to trace out that saying, " He that hath ears to hear, let him 
hear," you will find it expressed by the Ephesian in this manner, 
"Those who hear," etc. 

Theodoretua, Therap. i. p. 13, 49. 

IV.— Sestna Emp. adv. Math. vii. 126. Context :— He (Heraclitus) 
casts discredit upon sense perception in the saying, " Eyes and ears 
are had witnesses to men having mde souls." Which is equivalMit 
to saying that it is the part of rude souls to trust to the irrational 

StobaeuB Floril. iv. 56. 

Compare Diogenes Laert. ix. 7. 

v.— Clement of Ales. Strom, ii. 2, p. 432. 
■ M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context : — Be ever mindful of the Heraclitic 
saying that the death of eaith is to become water, and the death of 
water is to become air, and of air, fire (see frag. 25). And remember 
also him who is fot^tful whither the way leads (comp. frag. 73) ; 
and that men quarrel with that with which they are in most con- 
tinnal association (^frag. fl3), namely, the Reason which governs 
all. And those things with which they meet daily seem to them 
strange ; and that ne ought not to act and speak as though we were 
asleep (^ frag. 94), for even then we seem to act and speak. 

VI.— Clement of A!ex. Strom, ii. 5, p. 442. Context :— Heraclitus, 
scolding some as unbelievers, saya ; "They understand neither how 
to hear nor to speak," prompted, I suppose, by Solomon, "If thou 
lovest to hear, thou shalt understand ; and if thou iuclinest thine 
ear, thou ahalt be wise," 



VII. — If you do not hope, you will not win that 
which is not hoped for, since it is unattainable and 

VIII. — Gold-seekers dig over much earth and find 
little gold. - 

IX. — Debate. 

X. — Nature loves to conceal herself. 

XI. — The God whose oracle is at Delphi neither 
speaks plainly nor conceals, but indicates by signs. 

XII. — But the Sibyl with raging mouth uttering 
things solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her 
voice over a thousand years, because of the God. 

VII. — Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 4, p. 437. Context : — Therefore, 
that which was spoken by the prophet is shown to be wholly true, 
" Unless ye believe, neither shall ye understand." Paraphrasing 
this saying, Heraclitus of Ephesus said, " If you do not hope," etc. 

Theodoretus, Therap. i. p. 15, 51. 

VIII. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 2, p. 565. 

Theodoretus, Therap. i. p. 15, 52. 

IX. — Suidas, under word afK^Laparelv, * A filter Bar tlv, Iviol to afK^naPrfTeiv 
'iQveg 6e Kal ayx''P^'^^'''^t i^o.i ayxiPo-oi-JTV *B.pdK?ietTog, 

X. — Themistius, Or. v. p. 69 (= xii. p. 159). Context : — Nature 
according to Heraclitus, loves to conceal herself ; and before nature 
the creator of nature, whom therefore we especially worship and 
adore because the knowledge of him is difficult. 

Philo, Qu. in Gen. iv. 1, p. 237, Aucher.: Arbor est secundum 
Heraclitum natura nostra, quae se obducere atque abscondere amat. 

Compare idem de Profug. 32, p. 573 ; de Somn. i. 2, p. 621 ; de 
Spec. legg. 8, p. 344. 

XI. — Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 21, p. 404. Context : — And I think 
you know the saying of Heraclitus that ** The God," etc. 

lamblichus, de Myst. iii. 15. 

Idem from Stobaeus Floril. Ixxxi. 17. 

Anon, from Stobaeus Floril. v. 72. 

Compare Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14. 

XII. — Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397. Context: — But the 
Sibyl, with raging mouth, according to Heraclitus, uttering things 
solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her voice over a 




Xm. — Whatever concerns seeing, hearing, and 
learning, I particularly honor.' 

XIV. — Polybius iv, 40. Especially at the present 
time, when all places are accessible either by land or by 
water, we should not accept poets and mythologiste as 
witnesses of things that are unknown, since for the 
most part they furnish us with unreliable testimony 
about disputed things, according to Heraclitus. 

XV. — The eyes are more exact witnesses than the 

thouBand years, bewiuse of the Grod. And Pindar soys that Cadmus 
heard from the God a kind of music neither pleasant nor soft nor 
melodious. For great holiness permits not the allurements of 

Oement of Alex, Strom, i. 15, p. 358. 

lamblichus, de Myst. iii, 8. 

See also pseudo-HeracIitus, Epist. viii. 

XIII.— Hipp olytUB, Eef. haer. ix. 9, 10. Context :— And that 
the hidden, the unseen and unknown to men is [better], he (Hera- 
clitus) says in these words, "A hidden harmony is better than a 
visible " {=:frag.47). He thus praises and admires the unknown and 
unseen more than the known. And that that which is discoverable 
and visible to men is [better], he says in these words, " Whatever 
uoncerna seeing, hearing, and learning, I particularly honor," that 
ia, the visible above the invisible. From such expressions it is easy 
to nnderatand him. In the knowledge of the visible, he saya, men 
allow themselves to be deceived as Homer was, who yet was wiser 
than al! the Greeks ; for some hoys killing lice deceived him saying, 
"What WB see and catch we leave behind ; what we neithcraee nor 
catch we take with us" (frag, 1, Schuster). Thus Heraclitus honors 
in equal degree the seen and the unseen, as if the seen and unseen 
were confessedly one. For whatdoeshesay? "A hidden harmony 
is better than a visible," and, " Whatever concerns seeing, hearing, 
and learning, I particularly honor," having before particularly 
honored the invisible. 

XV. — Polybius xii. 27. Context : — There are two organs given to 
us by nature, sight and hearing, sight being considerably the more 
truthful, according to Heraclitus, "For the eyes are more exact 
witnesses than the ears." 

Compare Herodotus i. 8. 



XVI. — Much learning does not teach one to have 
understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and 
Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus. 

XVII. — Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised 
investigation most of all men, and having chosen out 
these treatises, he made a wisdom of his own — much 1 
learning and bad art. -J 

XVIII. — Of all whose words I have heard, no one 
^ attains to this, to know that wisdom is apart from all.^ 

XIX. — There is one wisdom, to understand the intel- 
ligent will by which all things are governed through 

-^ XX. — This world, the same for all, neither any of 

XVI. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context : — He (Heraclitus) was 
proud and disdainful above all men, as indeed is clear from his 
work, in which he says; ** Much learning does not teach," etc. 

Aulus Gellius, N. A. praef . 12. 

Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 19, p. 373. 

Athenaeus xiii. p. 610 B. 

lulianus, Or. vi. p. 187 D. 

Proclus in Tim. 31 F. 

Serenus in Excerpt. Flor. loann. Damasc. ii. 116, p. 205, Meinek. 

Compare pseudo-Democritus, fr. mor. 140 MuUach. 

XVII. — Diogenes Laert. viii. 6. Context : — Some say, foolishly, 
that Pythagoras did not leave behind a single writing. But Hera- 
clitus, the physicist, in his croaking way says, " Pythagoras, son of 
Mnesarchus," etc. 

Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 21, p. 396. 

XVIII.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 81. 

XIX. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context : — See frag. 16. 

Plutarch, de Iside 77, p. 382. Context : — Nature, who lives and 
sees, and has in herself the beginning of motion and a knowledge of 
the suitable and the foreign, in some way draws an emanation and 
a share from the intelligence by which the universe is governed, 
according to Heraclitus. 

Compare Cleanthes H. in lov. 36. 

Compare pseudo-Linus, 13 Mullach. 

XX. — Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711. Context : — Heracli- 
tus of Ephesus is very plainly of this opinion, since he recognizes 



the gods nor any man has made, but it always was, ,. 

and is,, and shall be, an ever living fire, kindled in due 

measure, and in due measure extinguished.^ 
XXI. — The transmutationB of fire are, first, the sea ; ^ "i 

and of the sea, half is earth, and half the lightning 

^ XXII. — All things are exchanged for fire and fire for ^ 
' all things, just as wares for gold and gold for wares. 

that there is an everlasting world on the one hand and on the other 
a perishable, that is, in its arrangement, knowin}; that in a certain 
manner the one ia not different from the other. But tliat he knew 
an everlasting' world eternally of a certain kind iti its whole essence, 
he makes plain, saying In this manner, " This world the same for 

Plutarch, de Anim. proereat. 5, p. 1014. Context: — This world, 
says Heraclitas, neither any god bor man has made ; as if fearing 
that having denied a divine creation, we should suppotje the creator 
of the world to have been some man. 

Simplicius in Ariatot. de cael. p. 132, Karat. 

OlympiodoruB in Plat. Phaed. p. 201, Finckh. 

Compare Cleanthea H., lov. 9. 

Nioander, Alexipb. 174. 

Epictetns from Stob. Floril. cviii. 60. 

M. Antoninus vii. 9. 

Just. Mart. Apol. p. 93 C. 

Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 36. 

SXI.— Clement of Ales. Strom, v. 14, p. 712. Context :— And that 
he (Heraclitus) taught that it was created and perishable is shown 
by the following, "The transmutations," etc. 

Compare Hippolytua, Ref. haer. vi. 17, 

XXn.— Phitarch, de ET. 8, p. 388. Context :— For how that (scil. 
first cause) forming the world from itself, again perfects itself from 
the world, Heraclitus declares as follows, "All things are exchanged 
for fire and Are tor all things," etc. 

Compare Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 8fi. Context, see frag. 24. 

Idem, de Incoir. mundi 21, p. 508. — LucianuB, Vit. auct. 14. 

Diogenes Laert. ix. 8. 

Heraditns, Alieg. Horn. 43. 

Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.— Iambi ichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41. 

Eusehius, Praep. Evang. xiv. 3, p. 720.— Simplicius on Aristot. 
PhyB. 6, a. 



XXIII.— The sea is poured out and measured to the 

same proportion as existed before it became earth.' 

XXIV.— Craving and Satiety." 

XXV.^Fire lives in the death of earth, air lives in 
the death of fire, water lives in the death of air, and 

I earth in the death of water." 

XXVI.- — Fire coming upon all things, will sift and 
seize them. 

XXIII.— Clement of AJes. Strom, v, 14, p. 712 (= Eusebiua, P. B. 
siii, 13, p. 676). Context ; — For lie (Heraclitus) Bays that fire iB 
changed by the divine Reason which TuicH the universe, through aii 
into moisture, which is ae it were the seed of cosmic arrangement, 
and which he cails sea ; and from this again arise the earth and the 
heavene and all they contain. And how again the; are restored and 
ignited, he shows plainly as follows, " The Bea is poured out," etc. 

XXIV.— Hippolytus, Kef. haer. ii. 10. Context :— And he (Hera- 
clitus) says also that this fire is intelligent and is the cause of the 
goTernment of all things. And he calls it craving and satiety. And 
craving is, according to him, arrangement ((i(o«ti(j,co(oic), and satiety is 
conflagration (fi-tjiuofc). For, hesays, "Fire coming upon all things 
will separate and seize them " (rr frag. 26). 

Phito, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 88, Context :— And the other (soil, 
h yovoppvliz'), supposing that all things are from the world and are 
changed back into the world, and thinking that nothing was made 
by God, being a champion of the Heraclitic doctrine, introduces 
craving and satiety and that all things are one and happen by 

Philo, de Victim. 6, p. 242. 

Plutarch, de EI, 9, p. 380. 

XSV.— MaximuB Tyr. ili. 4, p. 489, Context:— You see the 
change of bodies and the alternation of origin, the way ap and 
down, according to HeracHtus. And ^ain he says, "Living in 
their death and dying in their life (see frag. 67). Fire lives in the 
death of earth," etc. 

M. Antoninus iv. 46. Contest, see frag. 5. 

Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. 

Idem, de Prim. frig. 10, p. 949. Comp. paeudo-Liiius 21, Mull, 

XXVI.— Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context, see frag. 24, 

Compare Aetna v. 630 : quod si quis lapidis miratur fusile robnr, 
cogitet obscuri verissima dicta Hbelli, Ileraclite, tui, nihil insuper- 
abile ab igni, omnia quo rerum naturae semina iacta. 



XXV 11. — How can one escape that which never 
Bets ?" 

XXVUI.— Lightning rules all. ^ 

XXIX.^The sun will not overstep his bounds, for if 
he does, the Erinyes, helpers of justice, will find hira 

XXX, — The limits of the evening and morning are 
the Bear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright 

XXXI. — If there were no sun, it would be night. 

XXVII.— Clement of Alex. Paedag. ii. 10, p. 229. Context ;- 
one may escape the sensible light, but the intellectual it is ii 
to escape. Or, m Heraditus saya, " How can one escape that which 
never sets?" 

XXVIII.— Hippolytiis, Kef. haer. ix. 10. Context :— And he (Hera- 
clitufl) also says that a judgment of the world and all things in it 
takes place by Ere, expresaing it aa follows, " Now lightning rules 
all," that IB, guides it rightly, meaning by lightning, everlasting fire. 

Compare Cleanthes H., lovem 10, 

XXIX.— Plutarch, de Exil. II, p. 804. Contest :— Each of the 
planets, rolling in one ephere, ae in an island, preaerree its order. 
"For the Bun," says Heraeiitus, "will not overstep hiaboande," etc. 

Idem, de leide 48, p. 370. 

Comp. Hippolytiis, Hef. haer. vi. 26. 

lamblichua, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer. 

PBeudo-HeraclituB, Epiat. ii. 

XXX.— Strabo i. 6,, p. 3. Contest :— And Heraclitus, better and 
more Homericaily, naming in like manner the Bear instead of the 
northern circle, saya, "The limita of the evening and morning 
are the Bear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright Zeus." 
For the northern cirde is the boundary of riaing and setting, not the 

XXXI.— Plutarch, Aq. et ign. comp. 7, p. 957. 

Idem, de Fortuna 3, p. 98. Contest :— And juat aa, if there were 
no sun, as far aa regards the other stars, we should have night, aa 
HoradituB aays, ao as far as regards the senses, if man had not mind 
and reason, his life would not differ from that of the.beasta. 

Compare Clement of Alex. Protrept. II, p. 87,. 

Macrohius, Somn. Scip. i. 20. 


XXXII, — The sun is new every day. 

XXXIII.— Diogenes Laertius i. 23. He (acil. Thales) 
seems, according to some, to have been the firet to 
study astronomy and to foretell the eclipses and 
motions of the sun, as Eudemus relates in his account 
of astronomical works. And for this reason he is 
honored by Xenophanes and Herodotus, and both 
Heraclitua and Democritus bear witness to him. 

XXXIV.— Plutarch, Qu, Plat. viii. 4, p, 1007. Thus 
Time, having a necessary union and connection with 
heaven, is not simple motion, but, so to speak, motion 
in an order, having measured limits and periods. Of 
which the sun, being overseer and guardian to limit, 
direct, appoint and proclaim the changes and seasons 
which, according to Heraclitus, produce all things, is 
the helper of the leader and first God, not in small or 
trivial things, but in the greatest and most important. 

XXXV, — Hesiod is a teacher of the masses. They 
suppose him to have possessed the greatest knowledge, 
who indeed did not know^ day and night. For they 

XXXII.— Aristotle, Meteor, ii. 2, p. 355 a S. Context ;— Con- 
cerning ttie Bun thia cannot happen, since, being nottrblied in the 
Bome manner, an they nay, it ia plain that the sun b not only, as 
HeraclituB sayB, new every day, but it is continually new, 

Alexander Aplirod. in Meteor. I. I. fol. d'd a. 

OlympiodoruB in Meteor. 1. 1. fol. 30 a. 

Piotinne, Enn. il. 1, p. 97. 

Proclua in Tim. p. 334 B. 

Compare Plato, Rep. vi. p. 408 B. 

Olympioiiorus in Plato, Phaed. p. 201, Finckh. 

XXSIV.— Compare Plutarch, de Def. orac. 12, p. 416. 

M. Antoninns ix. 3. 

Pseud o-Heraclitua, Epiet. v. 

XXXV.— Hippolytus, Eef.baer.ix.lO. Context :— Heraclitua says 
tbat neither darkness nor light, neither evil nor good, are different, 
but thoy are one and the same. He found fault, therefore, with 


^^ "> 

XXX VI. — God is day and night, winter and sum- 
mer, war and peace, plenty and want. But he is 
changed, just as when incense is mingled with incense, 
but named according to the pleasure of each." 

XXXVII.— Aristotle, de Sensu 5, p. 443 a ai. Some 
think that odor consists in smoky exhalation, common 
to earth and air, and that for smell all things are con- 
verted into this. And it was for this reason that 
Heraclitus thus said that if all existing things should 
become smoke, perception would be by the nostrils. 

XXXVIII.— Souls smell in Hades.'*. - 

. ' XXXIX, — Cold becomes warm, and warm, cold ; wet 
f becomes dry, and dry, wet. 
V^ XL. — It disperses and gathers, it comes and goes." 

Heaiod because he knew [not] day and night, for day and night, he 
BKJB, arc one, expressing it somewhat as foUowfl : "Hesiod ia S 
teacher of the mafiaes," etc. 

XXXVL— HippolytuB, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context :— For that the 
primal (Gr. wpurov, Bernaya reada ■mia/Tiv^ created) world is itself the 
demiurge and creator of itself, be (Heraclitus) says as follows : 
" God ia day and," etc. 

Compare idem, Eef. haer. v. 21. 

Hippocrates, "tpi AaJr^f i. 4, Littr. 

XXXVni.— Plutarch, de Fac. ia orbe lun. 28, p. 943. Context :— 
Their (scil. tbe souls') appearance is like the sun's rays, and their 
spirits, which are raised aloft, as here, in the ether around the moon, 
are like flre, and from this they receive strength and power, as 
metals do hy tempering. For that which ia still scattered and 
difFuBe is strengthened and becomes firm and transparent, so that it 
ia nourished with the chance exhalation. And finely did Heraclitus 
Bay that "souls smell in Hades." 

XXXIX.— Sehol. Tzetzao, Exeget. Hiad. p. 126, Hermann. Con- 
text ; — Of old, Heraclitna of Ephesus waa noted for the obscurity of 
hia sayings, " Cold becomes warm," etc. 

Compare Hippocrates, jtc/h fiiahiK i. 21. 

Paeudo-Heraclitila, Epist. v. — Apuleius, de Mundo 21, 

XL.— PlQtarch, de EI. 18. p. 392. Context, see frag. 41. 

Compare pseudo-Heraclitos, Epist. vi. 



' '"XLI. — Into the same river you could uot step twice, 

■• for other <|and still other> waters are flowing. 

Y* XLIl.— |To those entering the same river, other and 

still other waters flow.f 

XLIII.— Aristotle, Eth. End. vii. 1, p. 1235 a 26. 

"vSAnd Heraclitus blamed the poet who said, " Would 

—For the waWre of 
n HeraclituH saye. 

XLT.— Plutarch, Qu. nat. 2, p. 912. Contest :- 
fountains and rivers are fresh and new, for, i 
"Into the same river," etc. 

Plato, Crat. 402 A. Context :^Heraclitua is supposed to say that 
alt things are in motion and nothing at rest ; he compares them to 
the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same 
river twice (Jowett's transl.). 

Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5, p. iniO a 13. Context :— From this 
assumption there grew ap that extreme opinion of those just now 
mentioned, those, namely, who professed to follow Heraclitus, such 
as Cratylus held, who finally thought that nothing ought to he said, 
but merely moved bia finger. And he blamed Heraclitus because 
be said you could not step twice into the same river, for he himself 
thought you could not do so once. 

Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. Context :— It is not possible to step 
twice into the same river, according to Heraclitus, nor twice to find 
a perishable substance in a fixed state ; hut by the sharpness and 
quickness of change, it disperses and gathers again, or rather not 
again nor a second time, but at the same time it forms and is 
dissolved, it comes and goes (see frag. 40). 

Idem, de Sera num. vind. 15, p. 569. 

Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f. 17 a. 

XLII. — Arius Dtdymus from Eusebius, Praep. evang, xv. 20, p. 821, 
Context; — Concerning the soul, Cleanthea, quoting the doctrine of 
Zeno in comparison with the other physicists, said that Zeno affirmed 
the perceptive soul to be an exhalation, .just as Heraclitus did. For, 
wishing to show that the vaporized souls are always of an intellectual 
nature, he compared them to a river, saying, "To those entering the 
same river, other and still other waters flow." And souls are 
exhalations from moisture. Zeno, therefore, like Heraclitus, called 
the soul an exhalation. 

Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. iii. 115. 

XLIII,— Plutarch, de Iside 48, p. 370. Context :~Fot Heraclitna 
in plain terms calls war the father and king and lord of all (=:frag, 
44), and he says that Homer, when he prayed — " Discord be damned 



thatstrife were destroyed from among gods and men." 
For__tliere could be no harmony without sharps and 
flaJs^_n,or living beings without male and female, 
which are contraries. 

''•^LIV.— War ie the father and king of all, and has 

^produced some as gods and some as men, and has f 

made some slaves and some free. J 

^ XLV. — They do not understand how that which 

from gods and bumaii rftoe," forgot that he called down curaea on 
the origin of all things, since they have their source in antipathy 
and war. 

ChalcidiuH in Tim. 295. 

Simpliciua in Ariatot. Categ. p. 1(M A, ed. Basil. 

Sehol. Ven. (A) ad II. xviii, 107. 

EuBtathius ad II. xviii. 107, p. 1113, 66. 

XLIV.— HippolytuB, Eef. haer. is. 9. Context :— And that the 
father of all created things is created and uncreated, the made and 
the maker, we hear him (Heraclitas) eaying, " War is the father and 
king of all," etc. 

Plutarch, de leide 48, p. 370. Context, see frag. 43. 

ProcluB in Tim. 54 A (comp. 24 B). 

CompareChrysippuBfromPhilodeiii.'r.£M''(^EiQc,vii.p. 81, Gomperz. 

LucianuH, Quomodo hist, conscrib. 2 ; Idem, Icaromen 8. 

XLV.— Hippolytus, Ref. haer, ix. 9. Context, see frag. 1. 

Piftto, Symp. 187 A. Context : — And one who pays the least atten- 
tion will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation 
of opposites ; and I suppose that this mtitst have been the meaning 
of Heraclitus, though his words are not accurate ; for he saya that the 
One ia united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the 
lyre (Jowett's tranat.). 

Idem, 8oph. 242 D. Context : — Then there are Ionian, and tn 
more recent times Sicilian musea, who have conceived the thought 
that to unite the two principles ia safer ; and they say that being is 
one and many, which are held together by enmity and friendship, 
ever parting, ever meeting (idem). 

Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 27, p. 1026. Context :— And many 
call this (aeil. necessity) destiny. Empedocles calls it love and 
hatred ; Heraclitus, the harmony of oppositions as of the bow and 
of the lyre. 

Compare Syneaiaa, de Inaomn. 135 A 

Farmenides v. 95, Stein. 


separatee unites with itself. It js a harmony of oppo- 
_ aitions, as in the caae of the bow and of the lyre." 
^tXLVI.— Aristotle, Eth. Nic. viii. 3, p. 1155 b 1. In 
reference to these things, some seek for deeper princi- 
ples and more in accordance with nature. Euripides 
says, " The parched earth loves the rain, and the 
„ high heaven, with moisture laden, loves earthward to 
fall." And Heraclitus says, " The unlike is joined 
together, and from differences results the most beau- 
tiful harmony, and all things take place by strife."- 
V/XLVII.— The hidden harmony is better than the 

VfXLVni, — Let us not draw conclusions rashly about 
the greatest things, 

't'XLIX, — Philosophers must be learned in very many 

fs L, — The straight and crooked way of the wool- 
carders is one and the same." 

XL VI. — Compare TLeophraatus, Metaph. 15. 

Pliilo, Qu. in Gen. iii. 6, p. 178, Aiicher. 

Idem, de Agricult. 31, p. 321. 

XLVll.— Hippolytus, Eef. haer. ix. 9-10. Context, see frag. 13. 

Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 27, p. 1026. Contest :— Of the soul 
nothing ia pure and unmixed nor remains apart from the rest, for, 
awiording to Heraclitus, " The hidden harmony is better than the 
viaible," in which the blending deity has hidden and sunt varia- 
tions and differences. 

Compare Plotinua, Enn. i. 6, p. 53. 

Proclus in Cratyl. p. 107, ed. Boisaonad. 

XL VIH.— Diogenes Laert. ix. 73. Contest :— Moreover, Hera- 
clituB says, " Let ua not draw conclusions rashly about the greatest 
things." And Hippocrates delivered his opiniona doubtfully and 

XLIX.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 733. Context :— Philo- 
sophers muet be learned in very many things, according to Hera- 
clitus. And, indeed, it ia necessary that "he who wishes to be good 
ahal! often err." 

L. — Hippolytue, Eef. haer. ix. 10. Context ; — And both straight 


-7 LI. — AsBeswoiild choose stubble rather than gold. 

i'*-LII, — Sea water is very pure and very foul, for, ' 
while to fishes it is drinkable and healthful, to men it 
is hurtful and unfit to drink. 
a Lm. — Columella, de Re Rustica viii. 4, Dry dust 
and ashes must be placed near the wall where the roof 
or eaves shelter the court, in order that there may be 
a place where the birds may sprinkle themselves, for 
with these things they improve their wings and 
feathers, if we may believe Heraclitus, the Ephesian, 

Cwho says, " Hogs wash themselves in mud and doves 
in dust." 
J-¥ LIV.— They revel in dirt. 

and crooked, he (Herarlitiia) Bays, are the same ; " The way of the 
wool-carders ia stra^ht and crooked." The reTolution of the iii- 
strumeat in a. carder's shop (Gr. ruapeli^ Bemaya, y^ciiJeiV vulg.) called 
a ecrev,' is straight and crooked, for It moves at the same time 
forward and in a cijclG. " It is one and the same," he saya. 

Compare Apuleiua, de Mnndo 21. 

LI.— Aristotle, Eth. Nic. x. 5, p. 1176 a 6. Context :— The pleasures 
of a horse, a dog, or a man, are all difierent. As Heraclitus says, 
"Asses would choose stubble rather than gold," for to thorn there 
ia more pleasure in fodder than in gold. 

LII.— Hippolytiia, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context:— And foul and 
fresh, he (Heraclitus) says, are one and the same. And drinkable 
and undrinkable are one and tho same. " Sea water," he snys, " is 
very pure and very foul," etc. 

Compare Sextos Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. i. 55. 

Llll.^Compare Galenus, Protrept. 13, p. 5, ed. Bas. 

LIV.— Athenaeus v. p. 178 F. Context:— For it would be unbe- 
coming, says Ariatotle, to go to a banquet covered with sweat and 
dust. For a well-bred man should not be squalid nor slovenly nor 
delight in dirt, as Heraclitus says. 

Clement of Alex. Protrept. 10, p. 75. 

Idem, Strom, i. 1, p. 317 ; ii. 15, p. 465. 

Compare Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. i. 65. 

PlotiiiUH, Enn. i. 6, p. 55. 

VincentiuB Bellovac. Spec. mor. iii. 0, 3. 


- f^XV. — Every animal is driven by blows. ^ 
rt-LVI. — The harmony of the world is a harmony of 
oppositions, as in the case of the bow and of the lyre.'' 
r'LVII. — Good and evil are the same. 
^•^LVIII. — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. And good and 
evil (scil, are one). The physicians, therefore, says 
Heraclitus, cutting, cauterizing, and in every way tor- 
turing the sick, complain that the patients do not pay 
them fitting reward for thus effecting these benefits — 
fand sufferings.! 

LV.— Aristotle, de Mundo 6, \i. 401 a 8 (=Apu!eins, de Mundo 
36; StobaeuH, Eel. i. 2, p, 86). Context: — Both, wild and domestic 
animftle, and tliose living upon land or in air or water, are born, live 
and die in conformity with the lawa of God. " For every animal," 
as Heraclitna says, "tsdrivenby blows" {frhryv Stobaeue cod. A, 
Bergkins et ai.; vulg. rj/v yf/u iii/itTcu, every animal feeds upon the 

LVI.— Plutarch, de Tranquill. 15, p. 473. Contest :— For the har- 
mony of the world is a harmony of oppositions (Gr. ^a^ivrom; dp/iBvij!. 
see Crit. Kote 21), as in the case of the how and of the lyre. And in 
human things there is nothing that is pure and unmixed. But just 
as in music, some nates are flat and some sharp, etc 

Idem, de laide 45, p. 369. Context : — "For the harmony of the 
world is a harmony of opposition, as in the case of the bow and of the 
lyre," according to Heraclitus; and according to Euripides, neither 
good nor bad may be found apart, but are mingled together for the 
sake of, greater beauty. 

Porphyrius, de Antro. nymph. 29, 

Simplicius in Phys. fol. 11 a. 

Compare Philo, Qu. in Gen. iii. 5, p. 178, Aucher. 

LVII.— Hippolytus, Eef. haer. ii. 10. Context, see frag. 58. 

Simpliciua in Phys. fo!. 18 a. Context :— All things are with others 
identical, and the saying of Heraclitus is true that the good and the 
evil are the same. 

Idem on Phya. fol. 11 a. 

Aristotle, Top. viii. 5, p. 159 b 30. 

Idem, Phys. i. 2, p. 185 b 20. 

LVIII. — Compare Xenopbon, Mem. i. 2, 54, 

Plato, Gorg. 521 E ; Polit. 293 B. 

SimpliciuB in Epictetus 13, p, 83 D and 27, p. 178 A, ed. Heins. 


*''LIX. — TJnite whole and part, agreement and dis^ 
agreement, accordant and discordant ; from all com^ea 
one, and from one all. "^ 

'^LX.^They would not know the name of justice, 
were it not for these things.'' 

'-liXI.— Schol. B. in Iliad iv. 4, p. 130 Bekk. They say 
that it is unfitting that the sight of wars should please 
the gods. But it is not so. For noble works delight 
them, and while wars and battles seem to us terrible, 
to God. they do not seem so. For God in his dispensa- 
tion of all events, perfects them into a harmony of the 
whole, just as, indeed, Heraclitus says that to God all 
things are beautiful and good and right, though men 
suppose that some are right and others wrong. 

*7LXII, — We must know that war is universal and 
strife right, and that by strife all things arise and fare "^ 

LIX. — Ariatotle, de Mundo 5, p. 396 b 12 (^Ajmleius, deMundo 
20 ; Stobaeua, Eel. i. 34, p. 090). Context : — And again art, imitator of 
nature, appears to do the aame. For in i>ainting, it iB by the mixing 
of colore, as white and black or yellow and red, that representations 
are mode corresponding with the natural types. lu mtiHic ftleo, from 
the union of sharps and flats cornea a final harmony, and in gram- 
mar, the whole art depends on the blending of mutes and vocables. 
And it was the samethingwhichtheobseure Heraclitus meant when 
be said, " Unite whole and part," etc. 

Compare Apuleius, de Mundo 31. 

Hippocrates t. r/in^f 40 ; ?r. Jiairw i. 

LS.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 3, p. 568. Context :— For the 
Scripture says, the law is not made for the just man. And Heracli- 
tus well saya, " They would not know the name of justice, were it 
not for these things." 

Compare pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. vii. 

LXI. — Compare Hippocrates, Tfjui diain?c i. 11. 

LXn. — Origen, cont, Celsua vi. 42, p. 312 (Celsus speaking). Con- 
text :— There was an obscure saying of the ancients that war was 
divine, Heraclitus writing thus, "We must know that war," etc. 

Compare Plutarch, de Sol. animal. 7, p. 964. 

Diogenes Laert. is. 8. 



fcJ LXIII.— For it is wholly destined . 

♦•'LXrV, — Death is what we see waking. What we 8ee 

in sleep is a dream.'^ 

t*'LXV. — There ie only one supreme Wisdom. It wills 

and wills not to be called by the name of Zeus," 

**LXVI.— The name of the bow is life, but its work is 


*'LXVII. — Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, 

living in their death and dying in their life. 

LXIII.— Stobaeus Eel, i. 5, p. 178. Context :— HeraclituB declares 
that destiny ia the all -pervading law. And this iH the etherial body, 
the seed of the origin of all things, and the measure of the appointed 
coaree. Ail things are by fate, and this is the same as neceaBity. 

Thus he writes, "For it is wholly destined " (The rest is 


LSIV.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iii. 3, p. 520. Context :— And 
does not Heraclitus call death birth, similarly with Pytbagoras and 
with Socratea in the Gor^ius, when he says, " Death ia what we see 
waking. What we see in sleep is a dream"? 

Compare idem v. 14, p. 712. Philo, de loaeph. 22, p- 50- 

LXV.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718 (Euseb. P. E. xiii. 
13, p. 681). Context ; — I know that Plato also bears witness to Hera- 
clitus' writing, "There is only one supreme. Wisdom. It wills and 
wills not to be called by the name of Zeus." And again, " Law is 
to obey the will of one " (n fr^. 110). 

LXVI.^chol. in Iliad i. 40, fr. Cramer, A. P. iii. p. 122. Con^ 
text ; — For it seems that by the ancients the bow and life were syn- 
onymously called fli^;. So Heraclitus, the obscure, said, "Tlie name 
of the bow is life, but its work is death." 

Etym. magn. under word /3iof. 

Tzetze's Exeg. in Hiad, p. 101 Henn. 

Eustathiua in Iliad i. 49, p. 41. 

Compare Hippocrat«B, jt. Tpo^ 21. 

LXVII.— Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context:— And con- 
fessedly he (Heraclitus) asserts that the immortal is mortal and the 
mortal immortal, in such words as these, "Immortals are mortal," 

Numeuius from Porphyr, de Antro nymph. 10. Context, gee 
frag. 72. 



LXVni. — To Bouls it is death to become water, and 
to water it is death to become earth, but from earth 
comes water, and from water, soul. 

LXIX. — The way upward and downward are one"! 
and the same. - ] 

Philo, Leg. alleg. i. 33, p. 65. 

Idem, Qu. in Gen. iv. 152, p. 360 Aucher. 

MaximuB Tyr. x. 4, p. 107. Idem, xli, 4, p. 489. 

Clement of Alex. Paed. iii. 1, p. 251. 

Hieroclea in Aur. carm. 24. 

Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. 24, p. 51 Mehler. 

Compare Lucianoa, Vit. auct. 14. 

Dio CaHsioH frr. i — kskv. c. 30, t. i. p. 40 Dind. 

Hermes from Stob. Eel. i. 39, p. 768. Idem, Poemand. 12, p. 100. 

LXVIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, vi. 2, p. 746. Contest :— (On 
plagiariBms) And Orpheua having written, " Water is death to the 
soul and soul the change from water ; from water is earth and from 
earth again water, and from this the soul welling up through the 
whole ether"; Heraclitus, combining these expressions, writes as 
follows : " To souls it is death," etc. 

Hippolytns, Ref. haer. v. 18. Contest : — And not only do the 
poets say this, but already a!so the wiHest of the Greeks, of whom 
Eeraelitua was one, who said, " For the soul it is death to become 

Philo, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 509. Proelua in Tim. p. 36 C. 

Aristides, Quintil. ii. p. 106, Meib. 

lulianns, Or. v. p. 165 D. 

OlympiodoruB in Plato, Gorg. p. 357 lahn ; Idem, p. 542. 

LXIS.— Hippolytns, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context: — Upanii down he 
(Heraclitus) says are one and the same. " The way upward and 
downward are one and the same." 

Diogenes Laert. ix. 8. Context : — Heraclitus sayB that change is 
the road leading upward and downward, and that the whole world 
exisU according to it. 

Cleomedes, ir. iieniipuii i. p. 75, Bak. 

Masimus Tyr. xli. 4, p. 489. 

Plotinos, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468. 

Tertnllian, adv. Marc. ii. 28, 

lamblichua from Stob. Eel. i. 41. 

Compare Hippocrateu, >r, rpo^ 45. 

M. Antoninus vi. 17. 


. Iliad xiv. 200, p. 392, Bekk. 
a the periphery of the circle 

-- LXX. — The beginning and end are common. 

LXXI, The limits of the soul you w^ould not find 
out, though you should traverse every way. 

LXXII,— To soufa it is joy to become wet.** 

LXXIII. — A man when he is drunken is led by 
a beardless youth, stumbling, ignorant where he is 
going, having a wet soul. 

LXXIV. — The dry soul is the wisest and best.*' 

Philo, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 5 

Idem, de Somn. i. 24, p. OH. 

Idem, de vit, Moys. i. 6, p. 85. 

Muaoniua from Stob. Flo. 108, 60 

LXX.— Porphyry from Schol. 
Context : — For the beginning and end o 
aie common, according to Heraclitus. 

Compare Hippocratea, ir. rfiTuu riiv nar' &v6puKav, 1. 

Idem, T. SialTiii i. 10 ; ?r. Tpo<fv^, 9. 

Philo, Leg. ftUeg. i. 3, p. 44. Plntarch, de EI. 8, p. 388. 

LXXI.— Diogenes Loert. is. 7, Context:— And he (Heraclitus) 
also says, "The limits of the sou! you would not find out though 
yon traverse every way," so deep lies its principle (ntru ^uffi-v ^^701' 

Tertullian, de Anima 2. 

Compare Ilippolytns, Eef. haer, v. 7. 

Sestus, Enchir. 366. 

LXXII. — NumeniuB from Porphyry, de Antro nymph. 30, Con- 
text :— Wherefore Heraclitua says : To souls it is joy, not death, to 
become wet. And elsewhere he says : We live in their death and 
they live in onr death (frag. 67). 

LXXni.— StobaeuB Floril. y. 120. 

Compare M. Antoninus iy. 46, Context, see frag. 5. 

LXXrV.— Plutarch, Romulus 28. Context :— For the dry soul ie 
the wisest and best, according to Heraclitus. It flashes through the 
body as the lightning through the cloud (=fr, 63, Schleiermacher). 

Aristides, Quintil. ii. p. 106. 

Porphyry, de Antro nymph. 11. 

SynesiUB, de Insomn. p. 140 A Petav. 

Stobaeus FlorU. v. 120. 

Glycas, Ann. i. p. 74 B (compare 116 A). 

Compare Clement of Ales. Paedag. ii. 2, p. 184. 

Eustathins in Iliad xxiii. 261, p. 1299, 17 ed. Rom. 


LXXV. — fThe dry beam is the wisest and best soul.t 

LXSVT. — |Where tbe land is dry, tbe soul is wisest 
and best.f^ 

LSXVII.— Man, aB a light at nigbt, is lighted and 

LXXVin.— Plutarch, Consol. ad ApoU. 10, p. 100. 
For when is death not present with us ? As indeed "t- 
Heraclitus says : Living and dead, awaJte and asleep, 
young and old, are the same. For these several states 
A a ^ tra nsmutations of each other. 

LXXIX. — Time is a child playing at draughts, a 
child's kingdom. 

LXXV.— Philo from Euaeb. P. E. Tiii. 14, p. 899. 

Muaonina from Stob. Floril, xvii. 43. 

Plntarcb, de Eau. earn. i. 6, p. 995, 

Idem, de Def. orac. 41, p. 433. 

Oalenus, t. tuv r^; •pvxv! I/O"" 5, t. i. p. 340, ed. Baa. 

Hermeiaa in Plat. Phaedr. p. 73, Aat. 

Compare Porphyry, aipvpii. irpiif rd noijTa 33, p. 78 Hoist.; Ficinus, de 
Immort. a,nim. viii. 13. 

LXXVI.— Philo from Euaeb. P. E. vi. 14, p. 399. 

Idem, de Provid. ii. 109, p. 117, Aueher. 

LXXVII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p, 628. Context:— 
Whatever they say of sleep, the same must be understood of death, 
for it is plain that each of them is a departure from lite, the one less, 
the other more. Which is also to be received from Heraclitus : 
Man ia kindled as a light at night ; in like manner, dying, he is 
extinguiahed. And living, he borders upon death while aaieep, and, 
extinguishing sight, he borders upon sleep when awake. 

Compare Sestus Empir. adv. Math. vii. 130. 

Seneca, Epiet. 54. 

LXXVIII.— Compare Plntarcb, de EI. 18, p. 392. 

Clement of Ales. Strom, iv. 22, p. 628. Context, Bee frag. 77. 

SextuB Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. iii. 230, 

Tzetze'B Chil. ii. 722. 

XXXIX.~Hippolytus, Bef. haer. ix. 9. 

ProcluB in Tim. 101 F. Contest ; — And some, aa for example 
EeraclituB, say that the creator in creating the world is at play. 

Lneianus, Vit. anct. 14. Context:— And what ia time 7 A child 
at play, now arranging his pebbles, now scattering them. 


i LXXX. — I have inquired of myself.^ 

LXXXI. — Into the same river we both step axid do 
not step. We both are and are not. 

LXXXII.— It is weariness upon the same things to 
labor and by them to be controlled.** 

Clement of Alex. Paedag. i. 5, p. 111. 

lamblichus from Stob. Eel. ii. 1, p. 12. 

Compare Plato, Legg. x. 903 D. Philo, de vit. Moys. i. 6, p. 85. 

Plutarch, de EI. 21, p. 393. 

Gregory Naz. Carm. ii. 85, p. 978 ed. Bened. 

LXXX.— Diogenes Laert. ix. 5. Context : — And he (Heraclitus) 
was a pupil of no one, but he said he inquired of himself and learned 
everything by himself. 

Plutarch, adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118. Context : — And Heraclitus, as 
though he had been engaged in some great and solemn task, said, 
" I have been seeking myself." And of the sentences at Delphi, he 
thought the " Know thyself" to be the most divine. 

Dio Chrysost. Or. 55, p. 282, Reiske. 

Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468. 

Tatianus, Or. ad Graec. 3. 

lulianus. Or. vi. p. 185 A. 

Proclus in Tim. 106 E. 

Suidas, under word Uotrrovfiog, 

Compare Philo, de Joseph. 22, p. 59. 

Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 1, p. 429. 

Plotinus, Enn. v. 9, p. 559. 

LXXXI. — Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. 24. 

Seneca, Epist. 58. Context : — And I, while I say these things are 
changed, am myself changed. This is what Heraclitus means when 
he says, into the same river we descend twice and do not descend, 
for the name of the river remains the same, but the water has 
flowed on. This in the case of the river is more evident than in 
case of man, but none the less does the swift course carry us on. 

Compare Epicharmus, fr. B 40, Lorenz. 

Parmenides v. 58, Stein. 

LXXXII.— Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468. 

lamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41, p. 906. Context : — For Heraclitus 
assumed necessary changes from opposites, and supposed that souls 
traversed the way upward and downward, and that to continue in 
the same condition is weariness, but that change brings rest 
(= f r. 83). 



/' LXXXIII.— In ch ^pe ia rest. V 
;'( LXXXIV.— A mixtura,aQparate8 when not kept in 

LXXXV. — Coi-pses are more worthless than excre- 

LXXXVI.— Being born, they will only to live and 
die, or rather to find rest, and they leave children who 
likewise are to die. 
LXXXVII.— Plutarch, de Orac. def. 11, p. 415. 

Aeneas, Gaz. Theophrast. p. 9. 

Compare Hippocrates, ?r. Aiahia i. 15. 

Pbilo, de Chemb. 26, p. 165. 

LXSXIII.— PlotinuB, Eun. iv. 8, p. 468, 

Idem, iv. 8, p. 473. 

lamblichns from Stob. Eel. i. 41, p. 906. Context, eee frag. 82. 

Idem, p. 894. 

Aeneas, Gaz. Theophrast. p. 9, Barth. 

Idem, p. 11. 

LXXXIV.— TheophraatuB, de Vertigine 9, p. 138 Wimmer. 

Alexander Aprod. Probl. p. 11, Usener. Context:— A mixture 
{6 nvKcui-), OS llerocIituB says, separates unless some one stirs it. 

Compare Lucian, Vit. auct. 14. 

M. AntoninuB iv. 27. 

LXXXV.— Strabo xvi. 26, p. 784. Context ;— They consider dead 
bodies equal to excrement, just as Heraclitus says, "Corpses are 
more worthless," etc. 

Plutarch, Qu. eoQViv. iv. 4, p. 669, 

Pollux, OnoTO. V. 163. 

Origen, c. Cels. v. 14, p. 247. 

Julian, Or. vii. p. 2-26 C. 

Compare Philo, de Profug. ii. p. 555. 

Plotinus, Enn. v. 1, p. 483. 

Schol. V. ad Iliad xxiv. 64, p. 630, Bekk. 

Epictetua, Diss. ii. 4, 6. 

LXXXVI.— C'lement of Ales. Strom. iU. 3, p. 616. Context:— 
Heraclitus appears to be speaking evil of birth when he says, 
"Being born, they wish only to live," etc. 

LXXXVII. — The reference is to the following paaeage from 
Heaiod : 



Those who adopt the reading jJiMwtoc (i, e. at man's , 
estate, see Hesiod, fr, 163, ed. Goettling) reckon a gen- 
eration at thirty years, according to Heraclitus, in 
which time a father may have a son who is himself at 
the age of puberty. 

LXXXVIII.— lo. Lydus de Mensibus Hi. 10, p. 37, 
ed. Bonn, Thirty is the most natural number, for it 
bears the same relation to tens as three to units. Then 
again it is the monthly cycle, and is composed of the 
four numbers 1, 4, 9, 16, which are the squares of the 
units in order. Not without reason, therefore, does 
Heraclitus call the month a generation. 

LXXXIX. — In thirty years a man may become a 

XC.^M. Antoninus vi. 48. "We all work together to 
one end, some consciously and with purpose, others 
unconsciously. Just as indeed Heraclitus, I think, 
says that the sleeping are co-workers and fabricators 
of the things that happen in the world." 

XCI. — The Law of Understanding is common to all. 
Those who speak with intelligence must hold fast to 
that which is common to all, even more strongly than 

kvvka Toi Z^u yEcca^ T^oKipv^a nopiivii 
avifav ii^&vruv • iXa^f Si re Tirimndpuv of 
T/jtif iT eM^Dur D xdpaf fijpdeKerai, avrap 6 ^iiii^ 
CI/via TtAg Kipaicai ■ Sena iV iJ/iEif Toif ^fvuiOf 
vi/i^i kvTrliKaitoi, smjpai ^ib( aiyidxato. 

CensorinuB, de D. N. 17. 

Compare Plutarch, Plac. Philos. v. 24, p. 909. 

LXXXVIII.— Crameri A. P. i. p. 324. 

Compare Pbilo, Qu. on Gen. ii. 5, p. 82 Aucher. 

Pluterch, de Orac. def. 12, p. 416. 

LSXXIX.— Philo, Qu. in Gen. ii. 6, p. 82 Aucher. 

XCI,~-Stobaeo8 Floril, iu. 84, 

Compare Cleanthea H., lov. 24, 

Hippocrates, t. n«'^W 15- Plutarch, de Iside 45, p, 369, 

Plotinus, Enn, vi. 5, p. 668. Empedoclea v. 231 Stein, 



a city holds fast to its law. For all human laws are 
depgnclent upon one divine Law, for this rules as far ' 
as it wills, and suffices for all, and overabounds. 

XCII. — Although the Law of Reason is common, the 
majority of people live as though they had an under- 
standing of their own. 

XCIII. — They are at variance with that with which 
they are in most continual association. 
_ XCIV. — We ought not to act and speak as though 
we were asleep. - 

XCV.— Plutarch, de Superst. 3, p. 166. Heraclitus 
says: To those who are awake, there world iu 
common, but of those who are asleep,_ each is with- 
. drawn to a private world of his own, 

XCVI. — For human nature does not possess under- 
standing, but the divine does. 

sen.— Sextus Emp. adv. Math. vii. 133. Context :— For having 
thus statedly Hhown that we do and think everything by participa- 
tion in the divine reason, he (Heraclitna), after some previous expo- 
sition, adds : It is necessary, therefore, to follow the common (for by 
iiniuj be means i Koiintc the common). For although the law of 
reason is common, the majority of people live as though they bad 
an understanding of their own. But this is nothing else than an 
explanation of the mode of the universal disposition. As far, there- 
fore, as we participate in the memory of this, we are true ; bnt in as 
far as we act individually, we are false. 

XCm.^ — M. Antoninus iv, 46. Context, see frag. 5. 

XCIV. — M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5. 

XCV.— Compare pseudo-Pythagorae from Hippolytus, Ref. haer. 
vi. 26. 

lamblichus, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer. 

XCVI,— Origen, e. Cels. vi, 13, p. 291. Context :— Nevertheleaa ho 
(Celsua) wanted to show that this was a fabrication of ours and taken 
from the Greek philosophers, who say that human wisdom is of one 
kind, and divine wisdom of another. And he brings forward some 
phrases of Heraclitus, one where he says, " For human nature does 
not possess understanding, hut the divine does." And another, 
"The thooghtlesa man understands the voice of the Deity as little 
as the child underatands the man" (—frag. 97). 


XCVII,— The thoughtless man understands the 
voice of the Deity as little as the child understands the 

XCVIII.— Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 E. And does not 
Heraclitus, whom you bring forward, say the same, 
that the wisest of men compared with God appears 
an ape in wisdom and in beauty and in all other 
things ? 

XCIX. — Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 A. You are ignorant, 
my man, that there is a good saying of Heraclitus, to 
the effect that the most beautiful of apes is ugly when 
compared with another kind, and the most beautiful 
of earthen pots is ugly when compared with maiden- 
kind, as says Hippias the wise. 

C. — The people must fight for their law as for their 

CI. — Greater fates gain greater rewards. 

CII.^Gods and men honor those slain in war. 

CHI. — Presumption must be quenched even more 
than a flre.'^ 

XCVII.— Orige-n, e. Cels. vi. 12, p. 291. Contest, see frag. 96. 

Compare M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5. 

XCVIII. — Compare M. Antoninne iv. 16. 

XCIX.— Compare PiotinuB, Enn. vi. 3, p. 626. 

Aristotle, Top. iii. 2, p. 117 b 17. 

C. — Diogenes Laert. is. 2. Contest : — And he (HeracIituB) used to 
Bay, "It is more necessary to quench, insolence than a fire" (=:frag. 
103), And, " The people must flght for their law as for their waile." 

CI.— Clement of Ales. Strom, iv. 7, p. 58G. Contest :— Again 
Aeschylus, grasping this thought, says, "To him who loiis, glory 
from the gods is due as product of his toil." " For greater fates gain 
greater rewards," according to Heraclitus. 

TheodoretQS, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33. 

Conipare Hippolytua, Ref. haer. v. 8. 

CII. —Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 4, p. 571. Contest : — Heraclitus 
said, " Gods and men honor those slain in war." 

Theodoretos, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33. 

cm.— Diogenes Laert. is, 2. Contest, see frag. lOtl. 


CrV.— For men to have whatever they wish, would 
not be well. Sickness makes health pleasant and I 
good : hunger, satiety ; weariness, rest, ^ 

CV.— It is hard to contend against passion, for 
whatever it craves it buys with its life, 

CVI. — fit pertains to all men to know themselves 
and to learn self -control. t 

CVII. — t Self-co ntro l is the highest virtue^and wis- 
dom is to speak truth and consciously to act according 
to nature.'!* 

CVIII. — It is better to conceal ignorance, but it is 
hard to do so in relaxation and over wine. 

CIV.— Stobaeus Flora, iii. 83, 4. 

Compare Clement of Alex. Btrom. ii. 21, p. 497. 

Tlieodoretua, Therap. xi. p. 152, 25. Contest ; — HemcIituB the 
Ephesian changed the name but retained the idea, for in the place 
of pleasure he put contentment. 

CV. — lamblichns, Protrept. p. 140, Arcer, Context; — HeraelitUB 
is a witneBS to theee Btatements, for he says, " It is hard to contend 
against passion," etc. 

Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 2, p. 1105 a 8. 

Idem, Eth. Eud. ii. 7, p. 1223 b 22. 

Idem, Pol. V. 11, p. 1315 a 29. 

Plutarch, (ie Cohib. ira 9, p. 457. 

Idem, Erot. 11, p. 75r5. 

Compare Plutarch, Coriol. 22. 

PBeudo-Democritna fr. mor. 77, Mullach, 

LonginuB, de Subl. 44. 

CVI.— Stobaeus Floril. v. 119. 

CVII.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 84. 

CVIII.— Plutarch, Qu. Conviv. iii. proem., p. 644. Context:— 
Simonideg, the poet, seeing a guest sitting silent at a feast and con- 
versing with no one, said, "Sir, if you are foolish you are doing 
wisely, but if wise, foolishly," for, as Heraclitus says, " It ia better 
to conceal ignorance, but it is hard," etc. 

Idem, de Autliendo 12, p. 43. 

Idem, Virt. doc. poase 2, p. 430. 

Idem, from Stob. Floril. xriii. 32. 


CIX. — fit is better to conceal ignorance than to ex- 
pose it.t 

ex. — It is law, also, to obey the will of one.'' 
- CXI. — For what sense or understanding have they ? 
They follow minstrels and take the multitude for a 
teacher, not knowing that many are bad and few good. 
For the best men choose one thing above all — immortal 
glory among mortals ; but the masses stuff themselves 
like cattle. 

CXII. — In Priene there lived Bias, son of Teutamus, 
whose word was worth more than that of others, 

CXIII, — To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best. 

CXIV. — The Ephesians deserve, man for man, to be 
hung, and the youth to leave the city, inasmuch as 
they have banished Hermodorus, the worthiest man 
among them, saying ; " Let no one of us excel, and if 

CIX.— StobaeuB Floril. iii. 82. 

ex.— Clement ot Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718 (Euseb. P. E. xiii. 13, 
p. 681>. Contest, Bee frag. 65. 

CXI.— The passage is restored as above by Bemajs (Heraclitea i. 
p. 34), and Bywater (p. 43), from the following sources : 

Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 9, p. 882. 

Proelua in Alcib. p. 255 Creuzer, =^ 525 ed. Cous. ii, 

Clement of Alex. Btrom. iv. 7, p. 586. 

CXII. — Diogenes Laert. i. 88. Context : — And the fault-flnding 
Heroclitus liaa eepecially praised him (Bias), writing, "In Priene 
there lived Bias, son of Teutamus, whose word was worth more than 
that of others," and the PrionianH dedicated to him a grove called 
the Teutamion. He need to say, " Most men ate bad." 

CXm. — Theodorua Prodromua in Lazerii Miscell. i. p. 20. 

Idem, Tetrastich, in Basil. I (fol. k 2 vera. ed. Baa.). 

Golenus, Tt^i iuiyviiatu^ aifvy/idv i, 1 ; t. 3, p. 53 ed. Bm, 

Symmachua, Epist. ix. 116. 

Compare Epigramni. from Diogenes Laert. ix. 16. 
Cicero, ad. Att. xvi. 1!, 
Seneca, Epist. 7. 

CXIV.— Strabo xiv. 25, p. 642. Context :— Among distinguished 
men of the ancients who lived here (Ephesus) were Heraclitus, 



there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among 
other people." 

CXV. — Dogs, also, bark at what they do no.t_know. 

CXVI. — By its incredibility, it escapes their knowl- 

CXVn. — A stupid man loves to be puzzled by every 

CXVIII, — The most approved of those who are of 
repute knows how to cheat. Nevertheless, justice will 
catch the makers and witnesses of hes.^' 

CXIX.— Diogenes Laert. is. 1. And he (HeracUtus) 

called the obsL-ure, and HermodoruB, of whom Heraclitus himself 
aaid, " The Epbesiana deserve," etc. 

Cicero, Tubc. v. 105. 

Musoniua from Stob. Floril. xi. 9. 

Diogenea Laert. ix. 2. 

lamblichuB, de Vit. Pyth. 30, p. 1&4 Arcer. 

Compare Lucian, Vit. and. 14. 

pBeudo-DiogeneB, Epiflt. 28, 6. 

CXV.— Plutarch, An sfini sit ger. reap. vii. p. 787. Context :— And 
envy, which ie the greatest evil public men have to contend with, is 
least directed against old men. "For doge, indeed, bark at what 
they do not know," according to Heraclitus. 

CXVI.— Plutarch, Coriol. 38. Context :— But knowledge of divine 
things escapes them, for the moat part, because of its incredibility, 
according to Heraclitua. 

Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 13, p. 699. Context, see Grit, Note 36. 

CXVII.— Plutarch, de Audierdo 7, p. 41. Context :— They re- 
proach Heraclitus for aaying, " A stupid man loves," etc. 

Compare idem, de And. poet. 9, p. 28. 

CXVIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649. Context :— " The 
moat approved of those who are of repute knowa how to bo on hia 
guard (^iJ^dtrotiv, aee Crit. Note 37). Nevertheleaa, justice will catch 
the makers and witnessea of lies," says the Ephesian. For this 
man who waa acquainted with the barbarian philosophy, knew of 
the puriflcation by fire of those who had lived evil lives, which 
afterwards the Stoics called the conflagration {i/m-iyKjcm). 

CXIX.— Schleiermacher compares Schol. Veo. ad Iliad xviii. 251 
and Eustathius, p. 1142, 5 ed. Rom,, which, however, Bywater does 
not regard as referring to Heraclitus of Epheeus. 



used to Bay that Homer deserved to be driven out of 
the lists and flogged, and Archilochus likewise. 

CXX.— One day is like all. 

CXXI.— A man's character is his daemon.^ 

CXXII.— There awaits men after death what they 
neither hope nor think. 

CXXIII. — And those that are there shall arise and 
become guardians of the living and the dead.** 

CXXrV. — Night-roamers, Magians, bacchanals, rev- 
elers in wine, the initiated. 

CXX.— Seneca, Epist. 12. Context :— Heraclitns, who got a nick- 
name for the obscurity of his writing, said, " One day is like all." 
His meaning is variously understood. If he meant all days were 
equal in number of boura, he spoke truly. But othei's aay one day 
is equal to all in character, for in the longest space of time you 
would find nothing that is not in one day, both light and night and 
alternate revolutions of the earth. 

Plutarch, Camill. 18. Context : — Concerning unlucky days, whether 
we sbonld suppose there are such, and whether Heraclitua did right 
in reproaching Hesiod who distinguished good and bad days, as 
being ignorant that the nature of every day is one, has been 
examined in another place. 

CXXI.— Plutarch, Qu. Platon. i. 2, p. 999. Context:— Did be, 
therefore (viz. Socrates) call his own nature, which was very critical 
and productive, God ? Just as Menander says, " Our mind is God." 
And Heraclitns, "A man's character is his daimon." 

Alexander Apbrod. de Fato 6, p. 16, Orell. 

Stobaens Floril. civ. 23. Comp. paeudo-Heraclitua, Epist. 9, 

CXXII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 030. Context :— With 
him (Socrates), Heraclitns seems to agree when he says in his difl- 
courae on men, " There awaita men," etc. 

Idem, Protrept. 2, p. 18. Theodoretus, Therap. vlii. p. 118, 1, 

Themistius (Plutarch) from Stob. Floril. cxx. 28. 

CXXIII.— Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context:— And he 
(Heraclitua) says also that there is a resurrection of thia vifiible flesh 
of ours, and he knows that God is the cause of thia resurrection, 
since he says, " And those that are there shall arise," etc. 

Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649. 

CXSIV.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 18. Context ;— Rites 
worthy of the nigbt and of fire, and of the great-hearted, or rather 



OXXV. — For the things which are considered 
mysteries among men, they celebrate sacrilegiously, 

CXXVI.— And to these images they pray, as if one 
should prattle with the houses knowing nothing of 
gods or heroes, who they are. 

CXXVII. — For were it not Dionysus to whom they 
institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the 
pudenda, it would be the most shameful action. But 
Dionysus, in whose honor they rave in bacchic frenzy, 
and Hades are the same,*" 

CXXVIII. — lamblichus, de MyBteriis v. 15. I distin- 
guish two kinds of sacrifices. First, those of men 
wholly purified, such as would rarely happen in the 
case of a single individual, as Heraclitus says, or of a 

of the idle-minded people of the Erechthidae, or even of the other 
Greeks, for whom there awaits after death what they do not hope 
(eee frag. 122). Againet whom, indeed, does Heraclitus of Ephesus 
prophesy? Against night-roftmera, Magians, fcacchanalB, revelers 
in wine, the initiated. These he threatens with things after death 
and prophesies Are for them, for they celebrate sacrilegiously the 
things which are considered mysteries among men (::=frBg. 125). 

CXXV.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 19, Context, see frag. 

Compare Arnobius, adv. Nat. v. 29. 

CXXVI.— Origen, c. Gels, vii, 62, p. 3S4, 

Idem i. 5, p. 6. 

Clement of Alex. Protrept. 4, p. 44. Context :— But if you wil! 
not listen to the prophetess, hear your own philoaopher, Heraclitus, 
tlie Ephesian, imputing unconsciousness to images, " And to these 
images," etc. 

CXXVII.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 30. Context :— In 
mystic celebration of this incident, phalloi are carried through the 
cities in honor of Dionysus. " For were it not Dionysus to whom 
they institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the pudenda, 
it would be the most shamful action," saya Heraclitus. " But Iladea 
and Dionysus are the same, to whom they rave in bacchic fremy," 
not for the intoxication of the body, as I think, so much as for the 
shameful ceremonial of lasciviouaness. 

Plutarch, de Isido 28, p. 362. 


certain very few men. Second, material and corporeal 
sacrifices and those arising from change, such as are 
fit for those still fettered by the body. 

CXXIX. — Atonements.*! 

CXXX. — When defiled, they purify themselves with 
blood, just as if any one who had fallen into the mud 
should wash himself with mud ! 

CXXIX. — lamblichus, de Mys. i. 11. Context : — Therefore Hera- 
clitus rightly called them (sell, what are offered to the gods) " atone- 
ments," since they are to make amends for evils and render the 
souls free from the dangers in generation. 

Compare Hom. Od. xxii. 481. See Crit. Note 4L 

CXXX. — Elias Cretensis in Greg. Naz. 1. 1. (cod. Vat. Pii. 11, 6, 
fol. 90 r). Context : — And Heraclitus, making sport of these people, 
says, "When defiled, they purify themselves with blood, just as if 
any one who had fallen into the mud should wash himself with 
mud!*' For to suppose that with the bodies and blood of 'the 
unreasoning animals which they offer to their gods they can cleanse 
the impurities of their own bodies, which are stained with vile 
contaminations, is like trying to wash off mud from their bodies by 
means of mud. 

Gregory Naz. Or. xxv. (xxiii.) 15, p. 466 ed. Par. 1778. 

Apollonius, Epist. 27. 

Compare Plotinus, Enn. i. 6, p. 54. 



:, corrected by Bernaye, 

Fragmest 1. 
Note 1.— Instead of 5i1}to, MS has iiy/iai 
folloTved by all criticB except Bergk. 

Fraomest 2. 
Note 2. — The Wfof of Heraclitue stood for the element of order 
or law in the ever-shifting world. Onr word Reason may expresa 
the same idea more in accord with the thought of that time (see 
Introduction, p. 59 ff.), Zeller and Pfieiderer understand by it, 
Reason ruling or immanent in the world ; Ileinze, the objective 
{unconscious) law of Reason ; Bernaya, conscious Intelligence ; 
Teichmiiller, eelf -conscious Reason ; Schuster, on the other hand, 
regards it as the "revelation offered us by the audible Speech of 
Nature," In the present passage, Zeller is inclined to understand 
by rnu Myav roiSe^ primarily the discourse of the author, but contain- 
ing also the idea of the content of the discourae, »'. *. the theory of 
the world laid down in his book (Vol. 1, p. 572, 2). For fuller account 
of the /L^;or, compare Introduction, pp. 8, 12, 28, 45, 59, 61. 

Fbaoment 13. 
Nol« 3. — Bvwater reads, 'Oo«u S^Jif anoi/ pi^i/aii:, raiTu iyii npari/iii^ ; 
Compare Introduction, p. 19 f. 

Fbaqicent 15. 
Note 4.— Compare Introduction, p. 48. Bernays (Rhein. Mus. 
is. 201 t.) offers the esplanation that the eyes are more exact 
witnefflea than the ears, because by the eyes we have the only pare 
cognition of Are, in the perception of which ia the only true 

Fkaghbnt 18. 
Note S. — See Introduction, p. 36 fl. 

Fragment 19. 
Note 6. — Common reading has f" "S nuaiu fn-idrnoflni yiii/iiiii ^c oi 
ifnu^e/i-i't/aci n-aiTd iia irriiTu/j', Schleiermacher, ^vii/irp' o'it/ Kv^epv^Bci. 
giuKiT". Schuster, 'Jrt olr/ rt Kvjiepviisci. 

Fragment 20. 

Note 1.- — The sense of aTzdvTw is uncertain. In the citations 

from Plutarch and Simplicius, the word is omitted ; they read 



xiatioii Tfli'rlE. Ze)ler, whose interpretation of the word we bave 
followed, t-akea it as maBculine, referring to the godB and men, the 
meaning then being, that since gods and men are included in the 
world as part of it, they could not have created it. Schuster, on the 
other hand, renders it as follows ; "Die Welt, die alles in sich 
befaaat [die neben sich weder fur andre Welten noch fur einen 
Schopfer Raom hat]," etc. 

Feaoment 21. 

1 rendered by Schuster "fiery wind" such 
(, 1) believes it has essen- 
n frag. 2S, both words being 
r formative principle of the 

Note 8.—] 
as forms the stars. Zeller (Vol. 1, p. I 
tially the same signiflcation as Kipami^ ii 
other terms for the world-ruling fire o 

Fragment 23. 
Note 9. — EusebiuH omils yv, and is followed by Lasaalle and 
Heinze. The former (Vol. 2, p. 63) translates, " Das Meer wird 
auflgegoBsen und gemesaen nach demselben Logos, welcber zaerst 
war, ehe es (selbst) noch war," and finda here a confirmation of his 
interpretation of the Logos as the eternal preexisting law of the 
identity of being and not-being. Heinze understands it as follows : 
"Das Meer verwandelt sicb in denselben Logos, also in dasselbe 
Feuer, von welcher Beschaffenheit es vorher war, ehe es selbst 
entstand." Schuster reads 7^' and translates, "Das Meer ergiesst 
sich und nimmt sein Maass ein im selben Umfaiig, wie damals als 
noch keine Erde war" {p. 139). Zeller reads j-^ and understands 
the passage to refer to the retarn of the earth into the sea from 
which it sprang. By Myoi here he understands "proportion of 
magnitude " or " size," so that k t'ov aiirbv ?,c1jifv means that the sea 
returns "to the same size" as before it became earth (Vol. 1, p. 

Fraoment 24. 

Note 10.— See Introduction, pp. 15, 22, 68. 
Fbagmknt 25, 

Nof« U.— This fragment is not accepted by Zeller, who holds 
that air was not recognised by Heraclitus aa one of the elements, 
but that he accepted only the three, fire, water, and earth. Air 
was added, Zeller thinks, by later writers, who confused it with 
the" soul " of Heraclitus (Vol. 1, p. 615). Schuster, who thinks Hera- 
clitus did not teach a specific number of elements aftej the manner 
of Empedocles, regards the passage as trustworthy (p. 157 fl.). 
Teichmuller gives to air an important place in the system of Heracli- 
tus, distingaishing the apper pure air, which is not different from 
fire, and the impure lower air (Vol. 1, p. 62). 


Fbaqment 27. 
Not« 12. — Schleiermacher, followed by Mullach, reads riva for 
Tif, BO that the eenee becomes, "How can that which never Bete 
escape any one?" Tbie ie usDeceeeary and violates the context in 
Clement. That which never seta is the eternal Order or Law, con- 
ceived hers as Destiny or Juatice. According to Zeller (Vol. 1, p, 
590), that which never seta is Are. According to Schuster {p. 184), it 
is Relation or Law, and the tic refers to Helios, which, though itself 
the centre of power and intelligence, is yet subject to law. Teich- 
muller (Vol. 1, p. 184) understands it to refer tfl Justice or Destiny, 
which never sets like the sun, and which none can escape. 

Fkagmest 35. 
Note 13. — n?j.laTui' may be taken as nenter; "HcBiod was a 
teacher of the greatest number of things." On the unity of day 
and night, compare Introduction, p. 32 f. 

Note 14. — The original text, which reads 6k6tiim evfifiiyi) dviinaat, has 
been variously corrected. As the subject of ot/i/h; '7, Schuster inserts 
Diivc,thesense then being that as wine is mixed with spices and labelled 
aa any one pleases, so God receives different names under diSerent 
forma (p. 188). Bywater, following Bernays (Hhein. Mus. is. 245), 
inserts Hiiuiia, and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 602, 2) reads ^uuf ai,f for S«uoJrE;>. 
Teichmuller (Vol. 1, p. 67) attempts to save the original reading by 
making i "tor, (i. «. fire) the subject both of oB^oirni and avii/ijyy. The 
correction of Bernays is the most satisfactory ; the meaning then 
being, that as when perfumes are mixed, the m.i!cture ia named 
according to the scent that impresses each person, so God is named 
according to the attribute that most impresses the individual. Com- 
pare iwC' ^- About the same sense, however, Is derived from the 

Fbaqmbst 38. 

■Schleiermacher and Zeller think it doubtful whether 

made out of this fragment. For Schuster's 

ilanatioQ, see Introduction, p. 18 f. Bernays (Rhein. 

6) interprets it to mean that the perception of Are, 

'depends the existence of the soul, is gained after death 

: extinction of the sense of sight, by Uie sense of smell. Just 

)as8age from Aristotle (frag. 37) teaches that in the conflagra- 

the world, all perception wUl be by the nostrils. Pfleiderer 


Fragment 40. 

Note 16. — Of this passage from Plutarch only the words oKidinjat naX 
awdyei, 'ir(,6aeiai Kai avreiai^ can with any certainty be attributed directly 
to Heraclitus. The rest bears marks of later hands, as shown by 
Bernays (Heraklit. Brief e, p. 55), and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 576, 2). 

Fragment 45. 

Note 17. — Bernays' explanation of this passage (Rhein. Mus. vii. 
p. 94 ; compare Introduction, p. 44 f .) has been followed by Zeller, 
Schuster (partly), and Arnold Hug. According to this interpretation, 
the association of the bow and lyre lies in their form, which in 
the case of the old Greek or Scythian bow with its arms bent back 
at the ends, was like that of the lyre. Hence we have in the bow 
and the lyre, two distinct illustrations of harmony by opposite 
straining tension. Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 113) understands it to refer to 
the harmony between the bow and the lyre ; the bow and the lyre 
being symbols in the Apollo cult, the one of singularity and differ- 
ence, the other, of universality and union. On Pfleiderer's modi- 
fication of Lassalle^s view, see Introduction, p. 44. In place of 
t6^ov nal Avpvg, Bast reads tov b^ing re Kal papkoq. Bergk conjectures 
t6§ov Koi vevpf/g. On the interpretation of this passage by Plutarch 
and Plato's Eryximachus as the harmony of sharps and flats in 
music, compare Hug (Platons Symposion, p. 77, 5) and Zeller (Vol. 
1, p. 578, 2). Compare frags. 56, 43, 59. 

Fragment 47. 

Note 18. — Schuster (p. 24, note) reads eg ri yap (ftTiciv, apfioviri atpavi/g 
<pavep^g Kpeirruv ; See Introduction, p. 20, and Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 604, 1. 

Fragment 50. 

Note 19. — MS reads y/oa^cow ; Duncker and By water, yva(i>iuv ; 
Bernays, yva<pei(^. 

Fragment 55. 

Note 20. — The common reading is ttov ipirerbv t^v yfjv v^fierai^ which 
Zeller retains, understanding it to refer to the beastliness of men, 
who *'feed upon the earth like the worm " (Vol. 1, p. 660). Pfleiderer 
likewise accepts this reading, quoting Sallust, Catil. 1 : Vitam 
silentio transeunt veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri 
obedientia finxit. That '^'^nyVi the reading of Stobaeus, followed by 
By water, is correct, however, is shown by comparison with ^schylus, 
Ag. 358, Afof TT/Mydv ixovaiv eiTrelVj and Plato's Criti. 109 B, Kaddnep 
TTOLfiheg KTTjvTj irhpy vifiovreg. With this reading, the sense then 
becomes that man is subject to eternal divine force or law. 


(liiv Kol ^pfiiifiEva. 
■V for ipthi, and has 

Fragment 56. 
Note 21. — Compare frag. 45 and note 17. Bywater reada waJJiirowt 
dpoaiiii/, here ; but though in three paesagee, those namely given 
under this fragment, TraS./wroi'oc ia found in the MSS, yet the contest 
even in Plutarch, where sharps and flats are spoken of, callis for the 
meaning "harmony of oppositions," Eta explained in note 17, for 
which we should expect na^lvrfxHroi; rather than rraXluTovo^. 

Fbaoment 60. 

Note 22. — What is referred to hy roiro, "these things," haeheen 
questioned. Teichm filler, followed by Pfieiderer, has given the true 
explanation. Toira refers to Home idea the opposite of "juBtice." 
Clement is illustrating the Pauline principle that without law there 
would have been no sin. F6r this, Heraclitus, whose prominent 
thought was, no war without peace, no good without bad, etc., served 
him as good authority, 

Fbaqmknt 62. 

Note 23.— The original text is as followi 

tiirn ^iiiiiv Kni iimpi ipeiv vii yivofieva nivrc 
Schleierraacher proposes d/ievni for el Si ai 
i>een followed by Zeller, Bywater and others. Schuster retains the 
MS form in the first clause. Xpeii/iiva also gives trouble. Brandis 
proposes aa^oiieva. Schuster reajJs Karnxpciiucva, approved by Zeller. 
Lassalle and Bywater retain xpeiifieiia. This passive use is unusual, 
hut possible, as shown by the analogy of nin-nxiifapii'a. The transla- 
tions of Schuster and lassalle are as follows : 

Schuster (p. 198) — "In demFaile muss man also dengemeinsamen 
Krieg e<^ar Reeht nennon nnd [sagen] das alles [nur] in Folge dea 
Streites entsteht nnd sieh aufbraucht." 

Lassalle — " Man muss wisaen dass der Krieg das Gemeinsam ist, 
und der Streit dan Recht, und dass nach dem Gesetz des Streits alles 
wird und verwendet wird (or lit. und aich bethiitigt)." 

Hiwif in this passage has almost the signification "common good." 


Note 24. — Critics have expended their ingenuity in trying to make 
something out of this obscure fragment. Teichmiiller {Vol. 1, p. 97 
ff.) says that we have here the distinction of the inteliigible from the 
sensible world. The former is the pure, light, fiery and most incor- 
poreal beii^, compared with which the world of the senses la death 
Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 651) similarly refers it to the testimonj of the 
senaes, which see the world as something stiff and dead ' when 
really everything is in constant motion Rchuster (p 276) lahorh 
with a far-fetched interpretation to show that the paaaage does not 



cast any disparagement upon the senses. For Pfleiderer'a STplana- 
tion, see Introduction, p. 43. Ali these interpretations look for a 
theoretical meaning, when it is quite possible that no theoretical 
meaning was intended. It is simpler to compare it with frag, 2, and 
refer it to Heraclitus' repeated cliarge against the people, of their 
Bleep-like condition when awake. 


Note 25. — We have followed Schuster's punctuation of this frag- 
ment. Bywater, with other critics, reads, "Ei' rfl aiupov /lavyov 
WfEdftii oin jSfAfi ml iDi'Mi l^ud^ ovra/ia. T& eof6v, here, is the world- 
ruling Wisdom or Order, to which Heraclitus applies many names. 
(See Introduction, p. 60 f.) It wille and wills not to be called by 
the name of Zeus, because that name, while it points towards 
its true nature, yet but partly indicates it, or in part wrongly. 
The variety of meanings, however, which have been drawn from 
this fragment may be shown by the following translations, Schlei- 
ermacber (and Lasaalle): "Das Eine Weise allein will nicht 
ausgesprochen werden und will auegesprochen werden, der Name 
des Zens." Schuster: " Nur eines iat die Weisheit ; sie laest 
sich nicht und lasst sich doch auch wieder benennen mit des 
Zeus Namen." Bernays; "Eines, dae allein Weise, will und will 
auch nicht mit des Zf/v Namen genannt werden." The poetical 
form Zijio!- is chosen, thinks Bernays, to indicate that the One Wise 
is the source of "life." Zeller: "Eines, das allein Webe, will und 
will auch nicht mit dem Namen des Zeus benaant werden." 
PfleiJerer: "Als Eins will das weise Allwesen, Zeus genannt, nicht 
besieich net werden nnd will es," Teichmiiiler : "Die Weisheit, 
Zeus genannt, will allein eins heissen und will es auch nicht." 

Fragmint 72. 
Note 26.— This fragment is connected by Schuster and Zeller with 
the gronp of passages concerning rest in change (see frags. 82, 83), 
and refers to the pleasure which the rest and change of death brii^ 
to souls. They therefore reject the /i^ lldfaTcv of Numenius aa not 
Heraclitic. (Schuster, p. 191, 1. Zeller, p. 647, 2.) Meiderer, how- 
ever (p. 222), retains the >i$ davaTov as genuine, and explains that it 
is a pleasure to sutils \a become wet, because so by pursuing the way 
down into apparent death, they attain their new birth of life in 
death. He therefore retains also the rkti^iiiv 61 dvai airait -^n eif rju 
■}h'emii irruan; of NumeniuB, as expressing the true sense of the 

FH.4GMENT 74. 

Note 27. — The added clause of Plutarch, " It flashes through the 
body like lightning through the clouds," is also regarded by Sclileiet- 
macher, Schuster, Zeller, and Ffieiderer, as Heraclitic. 


Tb& similarity of the three fr^xDenta 74, 76, and 76 suggeets, of 
course, that they are all corrupted forme of a. common original. 
Bywatar, however, accepts the form of espresaion in frag. 74 as 
eurely Heraclitic and marks the other two as doubtful. Schleier- 
macher, from the number of citations of each of these fragments, 
poncludee that Heraclitua had expressed himself in each of these 
three forma. Lassalle, in agreeing with hini, believes also that 
Heraciitus, who was given to playing upon words (for further 
examples of Heraclitua' pnns, compare frags. 91, 101, 127, 00), not 
without purpose choae the words aii/ and aiiyi, and sees in the use of 
the latter word a reference to the lightning-like movement of the 
soul (Vol. 2, p. 1S6 f.). Zeller thinks it difficult to determine the 
original form, but he does not regard the proposition nij^ fnp^ iivx<i 
co^T&T^, aa Heraclitic (Vol. 1, p. 643, 2). 

Fbaombst 77. 

Hote 28. — The original of this difficult and corrupted passage as it 

appears in Clement, is as follows (unpunctuated), 'Ai^/juttoc iv d^pivg 

•fiioi a^Tcrai iavrp oiroSaviiP OToa/3eoftic l^Hv dl awrirai rtSiiiOTOC evSuv 
uiroe^cndei^ i^i; cypiiyopag amrrai EuJoiTor. Various emendations and 
translations of this have been mode. Compare Schuster, p. 271 ; 
Pfleiderer, p. 204, 1. Bywater, however, finally rescues aa Hera- 
clitic the form given above in the text. 

Fbagment 80. 
Note 29. — That this fragment is to be taken in the sense in which 
Diogenes understands it, rather than in that of Plutarch, ia held by 
Schuster (p. 61) and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 654, 4). Lasaalle (Vol. 1, p. 
301), following Schletermacher, takes itas Clement does, in the sense 
of the Delphic inscription, "I have sought myself in the general 
flux of things, Ihave striven to know myself." For Pfleiderer' s inter- 
pretation and the true meaning, see Introduction, pp. 41, 48. 

Fraombnt 82. 

Note 30. — Lassalle, following Creuzer, reads ayxcallai instead of 
ipx^<Mai (Vol. 1, p. 131.) 

Fkaombnt bo. 

Note 31. — Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 290) interprets this fragment aa 
follows : In waking, we distinguish our own representations from the 
objective world common to all. In sleeping, they are one and the 
same. Hence Heraclitus says the sleeping make their own world. 
Similarly Pfleiderer (p. 202 f.) understands Heraclitus to mean that 
the sleeper makes hie own world, while the waking man is con- 
scious that corresponding to his world of ideas there i. 


objective world. Pfleiderer rejects «•> owipyoii^ as an addition of 


Fraomxn't 97. 

Note 32. — This fragment liae given trouble. Bernaye {Heraclites 
15) propoHes to eubatitnte An/^wc for iloi/invot, but has not been followed 
by other critics. Schleiermacher translates, " Ein thiJrichter Mann 
vemimmt nieht mehr von Schicfcsal als ein Kind von einem Mann." 
SchuBter (p. 342) renders, " Der Menach in seiner Kindheit hat (sie 
[i. e. the names]) von Grott gehiirt, wie (jetzt) das Kind von dem 
Manne," and finds here support for the theory of the natural fitness 
of names {see Introduction, p. 16), which primitive man learned 
directly from Nature. Zeller {Vol. 1, p. fl53) refers it to the childish 
want of reason in man, which does not perceive the voice of the 
deity. Pfleidcrer (p. 61) renders, "Der unverstandige Mensch hat 
von Jeher nur soviel von der Gottheit gehiirt, als ein Kind vom 

Fragment 103. 

Note 33. — 'T^/Hv here ie to be taken in the sense of excess of self- 
assertion, the private will against the universal Law. Compare 
frags. 92, 104, etc. 

FnAGifSKT 107. 

Note 34. — The latter clause may also be translated, "Wisdom is 
to speak and act truly, giving ear to Nature." 

Fbaombnt 110. 

Note 36. — Clementine MS reads jfcu^^. Eusebius, followed by all 
but Mullach, reads 3<«i3.p. For Heraclitiis' opinions on democracy, 
see, further, frags. 114, 113. 

FaAftMENr 116. 

Note 36.^The paesftge in Clement ia as follows : aS,Ra T<i /itv rft- 
jTnioeuf ^adi/ Kpimrcm a-meriT/ ajM/.Kab' 'Updn^irou ■ aniariri y&p ftafiiyy&vci 
/lij ytytiiiaKraBai, from which it is seen thatthe words of Heraclitus, anarrii) 
Sia^vyyivu fii ytyvimiuaBaii v/ere differently understood by Clement and 
Plutarch. &chuster{p.72)acceptstfaeC^ementineform, and regards the 
whole passage as Heraclitic, and renders, " Die Tiefe der Erkenatniss 
zu verhergen, das ist ein gutes Misstrauen. Denn dnrch diese miss- 
trauische Behutsamkeit entgeht nian dem Schicksal durchschaut zu 
werden," by which he accounte for the (intentional) obscurity of 
Heraclitus' writings. Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 574, 2), following Schleier- 
macher, rejects the Clementine version, and regards the words as 
teaching that truth is hidden from the masses because it seems 
incredible to them. A still diflerent meaning may be found in the 
words if we take iwarl^ as subjective, referring to the want of faith 
which prevents as from seeing truth. 


Fragment 118. 
Note 37. — The common reading is, ioKsivri-ni A Soaiiiiraro^ yai&isixi 
^taeariv, which tnakcB nonBense. Schleiermacher proposes Jonfown i 
SoK^iiiraTo^ yiviicKeiv ^uXiiouEtv. Schuster (p. 340) BuggeatB, ioKc6vruv, i 
ioKiuinaTov ylverai, yis^nei fiiSdoonv, and fancies the alluHion ia to the 
poets, who Irom credible things accept that which is most credible. 
Bei^k, followed by Pfleiderer, reads ^Xviaacii', to talk nonsense. 
BemayB, followed by Bywater, reads irUeany. 

Fbagment 121. 

Note 38. — This fragment has b«en variously translated, but the 
meaning seems to be that a man's God or Destiny depends not upon 
external divine powers, but upon his own inner nature. TeichmuUer 
finds here the further meaning that the essence of mind is the 
essence of deity. 

Fragment 123. 

Note 39. — The meaning of this passage is very doubtful. We have 
followed Bernays' reading instead of the common hida dcdini, which 
Bywater retains, although he marks it uncertain. Schuster (p. 176, 1) 

suggests [6al/iav WeXei'] Maie kSvTL inilaraadai mi ^vTumb^ n. t. 7.. Zeller 
(Vol. 1, p. 648, 4) regards it as a reference to the dsemona who are 
made protectors of men. Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 185) thinks it refers to 
a resurrection of souls. 

Note 40.— For test and discussion of this passage, see Introduction, 
p. 63 S. Teichmi'iller's interpretation of it is as follows : " Wenn es 
nlcht Dionysus ware, dem siedie Procession f iihren und dabeidas Lied 
auf die Schamglieder singen, so wiire das Schamloseste ausgefuhrt. 
Nun aber, iat Hades (der Sohn der Scham) derselbe wie Dionyaus, 
dem sie rasen und Feste feiern." This means, says Teichmiiller, 
that the shameful and the becoming are the same (Identification 
of opposites). For what is improper (or men is proper for Dionysus, 
because he is the same as Hades, and Hades is the same as shame, 
which latter be attempts to prove from Plutarch, de Is. 29 b. Again, 
Dionysus and Hades are the same, because the former stands for the 
sun and the latter for the iower world, and as the sun is absorbed 
into the earth at night and generated therefrom in the morning, 
they most be essentially the same, (Neue Studien, Vol. 1, p. 25.) 

Fbaomknt 129. 
Note 41. — That the use of this term was ironical, ia made probable 
by the following fragment. 


n£PI «Y2E02. 

I. OvK cftcO ak\a tov \6yov aKOVcravrag ofioXoycccy aro<f)6v cWc, |y napra 


II. Tot) de \6yov rovd^ i6vT0t aU\ d^vP€Toi ylyvovrai avdpamoi Koi 
wpSarBev $ aKOvcrai Koi aKovcravT^t t6 irpSyrov. yivofi€voiv yap irdvrav Kara 
t6p \6yop rdvdf direlpoicri ioUacri iT€ip&p.tvoi KCii cirioip koi epyatv roiovriatv 
oKoiov €ya> dirjy€vpAi, diaip€<ov eKatrrop Kara <fiva'Lv koi <f)pd^<av oK<as ^X^^* 
Toifs dc oXXovr dvBpamovs \avBdv€i SKdcra eycpBevr^t noUovcri, oKcacnrep 
OKdara €vdovT€s iniKavBdvovrai. 

III. *A^vv€Tot dKovaravT€g Ka<l>oicri eoiKairi * <f)dTis avroctn fxaprvpcci 
naptdvrat dneivai, 

I V • Ka/cot fidpTvpeg dvOpdmoicri 6<f)$a\poi Koi ^a, fiapffdpovs yftvxds 

V . Ov <f)popeovari Toiavra woWol OKdcroicri eyicvpeovart oxide fiaB6vT€S 
yivaoTKOvortf ianrroiari de doK€ovari> 

V I. *AKOvarai ovk iTTiardfUvoi otd* elireiv, 

VII. 'Eav fi^ tKmjat, dviKiritrrov ovk i^evprjcreif dvt^epevvrjfrov iov Kat, 

V III, Xpvar6p ol di(rifM€voi yrjp iroW^p opvarcovo'i Koi evpio'Kovai oXiyop, 

IX. ^Ayxtfioo'irip, 

X. ^voris Kpxmrecrdai <f)ik€i, 

XI. 'O apo^ o5 TO fiapT€i6p iari t6 ip AcX<^oir, oiht Xcyci o{^e KpxmrUy 
ciKKa (njfiatp€i. 

XII. Si^vXXa dc fiaiPOfUpt^ frrofuvn dyiKatrra kcX dKoKKdmifrra kcli 
dfMvpiora <l>6eyyofUpri ;(iXi«i>y €T€o>p e^iKpeerai rjj (jxiapj dia top deop. 

XIII. *0<r«v 2^if aKorj fiddrjaiSf Tavra eyo> nporifUa. 

XrV. PolybiuS iv. 40 : tovto yhp XbUp ivn T&p pvp KQip&p, ep oh 
ndprap ttXcot&p koi nopevT&p ycyoporaip ovk hp €Ti npenop eirj noiijrais koi 


135 ^H 

npHlli&vtripi ^^H 

^^M rat n-X«i'(jT<ov, dir/tn-Di-i A^<j,iir^i{rov^ivtav vapfxifuvoi |8(;8oi 

.On-tkc KOT^ T^K ^H 

^^^1 'fipaKKitTOV. 


^^^1 XY. 'OlfiBaktUM. rav Strav aKpl^iirrtpot pdpnpfs. 


^^M XVI. n<iKvfu,ei,, Wov Ix^f oi 8.BaT«« ■ -H^ioSov yhp 

&t (di'Sdff no! ^^M 


^^^^H XvII. Hv8ay6pjis Mvriaapxov 'iaropii)r ijiiKrjiTt atiBpamnv fiakitrra ^^^H 

^^^^1 Itavtiay. xai fucXr^dfitvoc Tuvras' ras tniyypaipas cVoirjirf t 

ojiToS iro0.'.,c, ^^1 

^^H TToXtipidifiv, KaKKTfxylnv. 


^^H XVIII. 'OKuai^i' AJyoi-E 5<oi-(ia oiatlt ii0ii!)..'eTi» h 


^^H y.f.i^itfii' Stl oo^x 4an jrdjTW.. «txM()ii7/i(>'o^. 


Ta ^H 

^^1 XX. Kdcr/Mj- < TO»B. > T^» aMy diram»» offrc r« fltS^ 

olrt dt^p-W^if ^H 

^^^^H inoirfm, oXX' ^v aid ml (orl Kat ?(7Tiii TTb/i niifuov, dTrrd/it 

"'"' Ff'T/JQ ^^M 


^^^^1 XXI. nt;)]dE rpOTraX npairov ^aXatririi ' daXao-inji: Sc to 


^^H T^ dc ^ptm irptjoriip. 


^^^H XXII. Hvpbv airraptipfTai irdvra xni wvp Airavrai', i 

Sitnifp ;tpi>craij ^^H 

^^m xpw"-^" ""^ xpw^'^'-'y xp""^'- 


^^H XXIII. eaXao-cra SiaxeiTm nai plrptirai is rot avroi 

. Xdyo^ o.o7o. ^1 

^^^H npooBiv ^v 5 ytiiiaSat fy^f' 


^H XXIV. ■XpTiapi.Tiv,, . . . «DpM. 


^^^H XXV. Zjj nvp TDB -y^s tfdiiaroF, Koi arjp fy jov iri'/jot 

^(irnioi' ' liap ^^H 

^^^H Cn "" dipos Sdi/arov, -fy rhv uSarar. 


^^H XXVI. navra t6 inip ftrtMir icpinVi kox KaraX^rrai. 


^H XXVII. n ^ dOvd^ ^OTt ^c d.. r» XaOo. ; 


^H XXVIII. T^ Sf n-di^a o.-ax,'f» Ktpafi'dc. 


^^^1 XXIX. 'HXide dux innp^qa-iTat fiirpa ' ti Se ^7, 'Epi 

pi.y ^^1 

^^^^K imKovpoi t^iupijiroviri. 


^^^^M XXX. ' HoSt Kal iairipTjt Tippura 7 apKTut, ital livrio* 7-^ 

[ I'flKTDV oSflDi; ^^^H 

^^H dbJr. 


^^H XXXI. v,! pf, ij'XiDf >>, (i^c^pi;>'7 Ot {c. 



XXXIl. Ncor e^' ^fi€pu ijXior. 

XXXIIL Diogenes Laert. i. 23 : dot .r dc (scil. BaK^js) Kara 

Tivas irpStros dorpoKoy^crai koi fjXiaKas cicXci^eir Koi Tponhs vpoturtiPy &s 
<f)r}ariv EUdrifiot iv t^ irtpl r&v dtTTpokoyovfiivoiv laropiq. * odfv avT6v Koi 
S€VO<l)dvf]s Koi *lip6doros ^avfux^et. fiapTvp€'i d' avr^ koi 'HpdickfiTOs Koi 

XXXIV. Plutarchus Qu. Plat viii. 4, p. 1007: oZrc^s oZv 

dvayKalav irpos rhv pvpavov ^xtav avfinXoKfiv Koi arvvapfjuyyriv 6 xpdvos ovx, 
dir\S>s e<m Klvr)fTis aXX', Sxnrep tiprjfrai^ Kivfjiris iv rd^ci ficrpov ex^^^ '^°* 
mpara /cat ir€pi6dovs» l>v 6 fjXios tniarTdrrjs cav /col (ricoTruff, 6pi^€iv koi 
Ppap€V€iv Koi dvadeiKVvvai /cat dpa<f}aiveiv ftcra^oXar Koi S>pas at irdvra 
(j^povaif KaB *YipdKK€iT0Vy ovde <f}av\<ap ovde piKpcov, dWd rS>v fAeyioTcav 
Koi Kvpicardrcip r^ ryytyLOvi kclI irpoyra^ Oe^ ylvtrai avP€py6s* 

XXX ¥• i^iddo'/coXoff dc TrkelaToav 'Haiodos ' tovtop fniarapTcu TrXciora 
ctdfVai, oarrit fifieprjp koi €v(t>p6prjp ovk iylpoxTK^ * lori yap €P, 

XXX V I. 'O $€0: fipjipf) €V<l>p6prif x^iicap OepoSt TToXc/ior tlprjprij Kopos 
\ifws * oXXocovrai dc o/ccoo^cp 6/c($ray arvfjLfuy^ <C Bvofia ]> Bvctfiatri. ' 
6pofid^€Tai KaB ^8ov^p c/caorov. 

XXXVII. Aristoteles de Sensu 5, p. 443 a 21 : doKci d' cV/otr 

f) Kairpcabris dpaBvpiaait €ipai otrfi^f oZtra koip^ y^s re Koi depog, /cat 
7rdvT€s €7n<f>€popTai cm tovto irtpl 6(rfirjs * fii6 /cat 'H/ja/cXctror ovrms 
€tpriK€Pf CDS ct irdpTa rd 6pTa Kanphs yepoirOf p2p€s dp diaypoUp. 

XXXVIII. At yftvxal ocrpMprai KaB^ aSrjp, 

XXXIX. Ta yjtvxpd Beperai, Bepfwp ^vxcraty vypop avalperaif Kap' 
(fioKeop poTi^crai, 

XL. S/cidj/ijo*! ical (Tupdycif Trpdcrcicri Koi aTreto't. 

XLI. Uorafio^ai Sis Totcri avrotat ovk dp ififiairis * mpa yap <i Ka\ 
€Ttpa^ €inpp€€i vSara, 

XLII. J Horafioio'i TolfTi avroltri €fipaLPov(np mpa kcH mpa vdara 
cVippct *}*. 

XLIII. Aristoteles Eth. Eud. vii. ^, p. 1235 a 26 : Ka\ 'UpdK- 

Xciror firiTipa t» voi^crapTi * Cds tpis €k re Bt&p Koi dpBp&ircap dtrSKoiro ' 
ov yap dp €ipai dpfxopiap firi Sptos o^eos /cat fiapeos, ovdi rd {^a dp€v 
Brjkcos Ka\ appiPOSy ipaprmp 6pT<ap. 

arrav lut iraTT/p • 

Si avOp^TTOVS, TO 

Tt trcivrui' it ffaaikii!, koI't 
t tiiv BouXouE fTTOiijrre rove 


XLIV. lUXr/idc 
fit* Btois ld(if( Toil 

aLV. Ou JuvHUJt Skips iiaiptpuiicvov iaiiiTty ofiolioyiti ' iraKiiTpoTTni 
iplAOHii/ OKamrtp To^ou xai Xipqr, 

XLVI. AriatotelcB Bth. Nic. viii. 3, p. 1155 b 1 : ™! w(p\ 

(pairKani tpav piv 
paiptrov op^pov 
tal tK rial' 8iQ(/)i 

lirfpoi' tirifi/ToCo-i Kai (ftviriiia 
Spffpov yaiav ^ijpavStXtTav, (pu* 

it oSipatliy irXij- 

XLVII, "Afjjiovi'ij lii^ai^c (^Qi'cp^t Kptlaaaiv. 
XLVIII. M^ fiKjj Tttpl ruv ficyiWuv mi^^aXiufMdii. 
XLIX. Xp^ <b /uiXa TToXXmi' imopas i^iKoaii^eius ay&pai tanu. 
L. Tua^iov Siiic tiiBtia Kai UKoKiri pla iari tal fj alri). 
LI. *OMit (rvpnar' &v (Xoivro /laXXnv tj \piirrov, 
Lll. SdXnifcra iSap KaBaparratov lai /ilapiraTof, IxBiai fiiv jnSriflo* 
jtni (ra>T^piot, (itflpuTToic Si Snoror «:nl oXidpior. 

LIII. Columella tie E. E. viii. 4 ; aicctia etiam pulyis et cinis, 
ubicuuque cohortem porticuB vel tectnm protegit, iiixta parie- 
tes reponendna est, tit ait quo aves se perfiindant : nam his 
rebtia plomam pinnasqiie emendant, ai modo credimua Ephesio 
Heraclito qui ait: suea coeno, cohortalea ayea pnlvere (vel 
cinere) lavari. 

LIV. Bop^6pa ;^(ii;«"'. 

LV. ,nni' ipncTop itktfyTJ viptrat. 

L V I.. UaKlvrpimni ftppofi'ij Jtucrpou Btaaittp \vpiis koI rdfoii. 

LVII, -KyM. ..i ..Kb, rairt,. 

I Bef. haer. ix. 10: Kui uyaSIlu Ka\ xaKur 

LVin. Hippoljtui 

(BOil. ?.. .WO" oi yoi 

piaBby Xap^dini. 
jT&i- yJaom J. 


I f'pyaC^ptB 

1 rii dyaSi no 


LIX. Svj/d^ciar o^a Koi ovxl oZXof (rvfi(li€p6fi€vop dia^€p6fi€vov, 
crvv^dop di^dop ' €K irdvTcov tv kclL e( €v6s iravra, 

LX. AiKfjs odvofia o{>K &v ffdciraPf ei ravra fArj ^p, 

LXL Schol. B. in II. iv. 4, p. 120 Bekk. : dnpenes (paa-ip, el 
Tepjrei ToifS Beovs voKcfiap Oea, aXX ovk dnpares ' to. yap ycppoia €pya 
TcpTTti, SKXoDS T€ ndXcfioi Koi p-d)(ai rjfiip fjL€P dcipa doiccl, r^ dc 6€^ ovde 
ravra deiva. avvreXct yap dirapra 6 6(6? irpos ipfioviap rS>p oXwi/, oIkopo- 
fiap ra (rvfJi<f)€popray on^p Koi ^Hpa/cXctror Xeyei, a>r r^ piep Occo kclKcl irdpra 
Ka\ dyaOa kcu d/icaia, npBpcuTroi di & pcp adiKa xm€i\^<f)acnPy & de diKaia* 

LXII. Eldepai xpV '''^^ TToXe/ioi/ eopra ^vpoPy Ka\ di/ci/v €pip ' koi yipo- 
p.€pa ndpra Kar epip Ka\ \ ;(peco/iei/a | . 

LXIII. ^EoTi yap elfiappepa irdprcas * * * *. 

LXIV. Qdparos eon oKocra €y€p3€pr€s 6p€0fi€Pf OKoVa de €vdopr€s 


LiXV. *Ei/ r6 (ro<f)6p fiovpop ' XeyetrBai ovk eBeXet Ka\ e^cXei Zj)p6s 

LX VI. Toi) piov oi5pofui jSioy, tpyop de Odparos. 

IjX V II. *Addparoi Bptfroi, dptfroi dBdparoiy C&pres rop eKeipcap Bdparop 
r6p dc eKCLPODP plop r^Opcayrcs. 

LXVIII. "itvx^tn yap ddparos v8<op y^PftrOaiy vbari Sc 3dparos yrjp 
y€P€(r6ai ' €K y^s d€ vd(op yiperaiy i^ vdaros de ^^XV' 
LXIX. *0d6r cfj/o) Kara pia Kal cDvrr], 
LXX. !Svp6p dpx^ Kal nepas. 

LXXI. "^vx^s iretpara ovk hp e^cvpoio ndaap €fmrop€v6p€Pos 6d6p, 
IjXXII. ^vx^cri rep'^is vyp{j<Ti y€P€ar6ai. 

LXXIII. 'Aj/^p 6k6t^ iip p.€Bvcr6^y dytrai xmh iraibhs dp^fiov cr(fi(iK\6- 
p,€POSy OVK €irata>p oKrj fiaip fiy vyp^p r^p ^vx^v e;^6>i/. 

liXXI V . AUrj ^vxq aocjiayrdrr} Kal dpi(Trrf. 

liXXv. I Avy]^ $VP^ V'^X'? cocjxardrrj kol dpi(mj\, 

IjXX V I. I Ov y5 (^PVf ^^XV ffofjidtrdrrj Kal dpiarrj "f". 

LXX V II. "ApSpanosy oK<as tp €v<f)p6pu (fidoSy &7rr€rai dnoa'pipwrai. 

LXXVIII. Plutarchus Consol. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106 : rroVe ydp 

€v rjp.ip avrois ovk ^otip 6 ddparos I Kal rj (fujaip 'Hpa/cXeiror, rai;r tipai 

rdSt yap /HraTreirdna txtiwi (UTi iruitii/a jraXii- iiiTairiiroiiTa ravTa. 

IiXXlX. Aioii' iraii (iTTi waiCiof irtaafiav' nciifiiii: ^ jSaaiXijt'i]. 

LXXX. 'Eflifjjoiifii)* (fifoiUTili'. 

LXXSI, HoiapotiTt TOia-t airoitri i/iffaiiioiiii/ rt tai oIik f'/i^alyofiiv , 
tlpit T< Ka\ (Ak tiftf,: 

LXXXII. Kd/ioToe eoTi roit Quroir liOxSt'" «"' ap-)(ia$ai, 

LXXXIII. M.Taj3.iXX« ,i.a™v«-<K. 

LXXXIV. Kal i «VK.ijv fiiiWcTQl /.^ «<«d^t™i:. 

I jAXX V. NflfVEJ KOTTpiatV *lfj9Xip"OT(pOt, 

LXXXVI. r«i^f«i'Oi fimi (fltXouin /topovs t (;(«tv ' fiSXXoii fit 
nyajTaiifaBiu, tal iralSar jcaT-aX(iirot;crI ^dpouc yiria6ai. 

LXXXVII. Pliitarchus de Orac. def. 11, p. 415: oi ^v 

"jlffiain-os" dtayivaaxofrfs (apud Hcsiod. fr. 163 Goettliug) ln( 
TpuiiiovTa jTMoCcri Tfli' ytvtif xaS "HpaKXtiTo;' ' iy f XP°'"P ytyyarra 
napixft Tic e'J aSrou ■yeyti'i'^fH'woi' i ■ycrv^irac. 

LXXXVni. lo. LjdM (le MensibiB iii. 10, p. 37 ed. Bonn : 

ray dirA fuivd^os ^£^f TfTpayayyiitv □, S', ^, t^^ o6zv otiK tijr& irKOTTOV 
'MpiiiAtlTos yrviay riy /i^ya xaXei. 

LXXXIX. Ex homine in tricennio poteat avua haberi. 

XC. M. Antoninus tI. 42 : tniyrtc ih ir airorfXur/ia avyijyyov^ty, 
oi (tip fJddroii ica'i irapOKd^ovSijnuas, oi Se dyfTTurraTas ' aancp koI toiis 
KaBtvbovTas, alpat, n HpaNXe^Tcif tpydrai ilyai ^tyri K(n rrvvfpyoiis Taty , 

XOl. Svviy (W. ndal rh <l,poyiciv. ^iy y6^ Xtyoyras iV;(iip.'feffflQI 
XPn ''¥ ^'""j' Trayrav, OK(i><nrip yofuf woktc tai iroXu la'Xi'p'Tipas, Tpe- 
tpovrai yap irdyrtc ol dyffpametoi yo/ici utto ivAi tdD Stlov ' Kpariti yap 
TouovToc or:6uap iBiXtt koi ('|opKf'(( noai xai n-epiyi'ttrai. 

sen. ToC \6yov 8' ('c;«-OE |uvo2, fi-HJo^l nl ttdXXdI it iSi'^j- (•;{<.«■.[ 

XOIir. *Ql ^XllTTU SlT)K«'ft)t D^iX.Wiri 

J) B.o0e'po»- 


XOIV. Ov du o>a"n€p Ka$€v8oirras nouiv kqI Xcyeif. 

XCV. Plutarchus de Superst. 3, p. 166: 6 'UpdicKciTos ^rjai, 

Tois cypfjyopoaiv cya /cat koivov K6arfiov €ivai, ratv dc KOifjuofievov eKaarov 
€is tdiop d'irofTTp€<f>€€r6ai, 

XO VI. YiBot yap dp6pam€iov fuv ovk e^ft yvoDfiaSf Ottov de cx**' 

XC vll. *Aw)p p^ios rJKovat irpos dalfwvos oKaanep ircus irp6s dvdp6s. 

XCVIII. Plato Hipp. mai. 289 B: fjol aal 'UpdKXeiTos rai^hv 

TovTo Xeyei, ov <rv eVayei, on dv6piiir<av 6 aof^itraros irpos Bthv irl&qKos 
(fiaveirai Koi a'o<f>ia Koi icaXXei kol ro7s akXots iraaip ; 

XCIX. Plato Hipp. mai. 289 A : ^ avOpaire, dyvotU on to tov 
'H/joicXeirou c^ ^X^^* ^^ "P** in6^K<t>v 6 KaWiaTos altrxpos aXX^ ^€1/61 
avfi^dXKeiVy koi xyrp&v ff /coXXion; alaxpo. irapBevnav ytvti crvfi^dWeiVf &s 
ffificriv Imrias 6 (ro(f)6s, 

C Mdx^arOai xph ^^^ drjfAov xmip rov v6fiov okohs vrrfp rcix^os. 
CI. Mopot yap fu^oves pA^ovas p.olpas \ay\dvov(n* 
CII. * Aprjicjmrovs deol npSicrt kcu avBponiroi, 
cm. Y^piv xpri a^cvvvfip /loXXoi/ ^ irvpKairjv. 

CIV. *Avdpamoi(n yiveaBai OKoa-a Bekovtri otK ap^ivov, povtros vyi€iau 
€Voii;<r€ ^v Koi dyaOoVy Xifios Kdpovy Kap-aros dvairavcriv* 

Ov. Qvpjt^ fidx^crBai ;^aX€7rdi'' o n yap hv XPV^Cv ytVec^ai, yj^vx^s 


VI. '\' * AvBpoyrroio'i Tram p^rean yiyvaxrKtiv eavroifs #cai a'o><f)pop€iv\> 

VII. I '2<o(f)povuv dprrt} /xcytWi; * koi <ro<^lri oKrjBea Xeycii/ Ka\ noi€iv 
Kara <f)v(nv enatoirras | . 

C V III. *A,pxiBirfv apeivov Kpxmrtiv ' tpyov 8e iv dvecrei Ka\ irap^ olvov. 
OIX. f Kpvnreiv dp^Blriv Kpttraop fj €S t6 p^trov <f)€p€iv f . 

OX. Nfi/iof Koi fiovXfj TTtlBecrBai €v6s» 

CXI. Tls yap avT&v p6os fj <t>pT}V 'y [d^fuoyj doibolai errovrai Kat 
didaar/caXo) ;(pc6>i^rai opJXto, ovk flddrts on ttoXXoI KaKol oXiyoi de dyaBoi* 
alptvvrai yap ev dvria irdvrtav oi apioroc, /cXcor divaov Bvrjr&v, ol Be ttoXXoi 
KeKdprjvTQi oKcocnrcp KTTjvea, 

CXII. *Ei/ Upi^vfj Bias €y€V€To 6 TevrdpeiOt ov ttXcwv Xoyof fj rS>y 

CXI V. 'AJiob 'Etjytaiois ^^ijioif airay^aSal irofff ml TOIC ili^j3oiE r^t 

* qf«BV fU)A( (U- Dl^lCTTOC (CTTW, <I ilc ^^i fl^X^ TF (a! )ifT HkXar. 

CX V. Kvitt Kol ffat{ovai in Sii liij yivAaKiaiTi, 
GXVl, ^AwtaTiif Siatpvyydvii fitf yinaiirKto^ai- 
CXVII. BXiJ .MpomoE fVl n-a«-l X6ya tVro^o-fln. (^lA«<. 
CXVin. io«d^,«. 6 8o«^i™ 
ca( dfjrij KaraX^i^craf tjrevSecaj/ Tticrotas Kai fiapTUftns. 

CXIX. Diogcnea Laert. is. 1: nip 6' 'o^,,poy l^«rf.(,- ,Ijin» 

■uf oyuvoi* tKpaXXfo-flnt unl poTriftirfloi, unl 'Apj(iXi;(oi' nfini'wt. 

CXX. Unus dies par omni eat. 

(jXXl* HBov ni'&pain^ Snitntn^- 

GXXII. 'fLr6p^av<: ^.'v» r,\,VTi,aavTat &fTTa nU rX^nn-i. nl 

CXXIII. 'EvSaii fAnrac intailimurBat loi ^iJXaitnr yivcaffai lyfpTi 
fuvnui- Kni iitxpuir. 

OXXIV. Ni-KTuroXoi, /jiyoi, Amx"'- ^^«"i M'''"'"- 

UXX V, Ta yap vofii^dptva kut i\v6jt^7Tm^s fivtrTtipm Afttpiiiirri 

CXXVI. Kol Tort dyuX^ao. rouT.'o<,r. .S^oi^a., 6*o:.* .t Ttr 
^'i/ioicri Xftr^'jvcl'nCTO, oS rt yivun-jnaii' drous' duS' Ijpaa!, niTivis ilvi. 

OXXvII. Ei fifj yAp AiowJtrp wo/iTi^ip «)rol<vvro koi Sfiww an-fio 
niJoioio-i, oBaiBfiTTaTa c'pyatrr 'iv ' imtis Si 'aSiji ini A(d"uor, iiTfoj 
^.lii-oiTai ml Xijcaffouirt. 

^ GXXVIII. lambliohns de Myst. v. 15; fli,(r.i^ t<»W>. rM,;.i 

SiTTa fifljj ' ra ^itt Till' njTOKfKaflcijjfMWl' wan-uTIocriJi nipfljiriiroiti, oEo tiji' 
(for nf TToTt yifoiTo rnTaviat, as ^ijirti' 'HpiiitXnTot, ^ rifui' oXiyuj' 
(tapiflfi^Tuw dvipmir " Ta fl* tviiXn (ill aapjiTonSii Kiii Sia piraffoXfjt 
•Tvnirraptra, o'a Toir (ti kht(;(o/i(1'oI! iWii rot o-ufAorot lipfidf". 

cxxrx. 'A«a. 

OXXX. Kodaipoirai Si n7/iaT< luati'otin'oi Surirfp Hv fi rit (t TTJiXny 
t/i^As TTTjX^ ajTovipoim. 


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